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Abstract
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) technology supports security threat de-
tection and response through real-time and historical analysis of security events from a range
of data sources. Through the retrieval of mass feedback from many components and security
systems within a computing environment, SIEMs are able to correlate and analyse events
with a view to incident detection.
The hypothesis of this study is that existing Security Information and Event Management
techniques and solutions can be complemented by location-based information provided by
feeder systems. In addition, and associated with the introduction of location information, it
is hypothesised that privacy-enforcing procedures on geolocation data in SIEMs and meta-
systems alike are necessary and enforceable.
The method for the study was to augment a SIEM, established for the collection of events in
an enterprise service management environment, with geo-location data. Through introducing
the location dimension, it was possible to expand the correlation rules of the SIEM with
location attributes and to see how this improved security confidence.
An important co-consideration is the effect on privacy, where location information of an
individual or system is propagated to a SIEM. With a theoretical consideration of the cur-
rent privacy directives and regulations (specifically as promulgated in the European Union),
privacy supporting techniques are introduced to diminish the accuracy of the location infor-
mation – while still enabling enhanced security analysis.
In the context of a European Union FP7 project relating to next generation SIEMs, the re-
sults of this work have been implemented based on systems, data, techniques and resilient
features of the MASSIF project. In particular, AlienVault has been used as a platform for
augmentation of a SIEM and an event set of several million events, collected over a three
month period, have formed the basis for the implementation and experimentation.
A “brute-force attack” misuse case scenario was selected to highlight the benefits of geoloca-
tion information as an enhancement to SIEM detection (and false-positive prevention).
With respect to privacy, a privacy model is introduced for SIEM frameworks. This model
utilises existing privacy legislation, that is most stringent in terms of privacy, as a basis.
An analysis of the implementation and testing is conducted, focusing equally on data security
and privacy, that is, assessing location-based information in enhancing SIEM capability in
ii
iii
advanced security detection, and, determining if privacy-enforcing procedures on geolocation
in SIEMs and other meta-systems are achievable and enforceable. Opportunities for geoloca-
tion enhancing various security techniques are considered, specifically for solving misuse cases
identified as existing problems in enterprise environments.
In summary the research shows that additional security confidence and insight can be achieved
through the augmentation of SIEM event information with geo-location information. Through
the use of spatial cloaking it is also possible to incorporate location information without com-
promising individual privacy. Overall the research reveals that there are significant benefits
for SIEMs to make use of geo-location in their analysis calculations, and that this can be
effectively conducted in ways which are acceptable to privacy considerations when considered
against prevailing privacy legislation and guidelines.
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“There’s a war out there, old friend. A world war. And it’s not about who
has got the most bullets. It’s about who controls the information. What we see
and hear, how we work, what we think...it’s all about the information!” –
Sneakers(1992)
1.1 Motivation
We knew for a long time this was coming - the great Information age. The influence of the
internet in daily lives is a congealing reality of modern day. Security analysts are tasked with
protecting information on networks facing a giant ocean of internet users, the count reaching
3 billion users[28] in 2014.
Advancing internet security tools to aid analysts in their efforts is a top priority within IT
security research. The effectiveness of current procedures with fast-evolving technologies are
re-assessed continually to stay a jump ahead of the user masses. In times where the concept
of Identity still struggles to solidify itself on this mammoth world platform, strong security is
cardinal.
To safeguard really large networks with many targetable users there are many security ap-
proaches available, one of these is the use of Security Information and Event Management
(SIEM) technology. SIEM technology can be defined concisely as tools and processes for cen-
tralised real-time log event collection, integration and analysis in a distributed system. Using
a centralised approach, SIEM tools can provide unified interfaces for disparate data, real-time
correlation of different events in different parts of the system for early threat detection[6]. Ad-
ministrators can utilise SIEMs to narrow down the large sets of security data generated from
the multitudes of events to data of relevance, producing thorough and efficient reports[13].
SIEM is a differentiation in its particular capability to quickly sift through a sea of security
and log data detecting behaviours in networks that indicate malfeasance.
According to industry research firm Frost&Sullivan, the world-wide market for SIEM systems
are predicted to grow to $1.3 billion US Dollars in 2015, rising from $680 million in 2009[39].
Looking at SIEM technologies today, in order to maintain a strong hold their advancement
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must be prioritised; questions on the current approach and methods of data analysis for secu-
rity need to be assessed. Referring to the definition of SIEMs, the technology’s primal focus
is on the excavation of security event data from all possible sources for intelligent analysis.
The potential of the data received by the SIEM directly influences the culmination potential
of a SIEMs evaluatory abilities. The data that can be exploited from networks are now more
richer in content and source, for until recent years the internet had not been incorporated
with so many levels of devices. Remote sensing technology, for example, was generally known
to have very limited capabilities for handling vector data proving unsuitable for network anal-
ysis and high quality plotting which are best done with vector format data[38]. Though at
present, this is no longer the case. Current remote sensing technology provides compilation
and analysis of data from the ground, atmosphere, and sky with links to Global Positioning
System (GPS) data, Geographical Information Systems (GIS) data layers and functions, and
other new modelling capabilities[51]. This data, often present in logs sent to SIEM collectors
are rarely exploited for any security analysis procedures. Thus, the decided task, to evaluate
these new data avenues in augmenting SIEM security analysis techniques, is a salient one.
The central theme of this study focuses on geolocation as an insufficiently exploited channel
in these fields and determining the value it can bring to data management and security.
Especially today, in the wake of increasing terrorism concerns, governments and commercial
companies around the world are looking to remote sensing and GIS to support security initia-
tives. When it comes to analysing data with physical relevance, using geolocation data offers
a potential aid in monitoring and managing security operations.
Other possibilities of geolocation applicability is linked to the nature of the network being
used. Should the criteria of physical location be an important aspect in the security and
surveillance of the network, it becomes all the more useful.
A GIS itself can be seen as a versatile yet fundamental information management system. It
offers strong ability of data transferring, data management and data analysis [33].
With the rising applications of geolocation for exploitation in all areas of technology it can
prove to be more elemental with its incorporation. The study therefore centers on augmenting
SIEM frameworks with the discovery of geolocation data exploitation techniques than can be
capitalised on further than its basic use at present.
This research is focused on the missing exploitation gap between SIEMs as the security tools
and the data they mine, specifically geolocation data, when advancing security to cope with
the security challenges faced today. GIS applications were investigated in their use of geolo-
cation that could be applied by SIEMs in security analysis.
However, the addition of new data realms brings along with it its own bone of contention.
User geolocation data comes with significant privacy concerns in many countries, with efforts
to creating legislative restrictions - understandably so - on the use and storage of this data.
The second component of this thesis, focused on ensuring this additionally exploited data is
‘defending the defender’ by carrying out efforts towards ensuring user data privacy.
With focus equally on both security and privacy it is aimed to highlight the protection of user
data as a fragile balance between enforcing and violating rights. The tools used to mine user
data can be seen analogous to the firearm debate; the destructive or constructive potential
hinged solely on the possessor, safe usage procedures need to be implicated leaving trust to
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the mechanism rather, than on the bundle of contradictions that is man.
The following hypothesis is set forth addressing the research intentions with respect to SIEMs
and geolocation data;
1.2 Hypothesis
• Location-based information enhances SIEM capability to perform advanced security
detection.
• Privacy-enforcing procedures on geolocation in SIEMs and meta-systems alike are nec-
essary and enforceable.
1.3 MASSIF
Recognising the importance of new generation SIEMs, the EU funded a large-scale FP71
project to investigate the topic surrounding advanced SIEMs. The project ran for the dura-
tion of September 2010 to October 2013. This research was concluded in the context of, and
draws reference from, the scope and activities of this project.
The purpose of MASSIF was to achieve the following - an advanced SIEM Framework, defined
as “a framework that aids the compilation and processing of security events from various lay-
ers down to the low level network components, physical sensing devices and business related
applications through methods that are trustworthy, resilient and secure[40]”.
Location-based approaches were not at the time a focus in the project so this work facilitated
a contribution to this approach. The research was sufficiently independent to benefit from
the use-case scenarios and ‘testbed’ of the MASSIF project but independent of the timeline
or the deliverables of it.
1.3.1 Scenarios
The project, MAnagement of Security and events in Service InFrastructures (MASSIF), con-
sidered and investigated the topic of advancement in selected scenario environments. Using
an approach focusing heavily on requirements, these environments are used as the foundation
for extracting them; encouraging an advanced SIEM by providing solutions to specified needs
rather than determining how to collectively satisfy potential users in loosely guided advance-
ment aims. It makes use of these scenarios to provide design guidelines, using the scenario
requirements as the challenges for research, adaptation, testing and evaluation.
1 See http://www.massif-project.eu/
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 4
The use-case based approach is applied in four scenarios as seen in Figure 1.1. These selected
industrial domains serve as a source of requirements to validate and demonstrate project re-
sults:
Figure 1.1: The Scenarios of MASSIF
1. Olympic Games IT infrastructure. The processing of huge amounts of generated data
events in real time, deployed and managed by partner Atos.
2. Mobile phone based money transfer service, facing security events, especially for the
“non-IT” and “service” events. This was handled by partner France Telecom.
3. Critical Infrastructure, such as a dam, using advancing concepts of SIEM to support
their Information Technology (IT) system, managed by partner Epsilon.
4. Managed IT outsource services with a high degree of complexity in setting up SIEM
systems for large distributed enterprises. This was managed by T-Systems SA.
This research work will be carried out within the Managed Enterprise Service Infrastructure
scenario, sourcing environment data from scenario provider T-Systems International SA2
(TSSA).
1.3.2 The Managed Enterprise Environment
TSSA is a typical example of a Managed Enterprise environment in industry with a large
presence in the enterprise platform functioning as a global IT outsource service provider.
Most often, the clients for TSSA are classified as very-large enterprises. The MASSIF project
looked to contribute solving problems which current SIEM systems are facing to strengthen
the resiliency and business continuity requirements of such large companies.
The main requirements of the managed enterprise service infrastructure (MESI) scenario were;
(1) to improve the ability of service providers to identify and manage security attacks and;
(2) increase security of enterprise information systems through the deployment of advanced
security detection techniques.
2http://www.t-systems.co.za
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Misuse Cases
The MESI scenario identified five misuse cases that apply to its environment and need to be
addressed in the advancement of SIEMs to aid a better application of SIEM in this kind of
distributed environment. These misuse cases identify the top five threats persistently encoun-
tered by security administrators within the live enterprise scenario.
The misuse cases are listed with their corresponding ID (MC-X.Y.Z) given in context to
the MASSIF project documentation; such that MC stands for Misuse Case, and X.Y links
to the section listing the final approved misuse cases in the official Scenario Requirements
Deliverable 2.1.1[41]. Finally, Z is the number allocated to the misuse case itself.
• MC-5.5.1 The Brute-Force Password Attack
• MC-5.5.2 Un-authorised Login to a computer system, network or application
• MC-5.5.3 SQL Injection
• MC-5.5.4 Session Hijacking through Cross-Site Scripting
• MC-5.5.5 Worm Propogation
Addressing these challenges put forth by the environment aligns with the objectives of this
study. Within the scope of research there are two industry SIEMs that are investigated in
MASSIF, namely, Alienvault Open Source SIeM (OSSIM)3 and 6Cure4.
Alienvault’s OSSIM is a leading innovative SIEM product and provides an open source version
available to users all over the world. Gartner5 identifies OSSIM as one of the visionaries in
the SIEM market, proving salient in the influence of effective SIEMS. Figure 1.2 shows the
Gartner Magic Quadrant for SIEM frameworks in 2013.
This SIEM solution was additionally incorporated into research investigations and facilitated
part of the testbed experiments of enhancing SIEMs with geolocation. TSSA provided the
environment data in which they manage security services for their clients as source data used
in the experiment.
1.3.3 Context: Involved Partners
The project running for three years till the end of 2013, set out to demonstrate the advance-




• Télécom SudParis (IT), France.
3http://www.alienvault.com
4http://www.6cure.com
5Technology research firm Gartner, is the leading global provider of independent and objective technology
related research and advice. See http://www.gartner.com
6 See http://www.massif-project.eu/partners
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Figure 1.2: Gartner Magic Quadrant for SIEM Frameworks
• Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology (Fraunhofer SIT), Germany.
• Institution of the Russian Academy of Sciences St.Petersburg Institute for Informatics
and Automation of RAS (SPIIRAS), Russia.
• Consorzio Interuniversitario Nazionale per l’Informatica (CINI), Italy.
• Distributed Systems Laboratory, Universidad Politcnica de Madrid (UPM), Spain
• Fundaao da Faculdade de Ciencias da Universidade de Lisboa (FFCUL), Portugal.
and industry use case providers,
• Atos Research and Innovation (ATOS), Spain.
• Orange Labs - France Telecom (FT), France.
• T-Systems South Africa (TSSA), South Africa.
• Epsilon srl, Italy.
as the contributors to the project.
1.4 Methodology
The methodology applied comprised of an investigative research approach using the MASSIF
platform for experimental application. The primary research objective concerned advancing
SIEMs with geolocation and was carried out in two main steps;
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• An investigative study into security methods capitalising on geolocation data in order
to assess geolocation credibility in the field of security; and conducting research into the
need for privacy enforcement of systems carrying personally identifiable data. For the
latter, a privacy model for meta-systems such as SIEMs is introduced based on privacy
legislation.
• The use of location-based information was investigated in Managed Enterprises, making
use of the final stages highlighted in Figure 1.3, in MASSIFs use-case based approach.
Figure 1.3: The MASSIF Approach[22]
The study focused on the experimental tool integrations in the final stages, 6 and 7,
where the adaptation and validation of scenarios with the MASSIF tools are performed.
The primary result of the tool adaptation and validation was to determine the applica-
tion of tools in each scenario and their contribution to each context.
For this research, using these stages, we contributed and performed experimentations
with location information in the Managed Enterprise scenario for the security augmen-
tation.
The conclusions drawn from our investigations in terms of location-based security and meta-
system privacy were applied to the managed enterprise scenario testbed and achieved through
some selected tools of MASSIF and an Alienvault OSSIM SIEM solution.
1.4.1 Research Approach
Using the conclusions drawn from the investigative study and learning from the MASSIF
project, an existing SIEM Framework was evaluated to determine if GIS methods can be
applied to the security challenges discovered and can be seen as apt and applicable solutions
to address them. Once applicability was determined, further study was carried out to explore
the integration of GIS into an existing SIEM. Using a feasible integration, an integrated pro-
totype was created and tested. The privacy implications of geolocation data and its use were
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 8
addressed, investigating its adherence in the prototype experiment.
The identified security issues in enterprise are applied to SIEMs and methods of addressing
them were discussed. The success of the privacy and security solutions determined, if carried
forward across to SIEMs, can augment SIEMs in the predicted future and strategise the
longevity of these frameworks as security giants of technology.
1.5 Thesis Outline
This thesis is divided into two main sections, SIEM Security and SIEM Privacy. It encapsu-
lates the efforts of applying geolocation information to strengthen these two areas in SIEM
technologies. The thesis continues henceforth with Chapter 2, a background study on SIEMs
and the position of geolocation today. In chapter 3, SIEMs and Security are discussed, patic-
ularly the application of security augmented with geolocation. Chapter 4 investigates SIEMs
and Privacy, how concerns of privacy can be addressed in SIEMs with personal data like
geolocation. This follows the experimental design and testbed architecture in Chapter 5. In
the implementation, Chapter 6, the technical procedures and strategy utilised in the proto-
type developed as the proof of concept are documented. The prototype results are confirmed
through test executions and inspection of the applied test data in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 eval-
uates the results of the implementation in the context of determining overall SIEM advantage
in terms of security, efficiency, and adaptability. The methods used are also evaluated and
interpreted in their approach conclusions. Finally, in Chapter 9, a summary of findings is
provided and an affirmation of the goals of this research is presented, closing with recommen-
dations for future work.
Figure 1.4: Thesis Mind Map
Chapter 2
Background
The following chapter concerns the definition of SIEM technology, defining components of the
SIEM, from the low-level collection to the interface at high level. Common security analysis
techniques used by a SIEM framework are discussed to provide insight in the provisions and
expectations of a typical SIEM. The methods of security data management and exploitation
for analytics are primary aspects of concern. Geographic co-ordinate data and it’s applica-
tion in various security-enforcing systems through GIS are investigated. The advantages of
geolocation (geographic location) data are discussed in the context of SIEM augmentation in
areas of security and privacy. The two areas are then investigated in detail in the chapters
following.
2.1 SIEM Overview
Security information and event management (SIEM) is an approach to security management
with the focal intention of providing a holistic view of IT security within an organisation. The
term is a combination of two functions, Security Information Management(SIM) and Security
Event Management(SEM).
2.1.1 SIEM Components
A typical SIEM framework can be seen as nothing more than a large security management
layer set across existing systems and security controls. It unifies security data through low
level devices to high level application sources, acting like a cosmic security lens. The un-
derlying tools and process structures required to support this data conglomeration, however,
requires a considerably high level of technical expertise. The four major SIEM functions on
the centralised data can be seen as log consolidation, threat correlation, incident management
and reporting[57].
The framework has two main components, as mentioned earlier, the SIM component and
the SEM component. The SIM provides log management, the collecting and logging of all
supporting regulatory compliance data as well as internal threat management, resource ac-
cess monitoring and all other security-relevant information. The SEM concerns itself with
event correlation, intrustion detection and incident response[6]. Both of these components
are viewed together as a combined concept - SIEM.
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The SIM component receives data from multiple sources - intrusion detection systems, syslog
tools, firewalls, vulnerability scanners and any sensor agents deployed to retrieve security rele-
vant information. This data is then collected, combined and centrally stored in logs, typically
secured with encryption procedures. The SEM is tasked to use these amalgamated logs for
data mining activities such as correlation of events, real-time monitoring, tracking data assets
and scanning for vulnerabilities.
The SEM typically has highly developed reporting capabilities, administrators and managers
of the system can be interested in variant statistics and data or may need independent reports
for different compliance requirements[6].
The combined tools provide the following minimum functionalities as a SIEM:
• Log collection and drill down analysis capabilities
• Event, file integrity and user activity monitoring
• Event normalisation and aggregation
• Correlation rules, security policies
• Real-time monitoring
• Incident response, alerts, messages
• Statistical analysis and feedback
Further functionalities that can be provided from application to interface level to be used by
analyst and security administrators vary on the distribution of SIEM that is chosen. SIEM
tools have been widely developed in industry with many SIEM solutions available, some of
which are present in the field of open source. Depending on their various approaches each
have a specific overall goal to offer, aiming to meet user expectations in their best practices,
with solutions often providing more than less.
2.1.2 SIEM Architecture
The data that is collected from various sources by the SIEM is aggregated - combined into
a single stream, then normalised - translated into standardised format[3]. This is done to
reduce duplicates and accelerate the subsequent analysis. It is then correlated between data
sources and analysed against rules defined by vendors, users or correlation algorithms created
by security analysts. This process aids the provision of real-time incident/event reporting
and alerting of events that need handling. The resulting data is stored in a secure manner
with methods such as encryption, to ensure data integrity, which allows them to use it as
evidence in investigations or for meeting compliance requirements. The SIEM also provides
maintenance and authoring of correlation rules, often supporting rules that can execute based
on arbitrary conditions as well as anomalous behaviour. An example of such a rule is a
negative condition rule, where the absence of an event over a period of time executes a rule,
such as a backup process that misses a scheduled routine[3]. Figure 2.1 depicts this flow of
information processes throughout the various areas within the SIEM machine.
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Figure 2.1: SIEM Architecture Reference[3]
Information gathering & Normalisation
• Event Sources.
SIEM collects data from the network (including servers like Domain Name Servers
(DNS), web servers, Active Directory (AD) servers, database servers and resources such
as switches, routers, hosts, databases, application logs, vulnerability management sys-
tems, firewalls, anti-malware systems, honey-pots, and Intrusion Detection Systems.
Other less traditional sources of data include Identity and Access Management (IAM)
systems, occupancy sensors or the lighting systems they control, Closed Circuit Televi-
sion (CCTV) systems, fire control systems, power management systems, and any other
system that can provide applicable data that aids in defining a security event in the
enterprise. A SIEM system can basically take almost any data that can be digitized
and, through a proper rule-set, create a useful output[3].
• De-duplication & Normalisation
Data can either be sourced directly into inventory from sources or through the process of
agent collectors. The two important factors that need to be considered before correlation
are de-duplication and normalisation. These procedures are the first stage in efforts to
remove the clutter of noisy data and retain the usefulness. De-duplication removes
repetition and simliarly normalisation standardises the data and removes redundancies.
The data is then dispatched to the application agents for ensuing correlation procedures.
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Data to Information Layer
• Event Database.
A SIEM establishes an early warning system to take helpful preventative actions, pro-
viding alerts, messages or generating relevant statistics for investigation. This type of
information is generated from the preceding analysis and correlation and are stored in
the event database to be sent through to the user interface.
• Correlation Engine.
Functionalities such as event correlation are very powerful procedures that do the magic
of going through tons of event network data and spotting the interesting, odd bits that
analysts can precede investigations with. Event correlation is more powerful than the
entire event aggregation. An example of the magic in correlating data, is in the case of
a large number of messages from different nodes in a distributed system being directed
towards the same destination node, this sort of pattern is indicative of a distributed
denial attack launched by the system[6].
• Knowledge Base.
As part of the implementation of a SIEM solution, tuning is performed to reduce
false positive alerts so that the device is giving relevant information to each specific
environment[3]. With the use of important context such as security policies and cus-
tomer status we can avoid the threshold for false positives in alarms and statistic predic-
tions. Analysing current vulnerabilities requires a fundamental application of knowledge
when mining security events for malicious activity.
Presentation and Interface
• Security Operations Center (SOC).
The Security Operations Center is the area that delivers the mined security data in
formats that provide the utmost usefulness to a user/system on the receiving end. The
data is given in statistical formats, such as reports, graphs. Alerts generated provide
response procedures, and of course the data itself is delivered as it is received for real-
time analysis and monitoring.
• SOC Interface.
At the interface, the output can be delivered to response systems, third parties, system
analysts, ticketing systems or maintenance systems. It all depends on the the system in
which the SIEM is placed and how it prefers to perform its next step of defence after it
has received the incriminating evidence and indications. Business Intelligence is a very
important part of applying a SIEM correctly to a system. As the needs of a business
change, in turn so do the vulnerabilities and operations which requires different rules
and data feeds to achieve the business objectives of the SIEM system[3].
2.1.3 SIEM Benefit Summary
A SIEM framework can help gain centralised visibility, leverage the value of existing in-
vestments and prepare for potential threats that could compromise their business-critical
information assets[3]. Overall, SIEM is an approach that can provide powerful insights with
the strength of conglomeration and intelligent data mining. Of course, the effectiveness of a
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SIEM is stringent on the rules and policies put in place and its deployment correctly applied
to the relevant environment. This requires skilled analysts and know-how if it is to effec-
tively extrapolate the benefits of such a giant management service. Using a SOC approach
it helps an organisation focus on data patterns from all over the network, predict the net-
works behaviour in cases of possible security incidents. Advances in correlation and analysis
of events is a saviour in large data volume situations which is a matter that is all the more
increasing in the times of the Information age. With the evolution to an “ Internet of things ”
more devices are IP enabled and providing data that can be digitized and applied in security
analysis, without the use of correlative analysis techniques data interpretation would be an
astronomical task[26].
SIEM will continue to play a vital role as a strong security handler of large data, with its
mining, integrity and quick response real-time monitoring abilities.
In the next section some of the main analysis tools used in SIEMs are discussed and how they
approach data to identify anomalies.
2.2 SIEM Security Analysis Techniques
In this section, elemental techniques applied in SIEMs are described and the various ingenu-
ities that are administered to sniff out malicious user intention. These tools focus on specific
qualities of the data to mine intelligent patterns that can trace irregularities, it can also be
determined if geolocation data can benefit within these mining techniques.
2.2.1 Event Normalisation
A SIEM framework performs the task of centrally combining all security data for unified
analysis, normalisation is the process that makes this possible. The process of taking raw
data input and extracting only relevant fields is called normalisation, for example, when
collecting data from various sources, the range and formats in which the data is received
varies extensively. These events are converted into a standardised format using a generic
schema, not only does this help combining data but it also aids better comparison of events.
The main purpose of the event normalisation technique is to create this common event format
which all source data can be translated into, enabling the unified comparison and collection
of information across the entire network.
2.2.2 Event Correlation
Security events need to be analysed from as many sources as possible to aid threat assess-
ment for the appropriate response, the greater the number of sources the better the potential
situational awareness can be invoked. From this, enters samaritan methods such as event
correlation. Event correlation is a technique for analysing a large number of events and indi-
cating the few events that are really important in that mass of information.
Correlation is the process of transforming a sequence of events matching certain conditions
to output an event. The output event is an indication of a triggered alarm to indicate the
identification of a pattern. These patterns are event sequences corresponding to suspicious
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behaviour such as cyber attacks or an unauthorised login. Listed below are just a few of the
many attacks that correlation rules can detect through their pattern-based analysis:
• Web service attacks (e.g. SQL injections, cross site scripting, etc.)
• Bruteforce authentication attacks across protocols (e.g. Secure Shell (SSH), Lightweight
Directory Access (LDAP))
• Policy violations (e.g. the use of torrents, anonymous proxies)
• Distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS)
The events generated from the correlation process are sent to the server as an event from the
SIEM sensors, and is stored in the SIEM databases to keep a record of the triggering event
incident. The real-time correlation of events greatly aids security administrators in filtering
through the extensive loads of security events entering the SIEM framework and highlight
data of security relevance, indicating activity with high potential of malfeasance.
2.2.3 Process Mining
Some advanced tools used for the evaluation of security events make use of process mining.
This concerns the extraction of knowledge of a business process from sources such as process
execution logs. This alternate perspective of mining aims to gain insight from varied views
such as process flow control and performance[50].
In such cases, the tool analyses the known-control flow of the event-driven processes involved
against any deviations from required security properties for that environment. Deviations
can be found from anomalies caused by attacker interactions, problems incurred with mea-
surements(e.g loss of events) or an evolution in the process specification[27].
Figure 2.2 is an example of event processing performed by MASSIFs process mining tool[27],
the Predictive Security Analyser (PSA); to use this technique, there a few steps that need to
be followed. First, certain security requirements are identified that the event-driven processes
need to adhere to, sort of like the business rules of a process flow.
These rules are specifications of the required security properties the monitored process should
adhere to. Process specifications can be determined from process discovery tools e.g. Petri
Net specifications can converted by ProM, a downloadable process mining tool1 that caters
for many modeling languages.
After the requirements have been determined a process model is created that will encompass
the incoming events and the events themselves need to be made available in real-time through
a collecting process.
If a critical state is incurred (violation of business rules) the tool provides a process-oriented
visualisation of the problem, providing a method of situational awareness of process states
and alarm generation methods that can be directed to reporting into the central response
center of a SIEM.
1http://www.promtools.org/prom6/
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Figure 2.2: PSA Event Processing[27]
2.2.4 Attack Graphs
Security violations in a network can be caused by many factors such as security policy er-
rors, system vulnerabilities, incorrect configurations and other security miscalculations. A
malicious agent will use such vulnerabilities in the network as methods for penetration of the
system. An assault follows a chain of attacks from one point of entry to the intended target
machine. This includes different network resources and a myriad of different types of attack
actions. The step-by-step compromise can realise different security threats and possibilities
in network compromise.
An attack graph is a route calculation taken by an attacker through system vulnerabilities.
The graph can be seen as a collection of scenarios showing the various methods in which a
malicious agent can compromise a target system. The correctness of a graph refers to the
mitigation of an attacker route. The execution is successful or correct if the attacker cannot
reach the intended target of compromise. The level of correctness is defined as a security
property[55]. An example of a security property in a computer network would be a statement
like the intruder cannot get root access on the web server. similiar to the security requirements
required in the process mining tool process discussed earlier.
In SIEM systems, the security administrator is tasked with checking network configurations
and security procedures to mitigate the level of vulnerability. Through the use of these graphs
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the administrator can perform security checks at various stages:
Exploitation Stage Current security event and alerts can be taken into account as well as
changes in the configurations of computer networks. This includes the identification
of new vulnerabilities, attack exploits and services to be added. The analysis is a
continuous process of network monitoring, vulnerability assessment and security level
evaluation.
System Design, First Stage Analysis The specifications of network configuration and se-
curity policies facilitate the main input for performing security analysis.
Operational Stage The main input is the actual parameters of the network configuration
and security policy including the alarm and security event sequences.
Therefore, system administrators would use such a tool to determine the security measures
that need to be deployed to patch the detected vulnerabilities[55].
2.3 The Power of GeoLocation
A person’s location can be just as, or more valuable, than a persons identity for either justice
or the opposite depending on the application. If applied to computer science this refers to
the two main fields, Security and Privacy.
To support the motivations of this research, the following questions with regards to geographic
data are raised:
1. What can geolocation (geographic location) provide for SIEMs? Is it significant?
2. How does geolocation feature in global privacy concerns?
3. Can geolocation augment tools already existing within the SIEM?
The investigation is lead through attempts to answer these queries, starting with an initial
exploration of geographic data and its application in GIS applications.
2.3.1 Core Offerings
Geography, is an integrative discipline that can be applied in a wide range of areas dealing
with spatial components. Geographic information systems(GIS) are versatile yet fundamental
information management systems. They offer strong ability of data transferring, data man-
agement and data analysis [33].
The advantages of applying geolocation to provide various functionalities to a network or
distributed system are summarised below:
• Visualisation
Visualisation is a key aspect in the application of GIS, this generally infers that large
sets of complicated data are represented graphically. By doing this, information dis-
played is actually absorbed into the human visual system directly rather than being
read, interpreted, depicted, then processed, this encourages a much faster response and
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 17
analytic ability of the person. It also supplies a more accessible and realistic visual
expression of static security assessment[33]. By exploiting this ability, information can
be used more effectively and help a user make more sound decisions as well discover
problems faster.
• Dealing with large amounts of data
GIS has a powerful ability to display and manage large data. It offers an effective tool
in dealing with large scales of data and engineering of data more directly[33]. Dealing
with copious amounts of information is a long standing issue that drives the efficiency
of a network. Information filtering needs to be balanced between what information is
relevant at the time, what is contextually important and what is neither. GIS can be
seen as an apt solution for such a situation.
• Data transferring, data management and data analysis
A lot of the data is dull and redundant, with GIS one can engineer the data more
efficiently as it proves to be an effective tool for data transferring, data management
and data analysis [33]. The collective management of data and other aspects can all be
facilitated within GIS.
• Focus on the User
Having a friendly interface implies ease of use, data comprehension and can be seen in
terms of a security officer having to analyse a situation in a timely manner. This is
an important aspect for end user satisfaction as it determines how well or productive a
system is. One can consider the creation of a user-specific GIS system. The versatility
of such a system enables it to be used not only as an information management tool but
also a decision support system. With more focus on the usability and the end-users
needs more efficiency in response and decision making is advocated.
• Selective display
Liu[33] states ‘different information should be displayed in different ways’. The purpose
of this is to allow administrative users to focus on related data in the area of concern
enabling them to pay attention or point out the weak points of a system.
The concept of geographical perspective is applied through the use of geolocation on
networks or stand-alone systems. This perspective can also be used to examine the
reliability and vulnerability of infrastructure[46].
GIS has also been applied to determine the efficiencies of a system. Using overlays of energy
distribution within a physical system, information is gathered on where energy is being used
and patterns of energy usage. Locational values assigned to each bus present on the system
is geo-referenced with the energy map overlays resulting in correlated information that can
help accomplish adequacy and overall security system benefit[23].
2.3.2 Where you are: Matter of Security and Privacy
The possible use of geolocation for supporting the security measures in a system and it’s
role in privacy is an important consideration best examined through the existing systems or
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networks that apply this data in such a context.
The various implementations of geolocation through GIS that augment security to provide
some of the benefits mentioned are discussed in this section.
GIS has been used to create a command and control infrastructure for the protection of crit-
ical infrastructures[64]. Using a geographical information system as the common semantic
foundation in presenting and analysing its data. The concept of selective display is also used
whereby information is visually shared with - where necessary - downgraded information de-
pending on what needs to be imparted. Modeling and simulation of infrastructure elements
as well as the interdependencies and risks to them is done on this system[64].
An example of GIS being integrated in a security system is ESRI with SAP[13]. It is used to
visualise the state of the computer system instead of having physical detectors . The physical
detection of systems using actual visualisation of the system can help provide better intrusion
detection [13]. The concept of using GIS for the protection of critical infrastructures had
already been introduced in 2003 when the Open GIS Consortium formed a pilot initiative for
a limited regional area (north-eastern US and south-eastern Canada)[64].
The application of a visual mathematical model for intrusion detection using GIS[59] has been
implemented. Though it should be noted here the GIS aspect is simply the final phase using
the basis of location to relate all models in the network. This facilitates a lot of collaborated
useful information as a result. The intrusion model itself uses an abstract geometric approach
to intrusion detection. Geometric models enable the possibilities of combination and predic-
tion. Information that is visually presented is much more naturally and easily processed by
humans. The model is suggested to improve the performance of an intrusion detection sys-
tem. It proposes a standard by which to encode and characterise complex systems as well as
a visual model to present information in a context - where data is presented as relationships
between components[59]. To limit the computational requirements current intrusion detec-
tion systems tend to focus on a limited set of system and user attributes, thus, the dynamic
behaviour of a hostile user across a networked system is hard to encapsulate and characterise
with such a limited set[59]. The model attempts to overcome this with a completely different
approach to how systems security data are modelled. This visual model can be created for all
computers on the network with a semantic basis of physical geographical location to view the
activities of the network nodes. The collaborative information drawn from this can help trace
dynamic intrusion detections on the network. Using these behavioural patterns determined
from dynamic behaviour one can further help the early detection of intrusion and ensure
network protection.
One of the primary uses of GIS-based systems is the ability to visually correlate information.It
has a foundation for integrating varied types of information that needs to be selectively dis-
played for decision makers, enabling them to quickly judge a situation or potential risk before
time[64]. An important aspect of GIS is the capability of providing situational awareness,
providing invaluable context to a situation to enable timely reaction and enable more accurate
decisions.
An example of the potential applicability of GIS was the previously mentioned power system
static security assessment[33]. Using GIS as its base for security analysis, it highlights very
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important advantages which current SIEM Frameworks can be evaluated against. The main
aspect of GIS applied was ‘Visualisation’, displaying large complicated data information with
visual figures[33]. It can abstract useful information from complicated data quickly. It needs
to be determined what existing tools in SIEMs convert complicated data into understandable
data and how the data is currently given and summarized to users. After which it needs to
be evaluated whether GIS can contribute better results. Aspects such as selective display
and friendly user interface are also very important aspects to take into account. Customising
the data according to user needs can help form an invaluable contribution to better decision
making. The creation of general views allows users to hide lower level data and pay attention
to the weak points of a system in relation to its overall position, this can give key information
to structural weaknesses. The contextualisation through geolocation can be further extended
to represent the vulnerability of infrastructure components to a far wider range of potential
threats. Taking into consideration the fact that vulnerability is dependent on the type of
attack, it is also possible to change the level of vulnerability enabling dynamic calculations
of effects on the system. Thus, GIS approaches can be utilized to promote a more ‘joined up’
approach to resilience planning for physical assets such as critical infrastructures[29].
Currently, within existing SIEM frameworks the data generated to provide security informa-
tion has considerate potential for strong security enforcement depending on how this informa-
tion is exploited. Additional information that can be gathered from the low-level devices is
geographic location but it is not yet exploited to much extent in SIEMs. Without the analy-
sis of data with respect to location a significant gap in the aspect of efficient security is present.
The security event management component in a SIEM consists of processing events from
security and network devices. Event information gathered from various devices would become
more useful if supplied with location data. This can then be mapped using GIS techniques to
help relate and monitor the physical status of network and the consideration of compromise
at any point.
SIEM data can be related with geolocation to formulate contextual input which encourages
speedy analysis for large systems. It can also aid security assessment reporting in line with
other assessments in an existing SIEM.
It can facilitate an acceleration of behaviour in the areas of detection, preparedness, preven-
tion, response and recovery. This is due to its ability to provide ‘situational awareness’ which
has become a fundamental aspect for better decision making of large systems.
SIEM Frameworks retrieve masses of feedback on all components and security events within
a system, the ability to filter and evaluate this data needs the highest attention to enable
timely reaction and prevention. Unarguably, the effectiveness of SIEM depends on this very
aspect, which could possibly be assisted by the integrative discipline of GIS.
The assuaging proposition of geolocation in SIEM, through the advantages discussed, brings
in the second consideration - the privacy concerns surrounding geographic data location.
Geographic data in some country regulations is considered personally identifiable information
as sensitive as ones own name and surname. The incorporation of geolocation in SIEM needs
to be evaluated with an assurance that data rights are kept secure while augmenting security
in one or more of the ways towards advancing SIEM capabilities.
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2.4 Summary
SIEM technologies can be defined as holistic approaches to security analysis and detection.
The framework centralises and performs mining procedures on the collected data to produce
insights into the conditions of all devices and systems being monitored. The methods applied
for security data management and exploitation for analytics are a primary concern. Common
security techniques used within SIEM are discussed and considered in their contributive abil-
ities to incident detection and response in the context of a SIEM platform. This concludes
the contextual description of SIEM from high level to component level, highlighting the var-
ious technical methods in security analysis used by these SIEM technologies. Geographic
location has assorted applications in the areas of security and analytics filtering. The main
contributive attributes of geolocation can be condensed into the following:
• Enhanced visualisation
• Aiding user preparedness and rapid response
• Selective display, isolating errors or situations
• Predictive modeling
• Better network analysis and simulation
• Improved decision making
• Facilitating dynamic visual intrusion detection
• Risk assessment of assets with physical relevance
The advantages of geolocation reviewed from various applications in security systems indicate
the possible augmentation of security within a SIEM. In the chapters to follow, geolocation
is considered for specified security challenges within a managed enterprise environment and
in the considerations of privacy for data within a SIEM environment.
Chapter 3
Security, SIEMs and Location
“Hardware is easy to protect: lock it in a room, chain it to a desk, or buy a
spare. Information poses more of a problem. It can exist in more than one place;
be transported halfway across the planet in seconds; and be stolen without your
knowledge.”
– Bruce Schneier, Security Expert
3.1 Where is Security Now?
The problems faced by organisations, SIEM frameworks, and all security devices alike identify
concerns that need to be addressed in current security battlefield strategies. At an RSA Con-
ference, McAfee’s Chief Security Officer summarised the key trends and drivers of security[11]
today as;
(1) data mobility through applications/software,
(2) the advent of the cloud,
(3) concerns in regulatory compliance
and lastly,
(4) emerging threats in network and data security.
These four corners are reviewed to gauge the current position of IT security and the measures
available applying to SIEM and other security management devices. Major threats identified
particularly within the managed enterprise environment are also discussed as part of current
security concerns. The use of geolocation to augment the identified problems in these areas
is considered, and is regarded as the salient point of this chapter.
3.1.1 Mobility
Mobile devices, the cloud, social media and various other non-standard applications are in-
creasing ease of data use. The provision of personal data transfer, constant data access,
anywhere, any place are now seen as standard features in technology. The trend induces
security implications at a large scale with wide-reaching data control and access impended
to the average user. Security analysts require a contextual view of user data patterns and
collective authentication methods. This is embedded through awareness of multiple factors
applied centrally to a users behaviour. Thus, multi-level authentication requirements are a
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result of the progressions emerging through technology shifts today.
Influentially, due to data mobility and the cloud, user identity and authentication have be-
come chief focal points in security systems. The necessity of situational awareness propagated
by the removal of physical restrictions in data realms, is a vital requirement. Situational
awareness for security analysts can be seen as the ability to identify and comprehend all in-
formation/factors concerning the surroundings of the environments and user activity under
observation. User authentication is supported significantly through this practice, the provi-
sion of context to an authentication activity gives administration better ability in discerning
suspicious activity from normal traffic.
3.1.2 The Cloud
The cloud is a large contributor to technology change, the platform extends boundaries de-
creasing physical limitations and facilitating powerful resources, large capacity storage and
other services. In the advent of cloud services achieving status as mainstream solutions in
ICT, the issues concerning privacy and security increase[3]. The provision of Security-as-
a-Service (SaaS) to enable the level of computation and resources for traffic analysis gives
security an edge on much needed performance in high load capacities. As attacks grow in
complexity and become more sophisticated, a prime outcome of security applied in the cloud
is a form of “Global Threat Intelligence”. A cloud-based threat intelligence tool will make
use of threat information from users all over the world. The gathering of attack intelligence
from a broad customer base, using internet traffic patterns from around the globe supports a
stronger prevention approach from collective knowledge.
Many organizations however, are reluctant to embrace cloud technologies, at least in part,
because of concerns about the security approaches to their data and applications. Perhaps
foremost among those concerns is the risk resulting from digital assets residing on cloud
servers in locations they may consider undesirable, such as countries with differing security
and privacy laws. An organization may not be willing, or ready, to have its data subject
to multiple sets of laws and to allow the location of its data to change without warning as
dictated by the internal decisions of the cloud provider.
The general solution to this issue is the contractual agreement with cloud providers not to
allow workloads to reside in certain geographic areas. Cloud geolocation techniques can facil-
itate this requirement through identification of approximate geographic locations of servers.
This approach however is primitive and does not encompass security considerations, work-
loads can quite easily be shifted into undesirable servers through manipulation of the data
on geolocation. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), developed a
method for trusted geolocation in the cloud. The technique involves cryptographic hash gen-
eration representing geolocation information for a cloud server. The hash is stored within
the server Basic Input/Output System (BIOS), securing it from alterations whilst allowing
access by management processes. The server BIOS is considered a better source of trust than
reliance on software-based information[54].
CHAPTER 3. SECURITY, SIEMS AND LOCATION 23
3.1.3 Regulatory and Compliance
Regulatory needs concern all national and international laws that require adherence from
businesses. In addition to this, there are industry specific best practices that either specify
or insist compliance with, in some cases this involves internal policies and requirements. The
encompassing arena of law regulations range from privacy through the European Protection
Directive, the Personal Information Protection Law in Japan to Financial Services Agency
(Japan) banking rules, HIPAA rules for healthcare and international rules like that of the
PCI in the payment card industry or other simple policies of enterprise[3].
Considerations with regards to data privacy and rights control has become a central focus
for countries and conglomerations responsible for regulatory enforcement. Legislations such
as the Data Protection Directive and Regulation Proposal provided by the European Union
(EU) are major contributers, particularly in regard to the advent of privacy protection with
mobility and the cloud.
Efforts in regulatory compliance for SIEM are considered in chapter 4 as a principle facet of
privacy considerations, legislations such as EU legislative documents are discussed and their
implications to a SIEM environment.
3.1.4 Emerging Threats
Despite the billions spent every year on IT security, over 80% of organisations expect to be
breached every year[7]. Threats faced by networks and systems over the web are getting
more sophisticated. Time decreases in exploits, strategic attacks targeting valuable resources
and environments and Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)’s shaping the biggest problems of
security organisations.
An APT is a network attack whereby a user intends to keep access to the network for a long
period of time. Typically, a hacker attempts to get in and out as fast as possible without
alerting an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) or administration but in this case the hacker
wants to be in as long as possible - undetected[52]. The purpose is to steal information from
target organisations, such hackers are paid for their services and are skilled adversaries.
3.2 Threats in Managed Enterprise Environments
Cyber attacks have continued to advance in frequency and intensity since last year with the
focus shifting back to large organisations. In a 2014 survey by PricewaterhouseCoopers1 the
fraction of large organisations successfully hacked has risen up to almost a quarter this year i.e
one in four large organisations partaking the survey reported penetration of their networks[7].
Clients in managed enterprise environments are typically in the large to really-large category.
The attacks carried out within their networks have strong consequences, the requirement for
timely detection and response being critical factors in such high data capacities.
As the scenario/data providers for this research, TSSA identified the following attacks as
persistent problems within their environment:
1http://www.pwc.com
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• MC-5.5.1 Brute-Force Password Attack
The Brute force misuse case is a common method for password hacking in enterprise
due to the many users being the likely weak point for infiltration. A Brute-force at-
tack essentially follows its name in that it floods an account authentication entry with
combinations till it discovers the username/password from sheer brute force guesswork
applications.
Due to factors such as end-user predictability and automated scripts success is quite
often achieved and are usually the entry points to getting into a network to compromise
an account with higher privileges and accesses.
• MC-5.5.2 Unauthorized Login to a Computer System, Network or Applica-
tion
Unauthorised login is when a malicious user compromises an account and uses it to
change permissions, gain access to resources or information, amongst other activites of
ill intent. This is the route taken by hackers carrying out APTs and is a prevalent is-
sue in large organisations often keeping confidential information and other data of high
business value.
• MC-5.5.3 SQL Injection
This attack is commmonly used to extract information from a vulnerable website e.g,
system configuration details, stored credit card data, passwords etc. Code injection
essentially applies to any applicable code such as SQL, HTML, XML and OS command
injection. Arguably, the most prevalent injection is the SQL injection. For SQL injec-
tions to work, the attacker has to jump out of the original SQL statement and append
his own query[43].
This is done with a meta character such as the ’ inserted in fields where user data is
meant to be received. The flaw depends on SQLs inability to distinguish between the
control and data planes.
• MC-5.5.4 Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
XSS is actually what can be considered as a subset of HTML injection. This attempt is
usually the compromise of a system through malware installation or cookie hijacking,
used to impersonate a user. An attacker redirects a users web browser to a site hosting
malicious code and tricks him to execute it, which gives the attacker the ability to put
malicious code into websites they do not own.
Cross Site Scripting attacks work by embedding script tags in URLs/HTTP requests
and enticing unsuspecting users to click on them, ensuring that the malicious javascript
gets executed on the victim’s machine. These attacks leverage the trust between the
user and the server and the fact that there is no input/output validation on the server
to reject javascript or other active code[43].
A waterhole attack in XSS is finding a website that is trusted by users and injecting
code into it, so the target user a hacker attempts to compromise clicks on the “trusted”
page and becomes the entry point. One of the main problems with these attacks is that
they can be easy to carry out using tools like the Browser Exploitation Framework2
2http://beefproject.com
CHAPTER 3. SECURITY, SIEMS AND LOCATION 25
• MC-5.5.5 Worm Propagation
A self-propogating virus that spreads through a computer network, malicious code that
users do not want running on their system. It manages to spread by replicating itself over
the network, an example effect, through muliplication it uses up a computers resources
and causes shutdown[17].
3.3 A proposal: Geolocation for Identification
The use of geotechnology has previously been limited to content delivery networks (CDNs)
and for the purposes of target advertising[37]. In these instances it was required to determine
the location of customers as accurately as possible to determine the best route for application
requests to the nearest available data center, optimising user performance. This also applied
in the case of advertising, using location to deliver context-aware advertisements for more ef-
fective results. With the increasing accuracy of geolocation through technology advancements
more cases for applying the data have emerged.
While advertising and performance related considerations are still applied, location-based
networking has encompassed a broader scope. The use of location-based access restrictions
and context-aware security is a significant case of application, becoming more crucial with
the increase of user mobility[37].
The following matrix is constructed (Table 3.1) indicating geolocation centric security proce-
dures that can strengthen efforts in the four driving areas of security:





Rule detection based on geolocation





The suggested geolocation security techniques are discussed and analysed in terms of its
proposed effect in the areas of mobility, cloud service, threats, and compliance. For each
technique that applies in the area of threat detection, a misuse table is listed indicating
which of the misuse cases for the managed enterprise (in section 3.2) can be addressed by the
solution.
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3.3.1 Location-based Security Authentication
Using contextual information such as user geolocation as a way of corroborating a users
identity is a key method of increasing the assurance level from an existing authentication
procedure. With regard to user authentication through contextual data sourcing, Gartner
predicts by 2016 more than 30% of enterprises will use ‘contextual’ analytics for remote
access, rising significantly from 2% as of 2014[2].
Location-based Authentication
Mobility
Using geolocation as a second-level authentication criteria as step-up or pro-
gressive authentication can facilitate stronger security for mobile users
using the mobile factor as a positive security application. Alternatively
a more granular approach towards transaction level verification could
be considered.
For example, if a users phone is out-of-bounds from a bank card the
transaction can either be disallowed or further security authentication
questions requested of the user.
Mastercard embraced the use of such a geolocation strategy just this
year, as an opt-in service users can carry out transactions when their
mobile phones are switched on within a specific geolocation abroad[42].
Using mobile phones as One Time Password (OTP) tokens as an effort
towards tokenless solutions of authentication mechanisms is a proabable
direction in banking security[2].
Adaptive access control using mobility features and geolocation can gear a
trust authentication approach. Focusing on what a user has, in addi-
tion to what a user is and knows aids collective trust. Various levels
of security can be set and adjusted depending on the accredited items
within possession of a user that can verify his/her identity[31].The user
authentication level depends on the number of tokens they can provide
when authenticating - this can apply to mobile-location-as-a-token.
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Threats Using process mining tools described in subsection 2.2.3 business process rules
can be identified taking user location into account as part of authentication
process monitoring. An example of security requirements within a logon/lo-
gout authentication process:
1. A user logout must be preceded by a user login. (login count == 0)
2. A user should not login if they have not previously logged out. (login
count <= 1)
3. A user logging in from IP address x with location z should not logout
from location !(area range of z) within time T (where T is maximum
time of physical possibility e.g 30 mins).
4. A user should not login if source of location z is not in accepted location
for that user.
5. There cannot be two LogonIDs for a session.
6. Special privileges assigned to new logon cannot have preceding logon
failure attempt event.
A second application considered in threat identification, is the use of loca-
tion in procedures where physical access is a requirement. This refers to the
example case of administrators working in a critical infrastructure environ-
ment such as a dam. The control systems are often automated to a certain
degree and are known common hacker targets; this is also partly due to easy
password setups by administrators, the nature arising from the need to log in
easily when a system failure occurs in such critical environments. Since the
administrator is expected to IN the control center of the dam building, the
concept of in-region verification is feasible and can be significant in countering
system compromise through password limitations.
An implementation to provide this method with geolocation can be facili-
tated through the use of a lightweight protocol called Echo. This proto-
col addresses in-region verification through sound and radio frequency signal
propagation[53].
Applicable to:
MC-5.5.1 MC-5.5.2 MC-5.5.3 MC-5.5.4 MC-5.5.5
X X
Table 3.3: Location-based Security Authenticaton
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3.3.2 Location-based Access Restrictions
Current location sources in some cases e.g IP addresses, are not a strong enough source for
authentication. It is not suggested to authenticate a user solely based on their geolocation
in such cases. Geolocation has a strong presence on the internet but it is not feasible to give
it the power of aunthentication in all areas of application when location is not sourced from
tamper-proof methods. However, blocking a location based on suspicious proxy use or activity
can be seen as an acceptable method in attack prevention.
Location-based Access Restrictions
Mobility The alternative to contextual authentication is the denial or restriction of ac-
cess based on location. This approach proves more feasible for fraud prevention
purposes. The approach used by MasterCard can be seen as a combination
of location-based authentication and access. If the user is outside (x,y) range
he/she is restricted from performing transactions through the card.
The method of restriction applies to situations when avoiding known ‘bad’ lo-
cations is preferred to pinpointing the ‘right’ location. For example, restricting
access from Russia, when the user is actively using their phone/devices from
an entirely different country.
Threats IP Reputation used in SIEMs like OSSIM to detect these attacks, can be
supported using geolocation-based blocking. Traffic from certain places that
exhibit obvious malicious behavior often such as SQL injection and XSS at-
tacks, can be denied, e.g China locations with no client present within that
region.
Often IP addresses are using proxies. The technical workaround for this is
that proxies/CDN’s will add an X-Forwarded-For header that tells you the
IP address of the actual user but this is not a sound solution for all contexts.
Therefore, geolocation in these cases shouldnt be a criteria for giving access
but that does not mean it isnt a valid criteria for blocking access.
Applicable to:
MC-5.5.1 MC-5.5.2 MC-5.5.3 MC-5.5.4 MC-5.5.5
X X X
Regulatory Previously in crytographic concerns regarding SSL, technologies that enabled
128-bit key certificates were not allowed to be exported out of the United
States. The restriction applied to all digital content including browsers. Re-
strictions such as these were obstreperous to enforce mainly due to the fact
that geolocation technology was a primitive concept at the time and often
inaccurate[37].
However, such restrictions can be applied to technologies specifically that in
areas of security and cryptography aided through well-developed geolocation
technology that can successfully enforce access restrictions
Table 3.4: Location-based Access Restrictions
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3.3.3 Location-based Policies
There is a host of regulatory requirements needing consideration. Organisations in the past
were required to prove their adherence to such rules, but this has changed to demonstrating
continous compliance. The reduction of the complexity can be aided though the use of
geolocation corroborated with security management frameworks, like SIEMs[3].
Location-based Policies
Cloud Cloud workload distribution with geolocation can help and ensure data is
within the desired country to keep ‘within’ law and rights of specific country
data rights.
Another challenge that can addressed is that of cloud computing. Global load
balancing configurations can be levered through the use of geolocation data
considerations. This can aid public and private cloud implementations in es-
sential purposes such as disaster recovery[37].
With cloud services reaching mainstream status, they are now targeted by
organised crime or used themselves to carry out crime. In both cases public
enforcement agencies will require access to data held on systems for forensics
or to collect information on suspects. Such forensic data can often be located
in foreign jurisdictions or unknown locations. Building cloud services with
location-aware structures aids the enforcement agencies in tracking and juris-
diction consideration awareness for forensic evidence.
In the same regard, law enforced access can cause security and privacy con-
cerns for users, such as in the case of Microsoft Office 365 in 2011. Microsoft
was unable to guarantee european customers that their data wouldn’t be ac-
cessed by agencies under US jurisdictions. Similiarly the dutch government
suggested ‘US’-based cloud service suppliers be exlcuded from handling gov-
ernment or citizen data due to the risk of access by US authorities[60]. These
risks can be mitigated providing assurance to users and government organisa-
tions through the enforcement of location-based policies and practices within
the cloud and its security sectors.
Regulatory When talking compliance with regards specifically to management of an or-
ganisation’s requirements in log retention, SIEMs have a stronghold in best
fulfilling that purpose. Geographic restrictions with data movement arising
from such compliance requirements are salient matters of concern.
Examination of the locations of log data to prevent compliance invalidation
need to be performed. Creating security policies/rules to verify geolocations
within security frameworks such as SIEMs supports the compliance for the
entire organisational system, enforcing it in a collateral effort of organisation
protection.
Table 3.5: Location-based Policies
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3.3.4 Geographic Visualisation
A visualisation method puts the data information into the human visual system directly,
through this users can abstract useful information from complicated data quickly[34].
The presentation of the collected data on infrastructure elements and environmental con-
ditions as well as the integration into relevant information that is immediately required by
decision makers can occur in a number of different views depending on the task at hand.
Geographical information systems can provide this contextualization as well as a founda-
tion for integrating the varied types of information that must be aggregated and selectively
displayed for decision makers.
Geographic Visualisation
Cloud Just as accurate geolocation data has valuable benefits in terms of security and
performance of web applications and resources, it also provides greater busi-
ness value and insight through enhanced visibility. Business value and insight
come from discerning the clients location and from additional data provided
by geolocation. For example, geolocation can be used in defined areas, such
as those established by Designated Market Areas (DMAs) and Metropolitan
Statistical Areas (MSAs), to derive deep demographic data that becomes part
of the application request context and can be subsequently incorporated into
analytical evaluation of visitor and customer web application interaction[37].
The provision of situational awareness for security analysts of networks and
communications on the cloud is a large contributory factor to incident detec-
tion and system monitoring capabilities
Mobility &
Threats
The provision of situational awareness for security analysts for mobile devices
and other applications plays a role detection of suspicious user activity.
Enhanced visualisation through geolocation allows analysts to evaluate
user movement patterns against other user data that correlate with these
patterns. Anomalies that arise from conflicting data can flag unauthorised
users roaming the networks through compromised accounts.
Applicable to:
MC-5.5.1 MC-5.5.2 MC-5.5.3 MC-5.5.4 MC-5.5.5
X X
Table 3.6: Geographic Visualisation
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3.3.5 Rule Detection based on Geolocation
The exploitation of user geographic location can be carried out through the definition of
the conditions that characterise such data, in terms of limitations and behavioural patterns.
Using the specifics of the data type to aid the identification of anomalous user activity in the
geographic paradigm further supports the isolation of threat activity and narrowing down of
false positives.
Rule Detection based on Geolocation
Threats The exploitation of geolocation as a verification mechanism is a viable route
of investigation considering the data availability and significance in trends
such as mobility and the cloud. Using client geolocation data, security rules
can be written to trigger anomalous behaviours in geographic footprints. An
example extract application summarised in pseudocode for rule detection to
trigger fraud possibilities:




Depending on the type of organisation, geolocation can be used for
many detection rules taking this data as a method of continous verifica-
tion considering the convenience of location-enabled mobile phones on the rise.
Applicable to:
MC-5.5.1 MC-5.5.2 MC-5.5.3 MC-5.5.4 MC-5.5.5
X X
Table 3.7: Location-based Rules
3.4 Geographic Data Accuracy
When geolocation data is highly accurate, it can be employed across a broader set of functions
that might depend on or be enhanced by having access to that information.
The key is to ensure the geolocation technology is, in fact, as accurate as possible. This often
requires that a solution wishing to take advantage of geolocation capabilities must look to
an outside source. The traditional methods of geolocation have depended upon public IP
address registries, which are now highly suspect in regard to accuracy and thus cannot be
depended upon to provide valid location information. Using a trusted third-party source for
location determination enables solutions to apply location-based policies with a high degree
of assurance that the data is accurate. This level of accuracy permits a broader set of uses for
geolocation technology[37]. In security, the SIEM technologies would need to locate without
any dependance on the client to provide this information, of course to rule out the chance of
being provided with false information, and alternatively proven legitimately accurate through
the system.
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The most common and effective accuracy methods in determining a users location from IP
address are:
1. Constraint-Based Geolocation (CBG)
This involves measuring delays from active vantage points, places that we know the
exact location of. The distance is calculated using the time delay difference from the
place we know and the place we want to know, narrowing down into a radius of distance.
2. Topology based geolocation
This involves CBG that considers network topological information in calculations.
3. Octant (Cornell University)
This involves CBG, router locations, geographical and demographic information in es-
timations.
All of the above mentioned are effective accuracy determining methods that can be applied
across the globe, however the problem here is regarding our specific application. The level
of accuracy needs to be able to pinpoint a subject in some security rule applications within
a distance radius of a few metres. In 2011, a method was discovered by Yong Wang[61],
that builds on the above mentioned methods going further to street-level accuracy client-
independant IP geolocation.
3.4.1 Wang’s Accuracy Method
The method determined provides geographical data with a street-level accuracy utilising just
the Internet Protocol (IP) address of the target computer. The procedure is as follows:
1. The initial step towards narrowing down the accuracy of a users location focuses on Point
of Interest (POI)’s. Organisations typically host their websites on servers stored on the
premises, the IP addresses of the servers are therefore tied to their physical location.
Through the use of Google Maps, the team extracted web and physical addresses of
such organisations accumulating data points of 76000 places as landmark points needed
in the second step.
2. The target computer is pinged, the time taken to send a data packet to the target is used
to calculate the distance. This is the CBG technique narrowing the possible location
down to a radius of around 200 kilometres.
3. Within the radius determined from step 2, data packets are sent to landmark servers
contained in that geographic range to find the routers through which they go through.
4. If a landmark machine and the target computer share the same router, comparisons
can be made between the time taken for a data packet to reach each machine from the
router, converting this to distance estimates narrows down the search area significantly
further shrinking the area size.
5. Finally the landmark search is repeated at a granular level, determining the closest
landmark server to the target.
On average the results fall within 690 metres of the target up to as close as 100 metres,
sufficient enough for identification of the target computer at a physical location within a few
blocks[61].
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Limitations and Workarounds
Regardless of the geolocation accuracy method used, proper identification can be avoided
by routing traffic through a proxy server which will provide a geographic location elsewhere.
According to MaxMind3, a open-source provider of geolocation information for IPs, the av-
erage statistics shown in Table 3.8 of data they have collected indicating the sources of bad
reputation IP addresses are:
Bad IP Reputation
7% High Risk Countries
25% Country Mismatch
39% Proxies
Table 3.8: MaxMind bad IP Reputation source statistics
With proxies, at the highest of 39% we can see that location verification can be hindered most
often through efforts such as suspicious proxies. Wang affirmed the inability to get around
proxies through his method but can facilitate the detection of a proxy, preventing the return
of false positives and highlighting addresses that are using proxies.
Therefore, identification of IP address locations can encompass checks for proxy, if there is
indication of a proxy, the proxy address can be run against collected information of anonymous
proxies through global intelligence data of bad IP reputation databases. Depending on the
reports received from these sources, the IP can be blocked as the security measure. There may
be something wrong with authenticating a person based on their geolocation but there isn’t
anything against blocking a suspected suspicious location(discussed in Table 3.4) or proxy.
3.5 Summary
The driving areas of security today are subcategorised into four main areas of concern - data
mobility, the advent of cloud technology, compliance in legal and regulatory facets, and the
emerging threats in the information age. Using these four corners as points of reference, the
rising trends, concerns and methods surfacing to address the raised considerations are exam-
ined.
Mobility provides the challenge in security with respect to user identity and authentication,
the flexibility of multiplatform use introduces various security implications and considerations.
The requisition of situational awareness is encouraged to support security analyst decisions
in minimal time spaces when evaluating the criticality of a situation.
Secondly, the cloud is a large contributing factor to technology change, extending physical
and virtual boundaries. Many companies however are reluctant to embrace the concept due to
the surrounding concerns of legal implications in data ownership. The suggested solutions are
based around contractual agreements with cloud providers or trusted cloud based procedures
3http://www.maxmind.com, provider of geolocation estimates of IP addresses
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using techniques such as cryptographic hashing.
Regulatory compliance is the third main area of concern, whereby many legalities are affected
by the implications of the preceeding trends, mainly mobility and cloud technology. The chief
issue rotating around the concerns of user privacy and data ownership.
The fourth area is the evaluation of the current attack trends affecting organisations, enter-
prises and networks today. Of these advanced persistent threats are highlighted as a critical
issue in todays security. Threats within managed enterprises identified from the real enter-
prise in which this study is based, are examined. These misuse case identified main attacks
that need to be addressed better in such environments, which are; brute-force attempts on
passwords, unauthorised log in attempts, cross-site scripting techniques, SQL injection and
worm propagation.
Geolocation for identification is proposed as a solution in an effort to mitigate these attacks.
A matrix of security techniques are mapped to addressing the driving areas of concern in
security discussed earlier. Each geographic-centric security approach is collated with appli-
cable areas and misuse cases identified from the managed enterprise. The application of the
solution to the applicable issues are given.
Lastly, an investigation into determining the accuracy of geolocation data, to aid useful ap-
plication of this field to produce correct results is discussed. A summary of techniques are
provided with the best solution determined through a combination of all methods, the limi-
tations and workarounds of solution are also provided.
In conclusion, geolocation can be applied in many intuitive ways to enhance SIEM in secu-
rity. A few of the main applications were considered for security enhancement and detection.
The most important outcome for this chapter of research is location-based identification and
authentication procedures for alarm triggering within a SIEM. Visualisation for data analy-
sis was also discussed as a contributive factor with aiding security analysts in their filtering
techniques.
While solutions for future cloud-based SIEMs using geolocation was briefly discussed here, it
is introduced to support the research of geolocation in security, further investigation into the
application in a cloud is considered future work and out of the current research scope.
Chapter 4
Privacy, SIEMs and Location
Sed quis custodiet custodes ipsos?
“But who will guard the guardians?”
– Juvenal (Satire VI, lines 347-8)
4.1 Our Data
The position of data privacy and its role in the information age is argued by renowned security
expert Bruce Schneier as being an enforcer of a critical sense of self ownership. Users leave
traces of their data in daily activities like ATMS, tolls, and surfing the internet, these traces
are the data shadow of a user. An entity withholding this information can directly influence
the life of the user, having removed the physical limitations such as the need to break into a
home to find infringing information. One’s data determines if a user can get a loan, get on a
plane, get into a country. A stronger hold on user data and its basic rights is required in the
overwhelming data capacity of the internet and its continuous expansion.
Discussions around privacy with arguments against the implied criticality of the responsibil-
ity is often given as a “I have nothing to hide” argument. The argument expresses a form
of personal responsibility as the solution, the onus being on the user to be careful and have
no incriminating activities. Schneier regards it as the most common response used against
advocates for privacy. The general public most often classify the stressed priority given to
data privacy as exaggerated concern; when it should be perceived as the second half of inter-
net security, with the unified aim of protecting an individual from adversaries they can and
cannot see. Users can be misused with, what privacy expert Paul Ohm coins our database of
ruin[49], whereby sensitive information can be used to deframe or blackmail using the simple
power of that information we dont want to be known. To get such information a physical
break-in would have been necessary, but today we are addressing the simple urgency that
those physical boundaries we depended on need to be modelled in the virtual world to every
system that stores our data, and control who has the keys to it.
Unfortunately it is not a simple procedure, the process of defending data rights, in the virtual
realm of the ‘internet of things’. Techniques employed for the free flow of data on the internet,
pre-processed with privacy-ensuring procedures, have been developed mainly to encourage the
ongoing distribution of information while compensating for individual privacy considerations.
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Among these procedures, the most common application is, or a variation of, data anonymi-
sation. An analysis into the effectiveness of such procedures is needed to determine if they
manage to fulfill the requirements of their implementational purpose.
4.1.1 Anonymisation
Anonymisation allows user data to retain some of it’s information whilst screening the prop-
erties one can identify. It is used to provide statistics while making efforts to keeping user
privacy intact. This concept has been well received by the various groups involved in pursuing
the privacy of individuals and is applied in many fields at many levels of internet security.
However, the success of this method when applied in industry requires further investigation.
One of the main issues that arise in industry, is determining what part of the user data falls
under the definition of “personally identifiable” that needs to be protected through proce-
dures such as anonymisation.
The concept of “personal” information is not a straightforward classification, almost all in-
formation can become “personal” when combined with other relevant data fields. The com-
parisons of collected seemingly generic information can make up the head and arms of a body
of sensitive information. This issue was proven in the case of Latanya Sweeney[56], who took
data released to the public and combined them to find the health records of the Governer
of Massachusetts. The only information needed was the zipcode, birthdate and gender to
identify the target person and marginalised the search scope through the identification of
combination anomalies.
It is for this reason, the fields of data available need to be evaluated in relational terms that
could aid re-identification from a culminated field effect.
With regards to the definition of personal information, geographic location is not considered
unilaterally as a type of personal data. Systems that utilise geolocation in networks and
devices often store this information in the clear. A 2013 study[14] by MIT and the Catholic
University of Louvain demonstrated the pitfall of incomplete privacy measures, whereby peo-
ple were identified from a collection of anonymised data through the use of only their geolo-
cation data fields present in the data sets. The researchers used 15 months of user mobility
geolocation data co-ordinates of test range of 1.5 million people on an area within a radius
of 100km. The results revealed there is evidently a close correlation between peoples identity
patterns and their movement patterns. The uniqueness and predictability of a user’s geo-
graphic footprints makes it fairly straightforward to reverse the efforts of the anonymisation
through this factor, resulting in a user’s re-identification.
The application of a privacy-enforcing method on geolocation is necessary to avoid this re-
identification that causes the failure of anonymisation entirely on the remaining fields. A
further investigation into anonymisation is required to determine a method of anonymising
the field of geolocation to prevent re-identification or otherwise determine if an alternate ap-
proach is required.
As in the case of the study by MIT, the effectiveness of anonymisation raised many questions
in privacy debates and was arguably claimed as not sound. In 2009, Ohm evaluated the work-
ings of anonymisation to determine the concerns on the solution in ensuring complete privacy.
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Ohm confirmed, re-identification from anonymised data was possible due to the paradoxical
situation arising of data utility over data privacy. It is made apparent that either utility or
privacy can be provisioned for but not both[62], anonymisation can only be successful if it is
completely curtaining data details, but this renders it unproductive.
As advocators of privacy, the debate is analysed in the context of utilising geolocation in
SIEMs. First, SIEMs are essentially meta-systems, collecting data about data. The NSA
court order discovered to freely accessing user metadata, was justified through the argument
that only meta-data was collected and not the actual data[45], however, mathematician Susan
Landau explained metadata is much more intrusive than the actual personal content. One
does not need the actual data most often it is the patterns - the ‘organised’ version describing
this data that provide all the necessary information.
If in the future, SIEMs are to be migrated into the cloud as a security-as-a-service, one of the
biggest areas of concern for this transition are the frameworks adaptability to legal consider-
ations in terms of privacy and various legal jurisdictions.
With regards to the SIEM in the existing scenario environment, the application of techniques
such as pseudonymisation have been applied to the data, with further data enforcements such
as data encryption and limited user access for different levels of personnel handling this data.
Geolocation is often present in the masses of information collected through devices from the
enterprise network and sent to a central management system for advanced analysis. The
geolocation used in these SIEMs is not obfuscated in any manner and is in fact processed and
viewed in the clear. SIEM frameworks need to introduce efforts in privacy of the raw data
collected by the system, such as geolocation, regardless of whether the data is exploited for
analysis or other procedures.
This discussion unfolds two main considerations of the research objectives in privacy; to de-
termine a suitable method of ensuring privacy enforcement on geolocation, and an approach
to mitigate the failures of anonymisation in SIEM frameworks as a whole that hold copious
amounts of information from every section of a monitored organisation.
The concern towards the privacy of SIEM frameworks as a whole is addressed in section 4.2
followed by the approach of geolocation privacy in section 4.3.
4.2 A SIEM Privacy Model
As it stands, for SIEMs and other data systems alike, techniques like anonymisation provide
proven limitations in their protection of user data. To enforce data privacy rights on these
systems the need for regulatory compliance is required. The law can aid the global adherence
to user protection as well as the method of approach in cross-border data transmission con-
siderations. Where the boundaries of technology are reached in ensuring privacy, regulations
need to play a role.
The managed enterprise scenario considered in this research is based on a managed IT out-
source environment, where events from multiple sources are collected centrally. The collection
of security events by SIEMs is becoming more widespread and can be identified under the
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growing notion of a type of big data in the security field[1]. The challenge with shared SIEM
services occurs where monitoring services may be provided by a third party organisation or
in a different country. This requires levels of event information sharing, consolidation and
aggregation.
There are many regulatory documents available to ensure various levels of privacy in systems,
though none as such directed to SIEMs themselves as a whole but rather components. There-
fore, in this section a privacy guideline is constructed based on existing approved benchmarks
of privacy enforcing legislations. Addressing the concepts of data protection and privacy
within this environment, relevant legislative documents are identified and summarised to
rules that apply to SIEMs.
4.2.1 Legal Documents: The European Union
The European Commission plays a major role in the privacy battlefield, with countries such
as Germany advocating the need for user protection in international data transfers and within
the country itself through facilities such as anopt-in as opposed to the opt-out approach. The
EU 2012 Privacy Regulation Proposal[9] COM 2012/0011, Personal Data transfer Sect 3.4.5
(V), Article 45, stipulates the conditions for information transfer to regulate the privacy rights
in the movement of data.
The relevant documents introducing data protection principles to be applied to organistions,
published by the Commission are;
• EU Data Privacy Directive 2009
• The proposed EU Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by competent
authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of
criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement of such
data Data Protection Directive 2012[15]
• Communication on ”Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World - A European Data
Protection Framework for the 21st Century” [10]
• EU 2012 Privacy Regulation Proposal[9]
The privacy requirements outlined in these documents need to be applied in the context of a
SIEM framework. The process of ensuring privacy can be enforced throughout the framework
by following a legislated standardisation. The implementation of the EU Directives varies
and can be interpreted in alternate ways, the existing Data Protection Directive is imple-
mented by member states in very different manners[30]. However, the same cannot be said
of the legislative EU Regulation documents. This differentiation occurring from the aim of
the respective documents, the purpose of an EU Regulation is to encourage a harmonisation
among member states, needing the application to thus be followed precisely[30].
The proposed EU Directive[15] is currently in the European Parliament and is yet to be
agreed on for adoption by the Parliament and Council. The guidelines set forth, are based
on this document as a commencement of SIEM technologies in applying legislative structures
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based on the most recent suggested privacy documentations. The EU legislative documents
are widely considered the strongest approaches of enforcing privacy than any other legal doc-
uments put forth in the areas of privacy preservation. A summarised overview is provided in
Figure 4.1, indicating the general areas stipulated in the proposed EU Directive [15].
Figure 4.1: Categorical Overview of the EU Directive[30]
The sections highlighted in Level 3; Data Subject Rights, Data Security, Authorisation Con-
trol and finally, Personal Data Transfer are discussed in their implications to SIEM manage-
ment approaches and their responsibilities as handlers of sensitive data.
Data Subject Rights
The foremost specification requirement of this section, is the explicit definition of what infor-
mation flowing with the SIEM is classified as “personal” data. As discussed earlier, failure to
correctly classify all data types in their sensitivity can lead to serious breaches of user privacy.
The SIEM framework needs to consider the following[30]:
◦ The classification of personal data, applying to all data types and formats within the
framework.
◦ The access and usage rights of the classified data. For example, IP addresses, RFID
tags, cookies storing user information.
◦ The examination of data held within the framework and the levels of privacy assured
to them depending on their classification.
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◦ The need to store user identity information in cases where the data is simply mined for
statistical evaluation (SIEM security reports) need to be evaluated.
The implementation of these requirements can be carried out through the construction of
access rules which allow the use of information to be governed under various privacy levels.
Differential privacy can be implemented in the DBMS layers, or through the use of crypto-
graphic keys at the various management levels[30].
Data Security
The articles specified under this section require the adherence in terms of automated data
processing. Specifications regarding the various areas of concern are listed in the following
areas:
(a) The control of access to all equipment
(b) The control of data media handling
(c) The control of storage access and changes
(d) The control of users utlising the SIEM framework. In this case, these are the security
analysts and administrators.
(e) The control of access to data
(f) The control of communications within the system
(g) The control of input feeds received by the system
(h) The control of transport of data, communication, and storage.
(i) A recovery control process.
(j) Measurable reliability and integrity
The SIEM framework is required to assess if all the above principles are enforced in a log
system that records activity across all areas. This ensures the internal circulation of data
maintains a privacy trail in all communications.
Authorisation Control
The articles categorised in the area of authorisation control consist of specifications regarding
the person hierarchy to be implemented to oversee t he control systems specified within the
Data Security specifications stated previously.
The control authorisation to be monitored should consist of the following members[30]:
◦ Controller, a Controller is defined in Article 3, with the related responsibilities stated
in articles 18-24, with regards to rights and needs for process documentation.
◦ Processor, the definition of Processor is also defined in Article 3, and applicable re-
quiremens in articles 18-24.
CHAPTER 4. PRIVACY, SIEMS AND LOCATION 41
◦ Supervisory Bodies, A board of supervisors assigned for the SIEM framework need
to be assigned; these members oversee the data Processors ensuring they don’t abuse
their permissions and rights on data processing[18]. They also ensure the rights of data
subject are heard and acccounted for. There may be more than one supervisory body
assigned to different areas of framework (for example, incident detection supervisory
and system analyst supervisory), if so the mutual assistance must be facilitated across
all bodies. There can be more than one supervisory bodies to ensure collaboration
between boards and if so they must ensure mutual assistance amongst themselves.
◦ Data Protection Officer (DPO), described with regulation requirements stated in
articles 30 -32 needs to be assigned to ensure data protection and privacy with the SIEM
framework[30].
The documenting of all processes and communications between these members need to be
documented and recorded.
Personal Data Transfer
The definitions for personal data transfer concern the movement of data, within or external
to the current environment. The following considerations are necessary with regards to the
consistent application of privacy[30]:
◦ The Data Protection Officer assigned is particularly responsible to ensure the consistent
application of data privacy, a global DPO can be assigned to check for the privacy is
ensured through the transfer, receiving reports from all relevant officers in the transfer.
◦ The biggest concern is the harmonisation across different jurisdictions in terms of data
privacy and handling. The approach of using a global DPO and where possible only
providing the data that is necessary(required by the receiving end), can aid this consid-
eration.
The most important concern stressed in the articles of this section is the harmonisation of
data privacy internally and specifically with cross-border situations; a common occurence
when overseeing very large enterprises, such as those typically monitored by a SIEM frame-
work.
In summary, the explicit implications towards SIEM environments extracted from the data
directive, are critical components in ensuring a privacy infrastructure support for an entire
monitored enterprise.
The implementation of data protection and privacy is needed for Security Information and
Event Management (SIEM) Frameworks, we need to make explicit the associated require-
ments for an SIEM framework. In particular, roles need to be clearly defined for an SIEM
system (for example processor, controller etc.) and the SIEM itself needs to be treated as a
processing system of an organisation. This means that the data residing in the system needs
to be made explicit, with the retention and storing or processing purposes made known and
documented. A data protection officer should be assigned, with responsibility for the SIEM
system in the same manner as other systems.
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Given the potential sensitivity of data collected by a SIEM this needs to be done very carefully.
Techniques of full anonymisation or aggregation can also be enforced where applicable. Rules
for processing jurisdiction could either be agreed contractually with SIEM providers, or there
may be ways to embed such meta-information into the processing rules of cloud or other
service providers so that Service Level Agreements can be implemented to guide and control
how security processing is conducted.
Further requirements specified by the Regulation include the establishment of a European
Data Board, enforcing the explicit consent of a data subject, possibly by existing methods
such as ’opt-in’, enforcing consistency mechanisms, data protection certification, codes of
conduct for the SIEM workforce, time limits for the processing of data, further authorised
member documenting, identifying types of personal data and treating them with different
levels of privacy and finally stricter enforcements of data subject rights.
4.3 Defending the Defender
Internet monitoring often results in employers versus employees, where both parties are fight-
ing to protect their personal interests. Employees desire the conservation of their privacy
while employers are interested in protecting their company from misuse. SIEM log data col-
lects a range of information, with many streams of traffic containing traceable user footprints.
Therefore, server logs, email activity and other data requires a monitoring approach governed
under defined enterprise policies to avoid indiscriminate employee monitoring. A second legal
concern in SIEMs is the capturing of data but failure to exploit it. There may be political or
legal ramifications to having data and failing to take action on it. Though it is known that not
every piece of information cannot be thoroughly analysed there must be enough justification
present to withstand the questions on inability to act. In some cases concerning legal conse-
quence, to not have the data is a better option than to have it and be unable to act upon it[3].
Using legislation to shape standards at which one must aim towards for securing user data
interests is a necessity, being fully aware that in large enterprises cross-border data transfer
is also not uncommon. With this in mind, the application of adherence to privacy through
legislations is introduced. In addition to this, the second privacy consideration addressed
is that specifically of geolocation. This data type is often left in the ‘clear’ in source logs
and not catered for through encryption or any other privacy technique employed in system
processes. The failure to commit this data under privacy procedures abrogates any levels of
anonymisation carried out on the related fields of data containing it. The possible methods
that can be applied on this data are further discussed, for application in this research.
4.3.1 Geolocation Anonymisation
The consideration of privacy procedures to be applied to geolocation information differs from
the application to standard data field types such as username, date of birth. Anonymisation
for example, when applied in geolocation is not re-identifiable through collective fields, such
as the case discussed with Sweeney and the governer[56]. This is due to the nature of the
data type itself, geolocation is an identity ’at a point in time’ and is most often given as a
range due to the accuracy radius. Anonymisation can be correctly applied to geolocation in
efforts to ensuring privacy, based on this dynamic nature of the data type. The approach
used to facilitate this is defined as spatial cloaking. The general strategy of this approach
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is to increase the range of geolocation data. Rather than an exact data point, it becomes a
data point estimate within a radius or cloaking region. Identified methods applying varied
approaches to spatial cloaking are summarised with their advantages and costs.
• Two-tier spatial approaches involve only the user and the LBS provider[19]. Privacy/-
cloaking can be created through the use of redundant queries. A user u can generate
r random queries to the LBS, in addition the original query, thus hiding through the
creation of decoy locations. These transformation methods tend to incur low overhead
but provide privacy through a limited set of assumptions. This results in provision of
privacy only against attackers with little background knowledge.
• Cryptographic private information retrieval technology (PIR) allows a user to privately
retrieve information (through the use of an encrypted request) from a database , without
the database learning what information was requested by the user. It relies on the fact
that it is not computationally possible for an attacker to discover the value of i given
q(i) provides a high level of privacy that can even hold against skilled attackers, but this
comes with a significant overhead cost especially for large data sets. In terms of SIEM
applicability, the method can be good but it is not feasible if it affects performance.
• Hybrid approaches utilise a combination of geographic and cryptographic combinations,
allowing the advantages of both approaches to be exploited. The strategy seems to
be the best direction to follow, because it provides strong cryptographic guarantees
as long as the user moves within a certain range of the dataspace. With a properly
chosen range, it can be ensured that no information about an individuals whereabouts
is released that can be used to infer sensitive information, and at the same time the
overhead of expensive cryptographic operations can be held in check[19].
• As a third dimension of the required properties of query protection methods, hybrid
approaches also bring the benefit of protecting excessive disclosure of data from the
provider, which not only protects the privacy of the users, but also the commercial
interest of the service providers[19].
A preferred Generalization
The anonymization process is based on the concept of k-anonymity. K-anonymity protection
means that the information for each person in the release cannot be distinguished from at
least k-1 individuals whose information also appears in the release[56]. Figure 5.2 shows the
cloaking region (CR) achieved when k = 4. The requirement is thus achieved by generalizing,
and possibly suppressing, information upon release[56] through ambiguity.
Three-tier spatial transformations implement the spatial k-anonymity paradigm. A contains
k - 1 users in addition to the query source (a k-CR) is generated, and the location-based
service(LBS) processes the query with respect to the CR. Since all the k locations enclosed
by the CR correspond to actual users (as opposed to“fake locations in the previous category),
the probability to identify the query source is at most 1/k, even if the attacker has knowledge
about exact user locations.
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A trusted centralized anonymizer acts as an intermediate tier between the users and the LBS.
All users subscribe to the anonymizer and continuously report their location while they move.
Each user sends his query to the anonymizer, which constructs the appropriate CR and con-
tacts the LBS. The LBS computes the answer based on the CR, instead of the exact user
location; thus, the response of the LBS is a superset of the answer. Finally, the anonymizer
filters the result from the LBS and returns the exact answer to the user[19].
Figure 4.2: Anonymisation technique
The anonymity requirement is expressed by specifying a quasi-identifier and a minimum
number k of duplicates of each released tuple with respect to the attributes of the quasi-
identifier.
4.4 Summary
This chapter concerns the implementation of privacy within SIEMs. An introduction to the
fundamental concerns in ensuring privacy and the position of this concept in the current infor-
mation age is provided. The need with respect to data privacy is highlighted, techniques such
as anonymisation employed to instill these attributes is discussed. The failure of anonymisa-
tion is explained, identifying the flaws of the technique when it is incorrectly applied.
A privacy model based on EU legislation providing a legal guideline by which SIEM technolo-
gies need to adhere, is given. The necessity of technologies like SIEM containing meta-data
of masses of information to comply with privacy, can be facitated through this guideline.
The position of geolocaton in privacy is assessed, and the implications towards privacy through
its inclusion. Anonymisation is discussed in its application of geolocation, proving to be a
useful privacy technique for this data type, albeit not a good approach for other forms of
personal data.
Finally, the various spatial cloaking approaches are discussed, including the method of gen-
eralisation to be used in the prototype implementation.
In conclusion, the SIEM solution we aim towards, is to provide anonymisation techniques
which can ensure privacy as far as technology boundaries can facilitate. This can be en-
compassed in regulations that provide an optimal privacy solution using both law and tech-
nology. Anonymisation will be applied to geolocation, the characteristic of geolocation to
be able to adjust in ranges, facilitates its ability to be sufficiently useful even after proce-




This chapter concerns the method and approach used to validate the research discussions
surrounding geolocation in SIEM technology and the concerns of data exploitation within
boundaries that encapsulate privacy concerns. The opening section discusses the experimental
objectives in terms of the aims that need to be demonstrated to support this study. These
objectives are then applied to the available tools, addressing tool feasibility and the overall
approach. The conceptual testbed accommodates the tools and framework justified with
individually determined purposes combining them into a process flow.
Finally, the integration and application strategies are determined towards committing the
determined justifications through the collective processes. The experimental design will lead
into the next chapter focusing on the complete implementation of a simulated testbed.
5.0.1 Misuse Cases of Managed Enterprise
The misuse cases (discussed in section 3.2) in the managed enterprise environment concerning
common issues faced in such a scenario have been examined as current security challenges
of enterprise. Each identified case and its applicability to the research investigations are
considered in Table 5.1 to Table 5.4.
MC-5.5.1: Brute-Force Attack
Description Multiple attempts to log into a user account with all possible combi-




The use of geolocation in such an attack can narrow down large analysis
sets to physical areas of concern. This applies to the case of physical
buildings that allow administrative use only within the building, making
an outside location an immediate trigger factor.
Possible
Solutions
For this attack location-based identification or authentication confirma-
tion is considered a viable solution in efforts to re-affirm a genuine user
or quickly identify a malicious one.
Table 5.1: MC-5.5.1 Brute-force solution using location-based authentication
45
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MC-5.5.2: Unauthorised Login
Description A malicious user gains access and privileges to a system through the




A scenario pattern to consider, log in attempts from different locations,
if a user has been verified to be logged in from a certain location and
an attempted successful login is made from a different location whilst
still logged in at location ’workstation’, this identifies the anomaly that
more than one person is using the account and alerts the admin of the
double usage hinting to possible account compromise.
Possible
Solutions
Using geolocation as the second factor in a ‘two-factor’ authentication
approach, should a user successfully log in but their source location not
an expected location, a flag is raised for additional security checks to be
made of the user e.g answering security questions.
Table 5.2: MC-5.5.2 Unauthorised login solutions using geo-fencing
MC-5.5.3: SQL Injection & MC-5.5.4: Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
Description SQL injection is commmonly used to extract information from a vulner-
able website by getting SQL queries to execute through it.
XSS is the case of an attacker attempting to get a valid user to execute
malicious code giving the attacker rights into a website she does not own
Geolocation
Applicability
IP reputation is used to circumvent attempts of these kind of attacks
where the intent is obvious and cannot be done in err, geolocation can
enforce IP reputation by facilitating geolocation-based blocking in cer-




Geo-reputation used as a consideration for user authentication proce-
dures, as well as flagging suspect users that have high chances of per-
forming malicious activities in the system network.
Table 5.3: MC-5.5.3/4: SQL injection and cross site scripting solutions using location restrictions
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MC-5.5.5: Worm Propogation
Description A malicious user creates the spread of a self-propogating virus that infect




Worm propogation gives messy results. We can encourage their circum-
vention in a broader security technique that restricts the possibilities
of receiving such traffic in our network. When connected to the inter-
net, an enterprise is exposed to incoming connections from all over the
world. Enforcing policies that allow incoming connections to employee
networks or customer portals depending on geographic location is a start
in that direction. This can greatly reduce the exposure of an enterprise
to dangerous zones that are key in producing such attacks, graciously
reducing overall unwanted traffic in the process.
Possible
Solutions
Location-based policies can be implemented to flag traffic from areas
that repute illicit behaviour e.g areas of China consistently demonstrat-
ing malicious intentions.
Table 5.4: MC-5.5.5: Worm propogation solution using location-based policies
To simulate the attack formation within a SIEM context, the source environment and data
collected for the test experiments need to be examined. The events can emulate one or more of
the misuse cases depending on the source it retrieves logs from, for example - Windows/Linux
servers, intrusion detection systems or anti-virus solutions.
5.1 Technical Objectives
In chapter 3 regarding SIEM security, the current challenges faced in the field of IT security
were discussed. Within enterprise security specifically, five main cyber attacks of a managed
enterprise were highlighted and examined. These attacks (addressed as misuse cases) in an
enterprise scenario, are fundamental issues that need to be addressed. Security measures
have been put in place to counter these problems, but these attacks still remain a legitimate
concern for many enterprises today. Possible methods of augmenting the existing security
threat detection methods with geographic location data was considered, from aiding initial
event analysis to stronger applications such as adding a second layer of user authentication.
In summary, there were many effective applications deliberated of geolocation, towards identi-
fication and authentication using smart security rules and threshold techniques. Additionally,
enhanced visualisation for data analysis with geographic perspective was highlighted in help-
ing security analysts for filtering techniques.
Privacy investigations of SIEMs and geolocation in chapter 4 determined the need for data
manipulation procedures such as pseudonymisation and anonymisation, for the protection of
user data. The SIEM solution must provide such techniques for location data to ensure user
CHAPTER 5. DESIGN AND ARCHITECTURE 48
privacy irrespective of whether the data is exploited or not. The use of anonymisation as a
privacy-enforcing technique for geolocation is justified in subsection 4.3.1 not falling under the
realities of ‘anonymisation is a failure’ concerns. This encourages the concept of ‘defending
the defender’ which concerns the best practices SIEMs follow as meta-systems. These data
managers hold copious amounts of user data that is often cross-border falling over different
regulations of countries. Regulation compliance is a significant concern for international con-
siderations. Not all sensitive data can guarantee user privacy through undergoing technical
techniques like anonymisation, as discussed earlier, though we saw it suffices in the case of
data like geolocation. Encompassing this functionality with our guideline privacy model for
SIEMs will provide an optimal privacy solution - using law to step up and enforce where
technology approaches are limited.
The deliberations of the preceeding chapters brings forward important security research con-
siderations. We epitomize the perspectives into research validation goals. These are sum-
marised as:
1. Augmenting existing security methods in SIEM technology using geolocation data.
2. Provision of anonymisation in SIEMs for geolocation data, as this data is considered
private information. Anonymisation has been justified as the privacy approach for this
kind of data.
The misuse case attacks identified for the managed enterprise are used as the platform for
demonstrating the objectives stipulated above. The attack detection approaches used in
enterprise are a constructive point of focus to develop the research validations around. We
are to develop an attack scenario for location security measures to demonstrate abilities in
augmentation as well as showing feasibility of its integration. This simulation must be carried
out within the umbrella of privacy-enforced procedures to support the aims of providing cross-
border friendly mining of user security data.
5.2 Source Data Environment
To replicate the misuse cases specific for this environment further investigations into the source
data system architecture and data sources is required. The security system in the scenario
environment is based on the commercial SIEM solution, IBM’s Tivoli Security Operations
Manager (TSOM) which T-Systems SA provides for clients. The client security manage-
ment environment based on TSOM consists of three main components, the event aggregation
module, the central management system and the database.
1. Event Aggregation Module (EAM)
This module is the entry point for event sources. It gathers data from network devices
using conduits, which it then normalizes, filters and batches into incoming data streams.
It then transmits the data to Central Management Systems.
2. Central Management System (CMS)
This system performs various event process activities. It receives data streams from
multiple EAM servers, correlates the data and categorizes the events. It performs
calculations on the threat the event poses to the destination. Finally, it applies rules to
respond to specific attack signatures.
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3. Database
An Oracle Database to store persistent data information.
A profile carried out on the TSOM solution in the source environment identified the basic
architectural setup of the source environment, illustrated in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: MESI event environment
Within the scenario the solution carries four EAMs, one CMS and database. Each EAM
server uses specific conduits to gather data streams from various devices, with the following
devices present in the profiled environment:
Sensors Network Device Conduit
3 McAfee ePolicy Orchestrator SNMP v2
2 Tipping Point Security Management System Syslog
120 AIX Servers Syslog
47 Window Server 2003 & 2008 SNMPv2 & UCM
117 Solaris 9 Server Syslog
108 Cisco devices Syslog
Table 5.5: Data Sources within Managed Enterprise Environment
The effectiveness of the SIEM depends on the accuracy of the analysis on these events sourced
from various inputs. As shown in Figure 5.1 source flow events can be collected from these
devices through the use of the logging standard Syslog or the networking managing protocol
SNMP.
SNMP is a transport protocol that manages networks and devices. It works on the applica-
tion layer of the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/IP model and is used by TSOM itself
to capture events from various sensors. It consists of two components, an SNMP agent/trap
and an SNMP Manager.
The SNMP agents are essentially event notifiers, which are encapsulated in the User Data-
gram Protocol (UDP) header of an IP packet. It agent contains an Protocol Data Unit
(PDU) which holds the contents of the SNMP trap in a element called a variable binding.
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The variable-findings field is encapuslated in managed objects such as the $EVENT.INFO
token which contains the raw data collected by the sensor and any other information attached
to the event[4].
Syslog is a client/server protocol transmitting text messages to the syslog receiver commonly
known as syslog daemon/server called syslogd.
Two devices/conduit sources channeled from the CMS are considered for the research testbed:
• McAfee ePolicy Orchestrator
Data feeds from McAfee anti-virus and anti-malware are sent to McAfee ePolicy Or-
chestrator, which feeds into TSOM.
• Window Server 2003
Responsible for monitoring the network for any suspicious activities, attacks and other
events which may be of interest. Sensors used by TSOM can communicate using con-
duits such as SNMP, Syslog or XML.
TSOM Data Source Sensors Events Total
Windows Server Windows Log Parser 7 8,612,030 16,745,426
Windows Event Log 40 8,133,396
McAfee Anti Virus McAfee ePO 4.x 3 132,322 132,322
Table 5.6: Event Statistics
Events captured from the CMS sources covered a time period of 79 days, the total dataset
contained 38,509,400 events from 322 individual sensors. For the experimental purposes of
this research a subset of 16,877,748 events from 50 sensors was extracted. This consisted of
events from Windows Server(s) and McAfee Anti Virus sources.
5.2.1 Event Schema
The events received are not in their source format but operationally modified for two reasons;
they are the output of event data from a live enterprise environment and therefore have
undergone obsfucation procedures performed on user names and other personally identifiable
data. The environment contains an existing SIEM (TSOM) which has performed its own
analysis procedures on the data.
The purpose is not to obstruct, repeat or undo the procedures performed on these data sets,
but to extrapolate more security data from patterns in these sets. The following procedures
were carried out on the collected datasets before use:
1. The current schema has undergone pseudonymisation of certain fields, as this test data
is captured from a live environment and needs to privitise information.
2. In addition, to this it has already have undergone procedures of event normalisation by
the environment SIEM.
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Processed Format
The normalisation technique applied on the data needs to be reviewed to understand the
context of the information that is to be sent to the test environment created using OSSIM
and selected tools of MASSIF. The process undergone on the data events is summarised in
the diagrammatic flow shown in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2: Anonymisation technique
The most significant event attributes were identified and combined in the definition of a well-
structured table referred to as the input vector. This input vector describes how the content
of the attributes should be mapped. For example, event attributes with similar content but
varied names are catered for accordingly, thus event attributes such as ”account name” and
”user name” both contain user names and are therefore mapped to one specific input vector
attribute. Test cases were developed for each event ID of the identified Windows security
logs. A test case specifies how the source event should be parsed and transformed according
to the input vector.
Each test case consists of the source event (SNMP trap) and the corresponding input vector
(Comma Separated Value (CSV) file). The test case identified various Windows event for-
mats which differed from Microsoft’s the documented format. After identifying test cases,
normalisation was performed on certain input vector attributes. Multiple Windows event
attributes were mapped to one input vector attribute (e.g. ‘Username’ provided by TSOM
and ‘Username2’ from a native event), the syntax and format had to be normalised. Different
letter cases, IP address formats, domain name formats and user name formats were identified.
As an example, a user name could appear as “user@domain.com”, “domain.com/user”,
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“user@domain com”. This was thus normalised to “user”. The same principle applies to
other Windows event attributes[4].
The input vector for Windows events (shown in Table 5.7) consists of two parts, TSOM-
specific and Windows-specific. Most of the TSOM-specific attributes are provided by TSOM
itself (e.g. SensorName, SensorType). Most of the Windows-specific attributes were exported
from the native Windows event which is contained in $EVENT.INFO (Event information,
often contains the native event as reported by the sensor) token.
Field Field name Pseudonymised Comment
TSOM Specific
1 <InternalSequenceNumber> - The internal sequence number used by ADEWaS
2 <TsomID> - TSOM-internal event ID
3 <TrapRequestID> - The SNMP request ID of the SNMP header
4 <InternalTimestamp> - The time the event was received by ADEWaS
5 <TsomTimestamp> - The time the event was received by the EAM.
The time format is Unix time (the last three
digits are milliseconds)
6 <SensorTimestamp> - The time the event was recorded by the sensor
(e.g. a Windows server). The time format is
Unix time (the last three digits are milliseconds)
7 <SensorName> Yes The name of the sensor which originated the
event
8 <SensorNameDescription> - Describes if <SensorName>is a domain con-
troller, member server or workstation
9 <SensorType> - The type of sensor which originated the event
10 <EventType> - Event type as defined, if possible, by the device
generating the event. The type is otherwise de-
rived from the reported event
11 <EventValidility> - A validity rating of the reported event by TSOM
on a scale from 1 to 100
12 <EventClass> - Identifies the event class assigned to the event
as defined by TSOM
13 <SecurityDomain> Yes The security domain to which the event was as-
signed
14 <UserName> Yes User name associated with the event
15 <Domain> Yes Operating system domain or internet realm if
provided by the device reporting the event
16 <SourceIP> Yes The IP Address of the source host
17 <SourceIPPrivate> - Binary indicator which specifies if<SourceIP>is
a private IP address, as described in RFC1918
18 <SourceIPGeoCC> - Two letter country code of <SourceIP>or string
”1918” if it is a private IP address
19 <SourceIPGeoASN> - ASN of <SourceIP>or empty string if it is a
private IP address.
20 <SourceIPGeoLat> - Latitude of <SourceIP>or empty string if it is
a private IP address
21 <SourceIPGeoLong> - Longitude of <SourceIP>or empty string if it is
a private IP address
22 <SourcePort> - The port of origin of the event from the source
host
23 <DestinationIP> Yes The IP Address of the destination host
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Field Field name Pseudonymised Comment
24 <DestinationIPPrivate > - Binary indicator which specifies if <Destina-
tionIP>is a private IP address, as described in
RFC1918
25 <DestinationIPGeoCC> - Two letter country code of <DestinationIP>or
string ”1918” if it is a private IP address
26 <DestinationIPGeoASN> - ASN of <DestinationIP>or empty string if it is
a private IP address
27 <DestinationIPGeoLat> - Latitude of <DestinationIP>or empty string if
it is a private IP address
28 <DestinationIPGeoLong> - Longitude of <DestinationIP>or empty string
if it is a private IP address
29 <DestinationPort> - Port on the host at which the event was directed
30 <SourceThreat> - The threat level assigned to the source host
Event Specific
31 <DestinationThreat> - The threat level assigned to the destination host
32 <InternalSubScenario> - Internal identification string of the sub scenario.
33 <InternalUseCase> - Internal identification string of the use case.
34 <EventID> - The unique ID of an event.
35 <TypeOfAction> - A short description of the event. It further re-
veals if it was a success or a failure.
36 <Workstation> Yes Specifies the NetBIOS name of the remote com-
puter that originated the logon request.
37 <OSType> - The type of the OS (e.g. WIN-XP, WIN-Vista,
WIN-7, WIN-2003 or WIN-2008).
38 <SourceIP2> Yes The IP Address of the source host.
39 <SourceIPPrivate2> - Binary indicator which specifies if <SourceIP2¿
is a private IP address, as described in RFC1918.
40 <SourceIPGeoCC2> - Two letter country code of <SourceIP2¿ or
string ”1918” if it is a private IP address.
41 <SourceIPGeoASN2> - ASN of<SourceIP2¿ or empty string if it is a
private IP address.
42 <SourceIPGeoLat2> - Latitude of<SourceIP2¿ or empty string if it is
a private IP address.
43 <SourceIPGeoLong2> - Longitude of<SourceIP2¿ or empty string if it
is a private IP address.
44 <SourcePort2> - The port of origin of the event from the source
host.
45 <UserName2> Yes The name of the account that authenticated.
46 <SecurityID> Yes The Security ID of the account that authenti-
cated.
47 <Domain2> Yes The domain of the account for which logon
is requested. The account is related to the
field<UserName2¿.
48 <AccountType> - Identifies if the account type in <UserName2>is
Privileged, SystemAccount or ComputerAc-
count.
49 <LogonType> - The logon type reveals how the user authen-
ticated (e.g. 2=interactively, 3=network or
10=remotely).
50 <LogonID> - The unique logon ID of the logon session.
51 <LogonGUID> - For logons that use Kerberos, the unique logon
GUID can be used to associate a logon event
with a domain controller.
52 <LogonProcess> - The process performing the logon.
53 <AuthenticationMethod> - The security package called to authenticate the
account.
54 <ServiceName> Yes Indicates the service for which a Kerberos Ticket
Granting Ticket (TGT) or a Kerberos service
ticket was issued.
55 <ServiceType> - Identifies the service in<ServiceName¿ (e.g.
tickets for domain controllers should be distin-
guished from tickets for member servers or work-
stations).
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Field Field name Pseudonymised Comment
56 <UserPrivileges> - Privileges of the account that authenticated.
57 <CallerDomain> Yes The domain of the account on the local system
which requested the logon. The account is re-
lated to the field <CallerUserName>.
58 <CallerUserName> Yes Account name on the local system which re-
quested the logon.
59 <CallerLogonID> - ID of the logon session for the account men-
tioned in <CallerUserName>.
60 <FailureReason> - The reason why the authentication attempt
failed.
61 <StatusCode> - The status code indicates why the authentica-
tion attempt failed.
62 <SubStatusCode> - Further details on why the authentication at-
tempt failed.
63 <ResultCode> - Result code of the Kerberos ticket request. In-
dicates if it was a success or a failure.
64 <CodeDescription> - Description in words of the code in <Result-
Code>.
Table 5.7: Windows Server Event Fields from Normalisaton
The input vector for McAfee events (shown in Table 5.8) contains fields which were directly
exported from the epoEvents database, except for fields which provide geographical IP infor-
mation (e.g. field no 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27).
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Field Field name Pseudonymised Comment
1 AutoID - Unique event id(primary key)
2 Auto GUID - -
3 ServerID Yes Computer name of the ePO server
4 ReceivedUTC - Timestamp the event was received by the ePO
server
5 DetectedUTC - Timestamp the event was generated on the
agent.
6 AgentGUID - Unique ID of the McAfee agent. An agent is
a computer the McAfee antivirussoftware is in-
stalled on.
7 Analyzer - The analyzer which was used by the agent (e.g.
VIRUSCAN8700)
8 Analyzer Name - Detailed name of the analyzer used by the agent
(e.g. VirusScan Enterprise).
9 Analyzer Version - The version number of the analyzer.
10 AnalyzerHostName Yes Name of the computer the McAfee agent is in-
stalled on.
11 AnalyzerIPv4 Yes IP address of the computer mentioned in <An-
alyzerHostName>.
12 AnalyzerIPv4Private - Binary indicator which specifies if <Analyz-
erIPV4>is a private IP address, as described in
RFC1918.
13 AnalyzerIPV4GeoCC - Two letter country code of <AnalyzerIPV4>or
string ”1918” if it is a private IP address.
14 AnalyzerIPV4GeoASN - ASN of <AnalyzerIPV4>or empty string if it is
a private IP address.
15 AnalyzerIPV4GeoLat - Latitude of ¡AnalyzerIPV4¿ or empty string if it
is a private IP address.
16 AnalyzerIPV4GeoLong - Longitude of ¡AnalyzerIPV4¿ or empty string if
it is a private IP address.
17 AnalyzerMAC - MAC address of the computer mentioned in ¡An-
alyzerHostName¿.
18 AnalyzerDATVersion - Version number of the analyzer’s signature files.
19 AnalyzerEngineVersion - Version number of the engine used by the ana-
lyzer.
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Field Field name Pseudonymised Comment
20 AnalyzerDetectionMethod - Detection method used by the analyzer. Most
common detection methods are on-demand scan
(ODS) and on-access scan (OAS).
21 SourceHostName Yes Computer name the threat originated from.
22 SourceHostIP Yes IP address extracted from <SourceHost-
Name>(if it contains an IP address instead of
a computer name).
23 SourceHostIPPrivate Yes Binary indicator which specifies if <Source-
HostIP>is a private IP address, as described in
RFC1918
24 SourceHostIPGeoCC - Two letter country code of <SourceHostIP>or
string ”1918” if it is a private IP address
25 SourceHostIPGeoASN - ASN of <SourceHostIP>or empty string if it is
a private IP address
26 SourceHostIPGeoLat - Latitude of <SourceHostIP>or empty string if
it is a private IP address
27 SourceHostIPGeoLong - Longitude of <SourceHostIP>or empty string if
it is a private IP address
28 SourceIPV4 Yes IP address of the computer mentioned in
<SourceHostName>
29 SourceHostIPv4Private Yes Binary indicator which specifies if <Source-
HostIPv4>is a private IP address, as described
in RFC1918
30 SourceHostIPv4GeoCC - Two letter country code of <SourceHostIPv4
>or string ”1918” if it is a private IP address
31 SourceHostIPv4GeoASN - ASN of <SourceHostIPv4>or empty string if it
is a private IP address
32 SourceHostIPv4GeoLat - Latitude of <SourceHostIPv4>or empty string
if it is a private IP address
33 SourceHostIPv4GeoLong - Longitude of <SourceHostIP>or empty string if
it is a private IP address
35 SourceUserName Yes User account on <SourceHostName>.
36 SourceProcessName Yes User account on <SourceHostName>.
37 SourceURL - -
38 TargetHostName Yes The IP Address of the source host.
39 TargetIPV4 Yes IP address of the computer mentioned in <Tar-
getHostName>
40 TargetHostIPv4Private Yes Binary indicator which specifies if <TargetH-
ostIPv4>is a private IP address, as described
in RFC1918
41 TargetHostIPv4GeoCC - Two letter country code of <TargetH-
ostIPv4>or string ”1918” if it is a private
IP address
42 TargetHostIPv4GeoASN - ASN of <TargetHostIPv4>or empty string if it
is a private IP address
43 TargetHostIPv4GeoLat - Latitude of <TargetHostIPv4>or empty string
if it is a private IP address
44 TargetHostIPv4GeoLong - Longitude of <TargetHostIP>or empty string if
it is a private IP address
45 TargetMac - MAC address of the computer mentioned in
<TargetHostName>.
46 TargetUserName Yes User account on <TargetHostName>.
47 TargetUserIP Yes P address extracted from ¡TargetUserName¿ (if
it contains an IP address instead ofa computer
name).
48 TargetHostIPPrivate Yes Binary indicator which specifies if <TargetH-
ostIP>is a private IP address, as described in
RFC1918
49 TargetHostIPGeoCC - Two letter country code of <TargetHostIP>or
string ”1918” if it is a private IP address
50 TargetHostIPGeoASN - ASN of <TargetHostIP>or empty string if it is
a private IP address
51 TargetHostIPGeoLat - Latitude of <TargetHostIP>or empty string if
it is a private IP address
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Field Field name Pseudonymised Comment
52 TargetHostIPGeoLong - Longitude of <TargetHostIP>or empty string if
it is a private IP address
53 TargetPort - The port targeted by the threat.
54 TargetProtocol - The protocol targeted by the threat.
55 TargetProcessName - The process name which was the target of the
threat.
56 TargetFileName Yes The name of the file which was the target of the
threat.
57 ThreatCategory - Common threat categories are anti-virus detec-
tion (av.detect) or firewall detection(fw.detect)
58 ThreatEventID - Unique event ID of the logged threat.
59 ThreatSeverity - Severity of the threat
60 ThreatName - Description of the logged threat (e.g. name of
the virus).
61 ThreatType - Type of the threat (e.g. buffer overflow).
62 ThreatActionTaken - Description of the action taken (e.g. deleted).
63 ThreatHandled - Indicator if the threat was handled or not
64 The Timestamp - Sequence number the ePO expects from a con-
necting agent. If the sequence number does not
match, communication is rejected.
Table 5.8: Input Vector of McAfee Events
The events were transformed according to the above specification and test cases, and pro-
duced a normalised set of logs. The resulting event log is an output from the input vectors
in CSV format.
The highlighted fields indicated the geolocation information present within the logs. The
geolocation data is identifiable for source and destination of events. The Windows events,
contain two sources for geolocation as shown in the table. One source is of geolocation is from
the TSOM sensor itself and the second is from the windows raw events, extracted from the
$EVENT.INFO token.
In Figure 5.1 we highlighted the connection between the TSOM environment output and our
experimental solution - the data received from the CMS was retrieved, normalisation per-
formed according to the input vectors specified above and retrieved for use in this ‘enhanced’
SIEM testbed to carry out the determined technical objectives.
5.3 SIEM Tools and Frameworks
The primary design step concerns analysis of the SIEM architectures and their technologies.
We take a look at the MASSIF tool framework and the OSSIM solution to determine the
elements of these SIEM implementations applicable for the research objectives and demon-
strative results.
5.3.1 MASSIF
MASSIF aims to develop new generation SIEM technology for service infrastructures. The
technical design is ‘requirements-driven’ focusing on providing high interoperability, high
scalability and high elasticity.
It focuses on four industrial domains to serve as a source for requirements and to validate the
project results. These are the Olympic games, mobile phone based money transfer service,
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critical infrastructure process control and managed enterprise service infrastructures. The
data used is from a managed enterprise environment therefore, the considerations are focused
on the tools applied within that scenario.
As a next-generation SIEM framework support for service infrastructures it encourages in-
telligent, scalable, multi-level/multi-domain security event processing and predictive security
monitoring[40]. Figure 5.3 provides an architectural overview of the MASSIF framework at
a high level.
Figure 5.3: MASSIF Architecture Overview[40]
On the basis of proper multi-level event correlation MASSIF can provide innovative techniques
to enable the detection of upcoming security threats and trigger remediation actions even
before the occurrence of possible security incidences.
This service-level SIEM technology involves the modelling and formal validation of security,
including trusted computing concepts, architecture for dependable and resilient collection of
service events, supported by an extremely scalable and high performance event collection and
processing framework, in the context of service-level attack models[40].
The tools and elements of MASSIF can be integrated with two SIEM solutions, these are
Alienvault OSSIM and 6Cure. The defined elements within the MASSIF architecture are
modular, allowing a tool or combinations of tools to be used with other systems. For this
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research this ability is exploited in the consideration of integration with OSSIM.
Technical Summary
The modularity of the tool structure that defines the MASSIF framework covers a range of
software requirements. However, the differences are not incompatible and easily deployable
in many environments. In terms of installation and implementation requirements, most tools
just require a Java friendly environment with the appropriate runtime environment version
installed. A summarised technical breakdown of the tools and elements of the conceptual
framework is shown in Table 5.9. The functionality area and it’s technical requirements can
assist an evaluation of compatibility for a testing environment and integration with other
software.
Component/Functionality General Tool Specifications
Event and Information Collection
Multi-Level Event Collection Java Runtime Environment (JRE) version
1.7
Languages SQL, Java, Python, UML
Multi-level event correlation JREv1.7, JDKv1.6, Derby DBMS
v10.10.1.1, Apache Tomcat 6.0.20 or later
Event, Process and Attack Models
Process & Attack Simulation Syslog, JREv1.7 , Linux MOTIF Library1,
Ruby
Multi-level security event modelling JREv1.7, Python, Apache Felix 4.0
Predictive security analysis Python, Netbeans IDE, JRE v1.7
Other tools
Alert and Reaction Generation Python(requiring packages e.g python-
lxml,python-mysqlb, python-setuptools,
figlet), JRE1.7
Trustworthy Event Collection JRE 1.7
Resilient Framework Architecture JRE. 1.7
Table 5.9: MASSIF tools software specifications
5.3.2 OSSIM Alienvault Solution
OSSIM is a fully featured SIEM solution offering all necessary functionality from event col-
lection and incident detection to alarm response and feedback visualisation. The foundation
for Alienvault’s security management solution is Open Source SIEM(OSSIM) which provides
SIEM vulnerability assessment, network and host intrusion detection, and file integrity mon-
itoring. Alienvault markets and supports commercial software or application offerings that
extends OSSIM with enhancements in scaling, log management, reporting, administration and
multitenanting for managed security service providers (MSSPs). Therefore, OSSIM works as
an open-source framework as well as commercial depending on the level of SIEM tool provi-
sion. Enabling the facility of open-source allows users to experiment with the current solution
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and help suggest even better adjustments to this framework.
In a summarised overview the solution provides the following features;
• Low level, real-time detection of security events
• Compliance automation
• Data log management and storage
• Event log and alarm visualisation
• Security intelligence that enhances the accuracy of threat detection
• Network behaviour analysis and situational behaviour awareness
Figure 5.4 provides a high level overview of OSSIM solution, it’s capabilities and security
event flow.
Figure 5.4: High level view of the OSSIM Architecture[36]
Technical Summary
The OSSIM solution based on the Linux Debian operating system, is available as a complete
solution using virtualisation software, such as VMware2. The entire solution can then be
2www.vmware.com
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installed in the virtual environment and accessed through its assigned static IP specified for
that machine instance. The system requirements for testing purposes use a minimum of 8GB
RAM, 2 CPU cores, with at least 250GB storage capacity.
This architecture is based and centered on the efforts of four main components:
• OSSIM sensor: The sensors collect and normalise the events generated by the different
security equipment. One can deploy as many sensors as needed
• OSSIM server: The server receives events from sensors, and does Risk Assessment and
Correlation tasks
• OSSIM database: For storage purposes, there is a provision of a MySQL database that
stores the events, configurations, and useful information.
• OSSIM framework: The framework encapsulating the solution is the PHP/Python code
that “serves” the information to the webfront-end.
Events are received by the sensors, once they are normalised on the sensor they are sent
forward to the remote or local OSSIM server[21]. The server collects the normalised events
and applies user defined policies on them. Depending on the policy definition the event is sent
for correlation in the correlation engine or not. The correlation engine is a powerful feature
of the solution, providing users the ability to write correlation rules using XML to parse
the events and trigger certain responses from the SIEM solution. After policy enforcement,
the next phase is risk assessment, then finally events are sent to the correlation engine.
Correlation of events is performed, which enables the generation of alarms that are visualised
in the interface. Any alarms generated are stored in the OSSIM database for a certain time
period.
The solution allows tight control over widely distributed enterprise networks from a single
location. In summary, the system considers the context of each threat and the importance of
the assets involved, evaluates situational risk, discovers and distinguishes actual threats from
the thousand of false positives that are produced each day in each network.
5.4 Tool Discussion
In section 5.1 we identified the main objectives of implementation needed to justify the re-
search implications. Using the collected data sets, the strategy of committing the results to an
implementation required examination of feature/tool(s) applicability in OSSIM and MASSIF.
Objective 1: Augmenting existing security methods using geolocation data
The first requirement would be for the SIEM to receive geolocation data in a usable format
for event analysis. These analysis tools need to expend it in authentication/alarm triggering
procedures and (possibly) visualisation. This requires an implementation of security proce-
dures, if considering visualisation, an interface for the SOC to view attacks and see alarms for
locations. These requirements are applicable to the interface of OSSIM which has excellent
alarm triggering visualisation and facilitates the analysis of any data regardless of the format
through the use of plugins. If a plugin for a specific data log format is not available, OSSIM
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facilitates the creation of a custom plugin by users themselves.
MASSIF in this regard is the lesser alternative to take, mainly due to the fact that OSSIM
gives easier visualisation at SOC level providing a unified visually appealing interface and
alert facilities as expected from a industry product. MASSIF can provide for this but as it is
currently functionality oriented and research driven its power lies in the tools more than the
visual asthetics.
Objective 2: Provision of anonymisation in SIEMs for geolocation data
This is an advanced expectation - the offering of anonymisation procedures in event process-
ing tools. This requires a SIEM with potential provisions and tools for untried manipulation
of data. In this case, MASSIF will be the preferred framework of operation to facilitate this.
MASSIF aims to realise the expectations of next-generation SIEMs, requirements such as
novel processing applications on data can be facilitated through the tools of MASSIF. These
tools are developed to experiment with data techniques and processes from different scenarios.
OSSIM in this case, is not the preferred SIEM, with MASSIF having advanced tools ready to
implement this without the need for writing an entire anonymisation procedure by the user
which would be necessary and more work in the case of OSSIM.
Both OSSIM and MASSIF have their strong points and provisions in feature delivery. MAS-
SIF is a modular collection of tools that combine together to form a conceptual framework.
The tools can be used individually, with the necessary elements used as additions to existing
SIEMs. This is a feasible option for implementation purposes, utilising the required elements
of MASSIF to ’enhance’ the OSSIM solution used for the experiment visual front-end. We
use the flexible properties of OSSIM and the advanced tools of MASSIF to create a testbed
for the initial hypothesis, using geolocation to enhance SIEM capabilities.
Thus, the implementation will be dependant on the integration efforts of an existing SIEM,
in this case OSSIM, with chosen elements of MASSIF.
5.4.1 MASSIF: Applicable Elements
The MASSIF conceptual framework has developed many tools that combine together in efforts
to creating novel or enhancing security procedures. These tools range in application from pre-
analysis, real time, detection and reaction feedback. A selection of tools were utilised from
the MASSIF framework in order to address the misuse cases and study, their functionalities
and provision towards demonstration validation are clarified.
Generic Event Translator (GET)
The GET is used for event aggregation, collection, normalisation and techniques such as
encryption, anonymisation or where applicable pseudonymisation. The purpose of this tool
is to act as the gateway for the entire framework to using data from any source or device,
with the capability to provide the handling of wide ranges of event formats produced by these
sources. It is able to convert these events to a standard format, such as the MASSIF event
format.
This data format conversion ability open doors for other uses besides standardisation, other
than pulling data from log lines into uniform schemas, it also facilitates the enforcing of
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security integrity on this data. The data is additionally encrypted and is sent along with the
standardised log to the relevant server.
Figure 5.5: MASSIF: The GET tool[27]
The tool primarily works as a normalisation tool, but in this scenario in particular it can
be seen it will not be necessary as the data has been normalised. Thus, the focus can be
made specifically on carrying out SIEM procedures that are novel and have not been applied,
without the need for simulating the common SIEM procedures again.
The conversion abilities from one format to another, is a similiar process to modification of
data fields, if the conversion formula contains an anonmyisation algorithm, this enables the
anonymisation to be performed on the necessary fields smoothly.
The GET requires an operating system with Java Platform Standard Edition (JSE) Runtime
Environment version 1.7.0 03 (build 1.7.0 03-b05) or later. The tool is a Java-based platform
for ease of use on any platform and portability.
Resilient Event Storage (RES)
The RES is an intrusion and fault tolerant data storage facility designed to ensure integrity
and unforgeability of events to be stored even if some components of architecture are com-
promised. Alarms and Events that are stored in the RES cannot be modified, also the data
is stored in encrypted form using a Password Based Algorithm technique. Should admin/
forensic authorities require the event data in original format, it can be retrieved through the
input of the correct password.
The purpose of the RES is to ensure integrity of the original data is maintained, as parts of
the data will be modified by undergoing anonymisation procedures. The secure storage of
alarms and events is also a needed facility to ensure the analysis results are not modified or
tampered with, and are in fact a result of the simulated attack.
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Figure 5.6: MASSIF: The Resilient Event Storage[22]
The RES facilities are composed of a number of nodes that implement resilient storage mech-
anisms based on threshold cryptography algorithms. The RES nodes might be corrupted, but
the RES should provide the ability to detect the corruption and retrieve the correct event[16].
The RES requires an operating system with Java Platform Standard Edition (JSE) Runtime
Environment version 1.7.0 03 (build 1.7.0 03-b05) or later. The tool is a java-based platform
for ease of use on any platform and portability.
Resilient Event Bus (REB)
The Resilient Event Bus provides resilient communication among a set of nodes (see Fig-
ure 5.7). The use of nodes as an overlay network with communications performed on top
of the standard protocols like UDP/IP, allow varied network settings to be supported. The
REB uses an application-level one-hop source routing policy that forwards messages towards
a destination, instead of following only the routes set by the network level routing[48]. It
also takes advantage of coding techniques and the available redundancies of a network, for
example, when a node has multiple network connections (as in multihoming, for instance), to
ensure a very high probability of secure delivery of messages to the required destination[48].
The purpose of the REB is to securely transmit events between components, a managed enter-
prise environment is a heavy duty network, event flows are high and fast, a channel that can
ensure the nature of this scenario in a typical live environment is an important consideration.
The REB requires an operating system with JSE Runtime Environment version 1.7.0 03 (build
1.7.0 03-b05) or later. The tool is a java-based platform for ease of use on any platform and
portability.
5.4.2 OSSIM: Applicable Features
The simulation of use-case can be facilitated through the use of writing a correlation rules
matching the specfication of the required attack. Events received or collected from agents
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Figure 5.7: MASSIF: The Resilient Event Bus[48]
go through various security processes to determine the generation of alarms from policy
comparisons and correlation checks, if an alert is triggered the incidents are stored in the
OSSIM DB. The data security flow that concerns us, is shown below[21]:
Correlation Directives
A SIEM correlation rule can be used to automate parts of the system login and authentication
monitoring process[8]. The rule encapsulates patterns of events that indicate suspicious or
malicious behaviour. The nature of the activity marked from the sequence of events from a
specific source towards another node on the network can highlight the intention of that user
and the predicted outcome.
The following examples of threat situations can be defined through the use of correlation
mechanisms to trigger an alarm to administration of suspected illicit activity:
• A single system attack when an attacker tries all credentials on one system
• A string of several login failures immediately followed by a success
• Authentication sweep attack (a user trying the same credential on all systems)
• Successful login at unusual times (for the user or for the system)
• Successful login from unusual locations (for the user or for the system)
A correlation directive, that can be defined in OSSIM, is a sequence of rules for the OSSIM
server to follow in order to correlate events. In each rule, one can specify at the very least[25]:
• the event’s signature to detect;
• the reliability of the rule;
• the occurrence of that event along with timeout;
• the source and destination ports/IP addresses;
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Figure 5.8: Security Information Flow within OSSIM[21]
For a correlation directive to raise an alarm, the rule detects event flows which satisfy condi-
tions leading to an increased risk factor. A risk factor of one or higher results in the generation
of an alarm.
Risk assessment depends on three variables, asset value, event priority, and event reliability.
Assets are key structures for SIM systems. An asset is an equipment that one wants to secure
or protect. Examples of assets are host, firewalls, databases and other company devices
holding value to the company in some way. For each asset that is defined in OSSIM, an
asset-value between 0 and 5 that has to be specified.
This value estimates the asset’s importance to the client/company itself. Priority and relia-
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bility are both values relative to the actual event, the values can be assigned within the range
of 0 to 10. Priority measures the relative importance of the event seen as an attack, while
reliability measures the probability of the event itself being reliable and true. For instance,
intrustion detection systems are known to generate many false positives in some instances[25].
In such cases, the reliability value needs to be set as low.
Each of those three variables are then calculated together to determine a final value defined
as the ‘risk’. This risk factor is calculated with the following formula:
Risk =
(




If the resulting value bypasses the value of 1, the server will generate an alarm to notify the
respective security manager. To illustrate the method of risk calculation let us suppose the
asset of IP address 11.22.33.44 is an asset belonging to the company. The asset value assigned
is given a value of 5. The agent/protocol generating the security event that is received in
OSSIM has been given a reliability value of 2 and due it’s nature, a priority of 5. The
calculated risk for this IP in question is R = (5× 5× 2)/25 = 2. Therefore, an alarm will be
generated. If the device is not specified to be a company asset however, it will be assigned a
default value of 2, in which case R<1 and an alarm will not be raised.
Alarm Generation
OSSIM triggers alarms visually in the user interface to warn the administration. For example,
if a pattern is matched within a correlation directive of a specific this invokes the creation
of an OSSIM incident, and an alarm at the alarm database. Both the generated security
incident and alarm are stored in a secure backup and storage resource to ensure responses
cannot be manipulated within the SIEM.
5.5 Integrated Concept
The conceptual integration aims to encompass the following processes to be applied on the
required managed enterprise data, towards satisfying all objectives of this study;
• The demonstration of confidentiality preservation capabilities throughout the process
flow of the concerned events (carrying geolocation information).
– At the edge side of event processing, the following needs to be performed:
Anonymisation of event data
Encryption of the entire event payload
– At the core side of event processing, the following is required to finalise the validity
of output:
Secure storage of all relevant security events, i.e. alarms generated and incidents
created.
Restricted access to the original event content through the use of authentication,
to ensure the results have not been tampered with - particularly for forensics.
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• The use of secure resilient mechanisms responsible for the transfer of events. This is to
validate the process flow ability to deal with the high volume nature of SIEM environ-
ment information flows.
Tool communications based on the Resilient Event Bus mechanisms
• Alarm storage based on Resilient Event Storage facilities, post-analysis.
• Usability vs. Privacy
The use of MASSIF anonymisation techniques allows location data to be used in security
analysis procedures whilst preserving user privacy.
• Feasible integration between MASSIF data layer components and the OSSIM SIEM
solution
• The demonstration of the detection of a MESI scenario misuse case, from the entry of
the attack sequence to the output of alarms identifying the malicious attempt through
alarms and incident generation, in a complete entry-to-discovery cycle.
Figure 5.9: MASSIF Conceptual Diagram
5.6 Experimental Design
In Figure 5.10, an experimental solution of the testbed depicting the relevant tools and the
flow to security events through the system is shown. The flow can be analysed to oversee the
conversion process of the location data used with the selected MASSIF tools and the OSSIM
solution.
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1. Data layer: The GET constitutes the point of access to the MASSIF system. It trans-
lates the MESI events from the source with anonymisation rules for data fields requiring
privacy. The events are then translated into OSSIM format.
2. Event layer: the REB transports these events from GET, adding the security provided
by the resilient framework, ensuring communication resilience.
3. Application layer: OSSIM processes the events and generates alarms for the end users to
check for irregularities that indicate attack attempts in login cycles using the correlation
directive. The directive is matched against the incoming events to be triggered if there
is a matching sequence of suspicious activity trigged from anaysis of the location data.
RES stores the alarm data for integrity and forensic purposes to support the process
of privacy ensuring techniques; committed from the beginning of the locational infor-
mation intake process by the GET. This ensures the privacy conditions are maintained
throughout the entire process of location data use.
Figure 5.10: MASSIF Experimental Diagram
5.6.1 Technical assumptions
The assumptions made through the test implementation, of the attacker and the operative
environment of the MESI systems, are as follows:
• The network has accurate location information on user access points in network
• Other user-sensitive log fields are pseudonymised to ensure privacy.
• The attacker attempts a brute force attack with consecutive login attempts from location
not identified as valid for user X.
• The target is a machine with admin rights.
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5.7 Summary
To validate the objectives of this research in terms of SIEM application of geolocation in
security, privacy enforcement of geolocation information and the feasibility of these sugges-
tions in a such a large framework with a high level of technicality. An experimental set up
is proposed, as a proof-of-concept implementation that can achieve the propositions of the
study. In summary, the experimental simulation will demonstrate the following features:
• Possible Attack.
An attack, for example, the brute force attack isolated from a specific area. Location
identification can be a good way to narrow a field of security analysis down.
• Data Privacy
Data crosses international boundaries, requires privacy considerations
• Geolocation for authentication
Location data can provide a second layer of verification of users permissible login but
for this anonymised location information must still be usable.
• Log Generation
source events are provided with location data for user logins on a windows server 03.
Login attempts with location either derived from sensors, WiFi, or IP address.
• Reality Vs Simulation
The generated log similarity to real-life and response. Login attempt pattern follows
definition of Brute-force attack. Possible system response, admin block user access from
location A.
• Limitations
Events are batch collections and not real time, simulation of real-time events will be
required.
• SIEM Integration
Attack Detection through the correlation abilites of OSSIM. Additional clause, anonymised
location information is still to generate alarms for geolocation rules.
The next chapter discusses the approaches taken to implementing this conceptual solution
and the resulting configurations and modifications required for the successful implementation
of the above listed objectives.
Chapter 6
Implementation
Following the discussed architecture, this chapter presents the implementation logistics, with
integration of all discussed components. The complete integration is run in a demonstration
setup with the use of virtual machines to facilitate the various tools and their capacities. A
SIEM environment is not a small deployment, it is a collection of tools connected with various
configurations and instructions, and connected resources. Therefore, the integration of the
required components to produce the needed process flow requires an examination from high
to low level, surrounding the test data itself.
6.1 Event Analysis
The events extracted from the managed enterprise environment are collected from two main
sources. For the purposes of this research, these two sources provide the test area for the
misuse cases identified in the corresponding managed enterprise scenario as the prevalent
attacks of that environment. These sources are; data events collected from the McAfee
ePolicy Orchestrator and from Windows Servers 2003/2008.
6.1.1 Event Set A: Windows Server 2003/2008
This source event data focuses on all account logon activities, its attribution is focused towards
simulating the following attack misuse cases:
• MC 5.5.1 An Unauthorised Login to a computer system, network or application
• MC 5.5.2 Brute force attack for attempted login
Listing 6.1-1 extracted from the month of May is a sample Windows event. The data
pseudonymisation on user names and identities must be noted and the CSV format it was
output in after procedures of normalisation (for field descriptions see subsection 5.2.1).
Listing 6.1-1: An example MESI Windows event
1 TBS;;1124490656;1325200062;1306496120083;1306496120000;500f7b56f8805d3fd2e4
2 8e36;;Windows EventLog;Security.Failure Audit;66;failed , failed , login ,
3 user;91734d39b55cb189ffc47c27;e0559ee6821fb98336ece5a5;;70.58.17.106;;;;39.
4 91470000000001;−105.0809;0;70.38.124.46;;;;45.5;−73.5833;0;66;66;S−6.1;U−6.
5 1.17;680;Logon attempt by;;WIN−XP/WIN−2003;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;MICROSOFT AUTHENT
6 ICATION PACKAGE V1 0;;;;;;;;0xC0000064;;;;
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The first consideration on the analysis of the event information is to determine which elements
of the event are relevant for processing and collection by the SIEM. A SIEM processes huge
volumes of information with a typical collection rate reaching around 20 000 events per second.
This mandates the need to ensure only required information is collected to aid the processing
utility of the SIEM. The relevant fields deemed necessary for further analysis through MASSIF
and OSSIM from the windows events are listed in Table 6.1.
Field Type Value
InternalTimeStamp TimeStamp 1325184445
The time the event was received in the normalisation
SensorName String fb2f0416b09c5e0611ee5319
The name of the sensor that orginated the event(example shown is in pseudonymised
format)
EventType String SE AUDITID UNKNOWN USER OR PWD
Event type as defined, if possible, by the device generating the event. The type is
otherwise derived from the reported event.
UserName String 675aa07dbab86489548c99c8
The username associated with the event(example shown is pseudonymised format)
SourceIP String x.x.x.x
The IP address of the source host)
SourcePort Integer 4958
The port of the origin of the event from the source host
DestinationIP String y.y.y.y
The IP address of the destination host
DestinationPort Integer 0
Port on the host at which the event was directed
EventID Integer 529
The unique ID of an event
SourceIPGeoLat Integer 529
Latitude of <SourceIP>or empty string if it is a private IP address.
SourceIPGeoLong Integer 529
Longitude of <SourceIP>or empty string if it is a private IP address.
DestinationIPGeoLat Integer 529
Latitude of <DestinationIP>or empty string if it is a private IP address.
DestinationIPGeoLongInteger 529
Longitude of <DestinationIP>or empty string if it is a private IP address.
Table 6.1: Windows Event required fields
In the Windows domain architecture, the procedure of logon and the process of authentication
are treated as separate concepts. A workstation logon through a domain account requires the
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workstation to then authenticate with the Authentication Server (AS) on the domain con-
troller. Two categories of security events allow the tracking of these events for both activities;
the Logon/Logoff category records logon activity, and Account Logon track all authentica-
tion events. These are the nature of the events that will be analysed in the SIEM environment.
Taking a look at the chosen fields, it is necessary to point out the EventID field is the only
event field, along with EventType, extracted of all the provided threat information fields. This
is because SIEM managers like OSSIM permit storage of event rule ID and their information
within databases, the log data sent through requires just the ID, while the rest of the data,
such as event descriptions can be pulled through from an request to the database. This allows
and lessening of stress in the volumes retrieved within the collection process of the analysis
cycle.
6.1.2 Event Set B: McAfee ePolicy Orchestrator
The McAfee event data contains threat information identified by McAfee such as threat type,
severity, name, action taken. This information applies mostly to assist detecting the following
attack misuse case;
• MC 5.5.5 Worm propagation
Listing 6.1-2 is an example event from the data set, note the pseudonymisation effects and
the McAfee event information regarding the action to be taken and identified threat.





e0559ee6821fb98336ece5a5;;;;;;;25;;;;fw.detect;1096;5;Anti−virus Standard Protection:Prevent mass
mailing worms from sending mail;access protection;would block;True;00000000028749EF;
Using threat information from Mcafee propagations can be traced in efforts to tracing the
source of the malicious spread within the network. We select the relevant fields from the data
that apply to the required information needs:
Field Type Value
AutoID Long 6370207
The unique id of an event(primary key)
ThreatEventID String 460bfe9ebd6978c9bb94bd44
Unique event ID of the logged threat.
SourceIPv4 String x.x.x.x
The ip address of the source computer)
TargetIPv4 String y.y.y.y
The ip address of the targeted computer
TargetUserName String e0559ee6821fb98336ece5a5
Username on the computer the threat targeted (example shown in pseudonymised
format)
CHAPTER 6. IMPLEMENTATION 74
TargetPort Integer 25
The port targeted by the threat
EventID Integer 529
The unique ID of an event
SourceIPV4GeoLat Integer 529
Latitude of <SourceIPV4>or empty string if it is a private IP address.
SourceIPV4GeoLong Integer 529
Longitude of <SourceIPV4>or empty string if it is a private IP address.
TargetIPV4GeoLat Integer 529
Latitude of <TargetIPV4>or empty string if it is a private IP address.
TargetIPV4GeoLon Integer 529
Latitude of <TargetIPV4>or empty string if it is a private IP address.
The same applies to the ThreatEventID field in the McAfee events, the event identifier is linked
to its information which is stored in a lookup table within OSSIM. This provision enables the
less parsing and handling of event information, minimising the parsing and collection time
effort, particularly beneficial optimisation for a framework handling data collection at such
great scales. Both event sets pull through IP sources, targets, ports and all geographical
information from event sources as the critical identification information.
6.2 Event Pre-processing
Prior to concept simulation, the data is evaluated on its content fields, the attestation of
results can only be validated depending on the provision of usefulness coming from the ex-
tracted fields. The main fields identified were, IP addresses, ports and geographical data of
source and targets.
Regarding geographical data, TSOM records this information recorded by sensors, however
the SNMP send trap doesn’t offer tokens yet for this purpose, the datasets therefore contain
partial geographical information and is not consistently present throughout the collected
events, for the required level of exploitation.
A workaround for this is to populate events that did not manage to obtain geolocation, with
a calculated estimation through the use of the IP address.
Of course, an assumption of this research is that location data can be provided directly into
the SIEM through conduits expressing this data. But in the event it does not, and in this
case where the data collection technique unrelated to SIEM collection itself commits partial
collection, this method is preferable. The great advantage as discussed in Chapter 3, is this
very ability to calculate additional geographical information from a such a fundamental field
in security, gaining more data for exploitation from existing ones.
The second concern is more specific to the SIEM applied in the investigation. OSSIM will
be used as the detection and response end of the resulting coagulation, the way it works in
terms of data management of sources is a very centric vision on the real-time aspect of events
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coming in from various sources. The events are pulled in and treated from the timestamps,
events older than three days are discarded from the event database making it possible for the
large flow of events to consistently stream in while avoiding an overflow in storage resources.
The datasets collected from the enterprise environment do not fall within this time limit, as
they have been collected in a much earlier time frame, on analysis of the timestamps OSSIM
will by default discard these events. There is no alternative available within OSSIM to change
this feature, as it’s purpose is focused on real-time analysis, not geared towards the processing
of relatively ‘old’ data.
These two issues need to be addressed to enable the test implementation to detect and utilise
events in the manner required. To facilitate the current limitations of trap collection and
OSSIM with respect to the data set of the managed enterprise, the logs undergo processing
to achieve the following:
• Real-time effect within a SIEM
• Addition of any missing geographical data through the events IP addresses
A script is written to facilitate this, and is run on the data sets before activation of the
plugn through OSSIM for detection of new events. The script procedures, written in python,
applied to the data sets are shown below;
6.2.1 Real-time Effect
Events falling in the same day need to be adjusted to the same day in the present time frame.
Therefore, each group of events is adjusted per date to the day of testing, the time in the
datetimestamp of the original events is not to be tampered with, only the date is extracted
and converted.
The function shown in Listing 6.2-3 is used if when using OSSIMs plugin method. The
approach exercises regular expressions (discussed later) to map a log event type to its own
schema. It would match the timestamp and map this directly to the timestamp that is
analysed if within real-time spans.







7 if(matchfrom != datematchto):
8 datematchto = matchfrom
9
10 #If the event date differs from preceeding event, prompt user for a new date, else change date to same date
set for preceeding event.
11 if(timestamp == True):
12 datechangeto = input(’Change the current field from %s to? ’ % time.strftime(’%Y−%m−%d %H:%M
:%S’, time.localtime(int(matchfrom))))
13 return datetime.datetime.strptime(datechangeto, ’%Y−%m−%d %H:%M:%S’).strftime(’%s’)
14 else:
15 datechangeto = input(’Change the current field from %s to?’ % matchfrom)
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16 return datechangeto
17 else:
18 if(timestamp == True):




The function written in Listing 6.2-4 searches for the geolocation fields within the data. If
the field is found empty, it performs a geographic-IP lookup to fill these fields. The tool used
is MaxMind’s downloadable GeoIP database. MaxMind1 is an open source tool collecting
geographic information on a global scale of IP addresses, stored in a database that can be
queried by this tool. The use of this information is free to all users and can be either queried
directly or downloaded with periodic updates. This procedure can easily be mimeographed
with a more advanced and accurate IP-to-Location tool such as Yong Wang’s street level
technique[61] discussed in Chapter 3, available in the form of paid services. For this research
however, an open source tool is considered sufficient for demonstration.




4 gi = pygeoip.GeoIP(’c:/Users/Herah/Documents/Mine/GeoIP/GeoLiteCity.dat’)
5
6 for line in args.infile:
7 if (args.logsource == ’tsom’):
8 timestamp = True
9 old date array = re.split(’;’, line)
10 arraylen = len(old date array)
11 if(arraylen > 3):
12 print(old date array)
13 if (len(old date array[15]) > 1) :
14 geosrcinfo = gi.record by addr(old date array[15]) # perform lookup from IP address
15 print(geosrcinfo[’latitude’])
16 old date array[19] = str(geosrcinfo[’latitude’])
17 old date array[20] = str(geosrcinfo[’longitude’])
6.3 Core Processing
OSSIM is needed to aid the scenario objective in augmenting attack detection with geoloca-
tion. The adaptation necessary for scenario events to channel into the body of OSSIM can
be done in two ways. The first, is to use the scripting plugin of OSSIM and pull in the data
from a specified directory with regular expression mapping techniques. The second, is to use
MASSIF to relay the data via a method such as syslog to OSSIM listening in on the specific
port. Both methods are discussed, with the latter eventuating to be the more apposite of the
two.
1 See http://www.maxmind.com/en/geolite city accuracy for accuracy details per country.
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6.3.1 Pilot Approach: Custom OSSIM Plugin
OSSIM encourages ease of integration with devices by providing users the means of creating
custom plugins. The rudimentary requirements for writing a plugin is the instantiation of a
plugin name and an unused plugin id. The pattern matching of the log event format into
predefined OSSIM variables (event mapping) is carried out and the definition of a source,
either process or directory from where the plugin is to periodically comb for new events.
The procedure required to initiate a plugin to connect the test data events to OSSIM for
analysis and correlation is described:
1. A plugin entry is made into the configuration file for the OSSIM agent (located in
/etc/ossim/agent). The entry is used to inform the OSSIM server to enable the plugin,
with its details defined in step 2, when the server is restarted.
2. The scripting of a new plugin file under the name defined in the configuration entry
made. Listing 6.3-5 is a plugin script written for parsing a sample data file extracted
from the Windows test data:















15 regexp= ...[insert regular expression to pattern match log into placeholders e.g (?P<eventid>[ˆ;]∗)]...
16




3. The creation of a regular expression specific to event formats, to map the meta-tags to
the incoming content.
The core of the plugin, is based on the regular expression mapping, if this is not correctly
created, the plugin will not retrieve any data. OSSIM stores plugins with the correctly
configured regular expressions specific to the event source of typical sources, such as
mcafee and windows server, however, in this case the events have been pre-processed
normalisation procedures as discussed earlier, modifying the event format.
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Regular expressions
A regular expression is a text pattern that is made of ordinary characters(for example,
alphabetic letters a to z) and special characters sometimes referred to as metacharacters.
The pattern this string makes defines what strings can match the given expression[44].
The resulting regular expression shown in Listing 6.3-6 is derived to map the windows
event logs.
Listing 6.3-6: Regular expression matching Windows events







The validation of a sequence can prove manually difficult, therefore must be run against
an expression checking tool to dissect the problems, available through python scripting
checks using its existing regex libraries(regexp). Table 6.2 is a reference table highlight-
ing sample expressions and meanings of regex(regular expression) syntax.
Regex Meaning
^ Indicated the beginning of a string
$ Has to occur at the end of a string
. Matches any line
* Preceeding item must match zero or more
times.
[ ] Bracket expression. Matches one of any
characters enclosed.
[^] Negates a bracket expression. Matches
one of any characters EXCEPT those en-
closed.
() Parentheses. Creates a substring or item
that metacharacters can be applied to
^\s*$ A full regular expression that matches a
blank line
Table 6.2: Regular expression common syntax
Mapping this is fairly straightforward, e.g plugin sid={$eventid} and so forth. This is
to be stored within the assigned directory for plugins of OSSIM, and activated in the
OSSIM framework script.
4. The creation of a plugin sid SQL file to map the OSSIM database to the data source
is carried out, shown in Listing 6.3-7. This step is responsible for mapping the event
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IDs to all the necessary event information needed by the SIEM and analyst in order to
evaluate the context and event activity.
Listing 6.3-7: SQL sequence for database population
1 −− Herah Test TSOM logs
2 −− Plugin id: 9010
3
4 DELETE FROM plugin WHERE id = ”9010”;
5 DELETE FROM plugin sid where plugin id = ”9010”;
6
7 INSERT INTO plugin (id, type, name, description) VALUES (9010, 1, ’herah−tsom’, ’Herahs TSOM
log testing’);
8 INSERT INTO plugin sid (plugin id, sid, category id, class id, name, priority, reliability) VALUES
(9010, 528, NULL, NULL, ’Successful logon’, 1, 3);
9 ...
5. Population of the OSSIM database on plugin data
On the OSSIM server, the SQL script created is run on the OSSIM database. Once the
server is restarted the plugin should be working and present with the OSSIM interface
as a recognised source of security input. The data to be collected through the plugin
will be identified through the OSSIM database, and enriched with event descriptions on
the OSSIM server, after the collection process.
This approach allowed OSSIM to retrieve geolocation data from the collected data sets for
exploitation in the event analysis tools in the correlation phase. This satisfies the aim of
enabling geolocation for security augmentation techniques, as required in the design objec-
tives. The limitation realised through this method however is the lack of privacy-enforcing
procedures performed on the geolocation before passing it through to the OSSIM correlation
devices and interface. In this manner, the geolocation data is managed within the SIEM in the
clear, a significant issue in regulation and compliance of user data from various jurisdictions.
6.3.2 Final Approach: Integration with MASSIF
The OSSIM plugin approach is feasible but is not a complete solution to the objectives of
the study. To satisfy the privacy objective for geolocation the data needs modification pro-
cedures that ensures this condition and keeps the original event version in a secure manner
for integrity purposes.
The conceptual design shown in section 5.5 is the final approach chosen where the GET is
used as the anonymiser of geolocation data before reaching OSSIM. The plugin approach is
modified to use the GET. The basic adjustments are:
1. The plugin source: Modified from log file to syslog, with events being sent from the GET.
Sending through the Syslog server of the GET enables event replay and the environment
to simulate real-time.
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2. The format: From windows normalised format, the events are modified through the GET
and conveniently converted to send directly in OSSIM format,decreasing conversion time
when received on the OSSIM server.
This approach[20] attempts integration of selected MASSIF components in a non-invasive
way using the existing methods and interfaces of the OSSIM platform.
Since the GET is to be used in this experiment for applicable privacy-enforcing procedures it
is convenient to utilise its sender agent and replay tool, events can be sent to OSSIM through
a secure channel like the REB from the GET. Therefore, the task of channeling the events
to OSSIM is shifted to the shoulders of MASSIF with OSSIM to function on the receiving
end. The replay tool makes use of the Syslog protocol(briefly discussed in section 5.2) more
specifically, the RFC 3164 BSD Syslog Protocol, for event replay.
The protocol architecture can be seen as consisting of the following definitions; device, relay
and collector. The device is typically known as the machine that generates messages. The
relay is a machine that can receive and forward messages to another machine. The collector
receives messages but does not forward it to any machine, it is also referred to as the syslog
server. Some machines can hold back a section of messages, thus acting as both collector and
relay[35].
Replaying the event data through syslog removes the real-time issue incurred earlier, as the
OSSIM agents plant their own timestamps on the data, in which case it appears real-time.
But, this brings along another issue which is that of the actual time differences in events not
being taken into account. This can be solved for the simulation, by getting the timing to
mimeograph the attack timing patterns, through the use of delays. This is preferred over the
first attempt as a smooth flow of event transmission and approach to testing.
6.3.3 Event Correlation
Various patterns can be detected through the use of correlation of data. The link between
activities in a time sequence can provide insight into the intention of a user. The following two
implementations of correlations listed, were constructed to identify an attack while applying
geolocation. The first is applied within a brute-force attack detection, the second applies to
an unauthorised login detection.
The rule of suspicious activity from a region that consistently records a high level of malicious
activity (poor geo-reputation), can be applied in a correlation rule. The entire correlation
rule sequence for brute-force attacks triggered from areas with malicious geo-reputation is
demonstrated in Listing 6.3-8.
Listing 6.3-8: Brute-force Geo-centered Correlation Rule
1 <directive id=”500000” name=”Brute Force Attack from US Denver City location Against DST IP”
priority=”4”>
2 <rule type=”detector” name=” Authentication failure”
3 reliability=”0” occurrence=”1” from=”ANY” to=”ANY”
4 port from=”ANY” port to=”ANY”
5 plugin id=”9010”
6 userdata1=”FIND:39.9”




10 <rule type=”detector” name=”Successful Auth (After 1 failed)”
11 reliability=”1” occurrence=”1” from=”1:SRC IP”
12 to=”1:DST IP”
13 port from=”ANY” time out=”15” port to=”ANY”
14 plugin id=”9010” plugin sid=”528,4624,540”/>
15 <rule type=”detector” name=”SSH Auth failure (10 times)”
16 reliability=”2” occurrence=”10”
17 from=”1:SRC IP” to=”1:DST IP”





23 <rule type=”detector” name=”Successful Authentication (After 1 failed)”
24 reliability=”4” occurrence=”1”
25 from=”1:SRC IP” to=”1:DST IP”
26 port from=”ANY” time out=”100”
27 port to=”ANY”
28 plugin id=”9010” plugin sid=”528,4624,540”/>
29 <rule type=”detector” name=” Account Access Denial (5 times)”
30 reliability=”4” occurrence=”5”
31 from=”1:SRC IP” to=”1:DST IP”






38 <rule type=”detector” name=” Successful Authentication (After 1
failed)”
39 reliability=”6” occurrence=”1” from=”1:SRC IP” to=”1:
DST IP”
40 port from=”ANY” time out=”150” port to=”ANY”
41 plugin id=”9010”
42 plugin sid=”528,4624,540”/>
43 <rule type=”detector” name=”Authentication failure”
44 reliability=”7” occurrence=”1” from=”1:SRC IP” to=”1:
DST IP”
45 port from=”ANY” time out=”4000” port to=”ANY”











The detection of a ’log in’ from different physical locations with an impossible time frame for
a user to travel between the places, for example, Zimbabwe and Russia, can be applied to a
correlation rule, this is demonstrated in Listing 6.3-9.
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Listing 6.3-9: Suspicious user location pattern triggering
1
2 <directive id=”500001” name=”Impossible login from location with DST IP” priority=”4”>
3 <rule type=”detector” name=”First Successful Auth”
4 reliability=”0” occurrence=”1” from=”ANY” to=”ANY”




9 <rule type=”detector” name=”Duplicated Successful Auth”
10 reliability=”1” occurrence=”1” from=”1:SRC IP”
11 to=”1:DST IP”
12 port from=”ANY” time out=”15” port to=”ANY”





The GET Framework is mainly used for normalisation, event collection and aggregation. For
this scenario however, the events received by the GET are already parsed and normalised.
The purpose of adapting the GET is to determine whether further functionality can be pro-
vided than the current tools used by the existing SIEM. In this particular case we look at
GET in terms of data anonymisation and pre-correlation abilities. Events from the MESI
scenario will be retrieved and sent to OSSIM through the GET which will present additional
possibilities of anonymisation and correlation not available through the existing OSSIM cor-
relation engine mechanisms.
In order to address privacy concerns, the MASSIF GET applies the mechanism of location
anonymisation in conjunction with pre-processing of data at the edge of the SIEM, such as
data suppression, aggregation and filtering. This solution limits the disclosure of personal
data that cross the event collection boundaries of companies or organizations. Also, in order
to maintain the full evidence contained in the source logs, the original data is transmitted to
the SIEM correlation engine after proper encryption.
6.4.1 Event Location Anonymisation
The events from the managed enterprise are anonymised and the original event payload is
encrypted at the edge MASSIF architecture. This mechanism allows to avoid disclosure of
sensitive data out of the security data collection systems of the MASSIF tools.
Approaches to provide K-anonymity in GPS based systems are given for instance in [24]. The
main idea is to round off the location coordinates in order to cloaking the detailed position
of users in a wider region including at least other k-1 users.
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6.4.2 Event Parsing
The GET tool is a product of project partner CINI in MASSIF. They provide its modifica-
tions for a scenario such as the GET adaptable parsers (APs) that read in the event data
for normalisation(in this case, anonymisation) procedures. For the managed enterprise sce-
nario, the following parsers were created after providing them the relevant data schemas for
simulation:
• Mcafee v1.jar, a jar file applying the mapping from the provided schemas to OSSIM
normalised format for McAfee events.
• WinSer v1.jar, a jar file applying the mapping from the provided schemas to OSSIM
normalised format for Windows Server 2003 events.
The mappings provided for the jar creation are discussed in the next section. In order to
pass these events through to the OSSIM sensor that can receive the events, these applied
parsers will output data in OSSIM normalized event format, more specifically the required
field mapping to ensure OSSIM reads the data appropriately. In addition to this rules need
to be defined in the OSSIM Database for the specific event types. The database will store
the event type ID’s and their information. These rules, seen in Table 6.3, are used to iden-
tify the type of events that stream through from these event ID’s for the Windows Server logs.
Event ID Rule Description
Logon/Logoff
528/4624 Successful Logon
540/4624 Successful Network Logon
529/4625 Logon Failure: Unknown username or bad password
530/4625 Logon Failure: Account logon time restriction violation
531/4625 Logon Failure: Account currently disable
532/4625 Logon Failure: The specified user account has expired
533/4625 Logon Failure: User not allowed to logon at this computer
534/4625 Logon Failure: The user has not been granted the requested logon
537/4625 Logon Failure: An unexpected error occured during logon
539/4625 Logon Failure: Account locked out
576/4672 Special privileges assigned to new logon
538/4634 User logoff
551/4647 User initiated logoff
Account logon
672/4768 A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested
673/4769 A Kerberos service ticket was requested
675/4771 Kerberos pre-authentication failed
680/4776 A domain controller attempted to validate account credentials
Table 6.3: Windows Server Rules fed into OSSIM database for relevant event ID’s
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In subsection 6.3.1, steps 4 and 5 complete the rule definition for the event format. The
SQL file constructed for the OSSIM plugin matches the specific event format IDs and type
definitions for recognition within the OSSIM SIEM regardless of the source of the plugin.
6.4.3 Event Schema Mapping
To send the events through to OSSIM with the afore-mentioned parsers the event fields need
to be mapped to the OSSIM normalized event format, to ensure OSSIM will read the data
appropriately. Listing 6.4-10 depicts the typical format of an event converted from it’s source
into OSSIM normalized format.
Listing 6.4-10: Event in OSSIM normalized format
1 2010−05−30 13:15:49,441 Output [INFO]: event type=”detector” date=”1275239752”
2 sensor=”192.168.178.201” interface=”eth0” plugin id=”4003” plugin sid=”7”
3 src ip=”192.168.178.20” src port=”4445” dst ip=”192.168.178.200” dst port=”22”
4 username=”root” log=”May 30 13:15:52 dmz01 sshd[12980]: Accepted password for
5 root from 192.168.178.20 port 4445 ssh2” fdate=”2010−05−30 13:15:52” tzone=”0”
The necessary fields listed with their purpose are described in Table 6.4.
Attributes Description
TYPE Type of event: detector/monitor, reserved for OSSIM internal purposes
DATE Date on which the event was generated provided by the event source
SENSOR IP address of the generating sensor or the source
INTERFACE Name of the network interface associated with the event
PLUGIN ID Identifier of the data source (plugin) that generated the event
PLUGIN SID Type of event specific to the data source that generated the event
PRIORITY Event priority, used in risk calculation
PROTOCOL The communication protocol used (TCP, UDP, ICMP, etc.)
SRC IP Source IP address of the generated event
SRC PORT Source port of the generated event
DST IP Destination IP address of the generated event
DST PORT Destination port of the generated event
LOG the original log entry
DATA Stores the event payload, can be used to store plugin specific data
USERNAME User generating the event, mainly used in HIDS (Host-based intrusion
detection system) events
PASSWORD Password used in an event
FILENAME File used in an event, mainly used in HIDS, can be also used in events
where the normalizing plugin can recognize a generic filename
userdata1...userdata9 These fields can be used to store arbitrary data being relevant to the
plugin
Table 6.4: OSSIM Event Format Description
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6.4.4 Attribute Mapping
Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 show the field mapping required for the two main event sources that
will be using OSSIM. Rows highlighted in red are OSSIM fields not used or are assigned by







PLUGIN SID 34 EventID
PRIORITY
PROTOCOL
SRC IP 16 sourceIP
SRC PORT 22 sourcePort
DST IP 23 DestinationIP















Table 6.5: MESI Windows Server OSSIM Event Mapping
It is important to note EVENT TYPE is not required to be mapped into OSSIM as the
information can be retrieved using the EVENT ID which maps from the event rule table
already created in OSSIM for this event type.







PLUGIN SID 58 EventID
PRIORITY
PROTOCOL
SRC IP 28 sourceIP
SRC PORT sourcePort
DST IP 39 DestinationIP















Table 6.6: MESI Mcafee OSSIM Event Mapping
Here again the EVENT TYPE is not required to be mapped into OSSIM as the information
can be retrieved using the ThreatEvent ID which maps from the event rule table already
created in OSSIM for this event type. In both event source mapping requirements, geolocation
data is fed in through the OSSIM void type userdata fields
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In conclusion, the event data manipulation performs the following cycle, summarised in Fig-
ure 6.1.
Figure 6.1: Anonymisation through Generalisation
This satisfies the design objectives determined for the events and format requirements through
the MASSIF elements and within the OSSIM SIEM solution.
6.5 The Final Integration
The Misuse cases identified for the Managed Enterprise Service Infrastructure scenario can be
reproduced though the use of existing correlation directives modelled for a SIEM system. The
first step to reproducing these cases is to identify the sequence per use case. The Managed
Enterprise Service Infrastructure scenario is based on a managed IT outsource environment,
where events from multiple sources are collected centrally. The events typically include oper-
ating system, router, firewall and desktop security related activities. The brute-force attack
was chosen, for the proof-of-concept demonstration of a test misuse case as it encompasses
the study objectives and is applicable in several contexts.
6.5.1 MC 5.5.1 Brute-force Simulation
In order to show the MASSIF feature to protect locational data, we considered the misuse
case defined as Brute force attack (Misuse case 5.5.1, MASSIF Deliverable D2.1.1 [41] ). The
Brute force is a common method for password hacking and is particularly relevant in large
enterprises due to the many users being the likely weak point for infiltration.
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The full details of the misuse case[41] simulated in the demonstration experiment is given in
Table 6.7.
MISUSE CASE 2 Brute-Force Password Attack
1 System prompts user for login details
2 Unauthorised user performs multiple attempts to log
in using many username/password combinations
3 System authenticates the authorised user’s successful
combination and creates a new session.
EXTENSIONS Step Branching Action
-
VARIATIONS Step Branching Action
3a1 Detection Mechanisms discover a brute-force attack
attempt and lock the computer to prevent any further
combinations from being attempted.
Exceptions - -
Other Information Most systems already have in place measures which identify failed
authentication attempts within close succession. The result often
locks the user from accessing the machine. Through early detec-
tion of port scans or automated login attempts, the damage from
such an attack being successful can be reduced or eliminated
OPEN ISSUES N/A
Table 6.7: Brute-force Misuse Case MC5.5.1
The directive (Listing 6.3-8), was created for the testbed simulation to verify the retrieval
of geolocation through SIEMS, and their use in detection and reponse. SIEMs stucturally,
are heavy frameworks and internally complicated. It’s significant to consider the ease of
integration of geolocation data into these tools and the OSSIM solution, to advocate the
fundamental reasons in investing the efforts to exploiting the data.
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6.5.2 The Testbed
The test solution makes use of three virtual machines named VM1, VM2, and VM3 respec-
tively. These machines and their specifications are discussed in Table 6.8.
Virtual Machine Operating System Description
VM1: MASSIF-RES Windows 7 Hosts Syslog tool for event replay
and the RES visualization interface
VM2: OSSIM OSSIM 4.0.2 Debian The OSSIM solution with REB
node
VM3: MASSIF-GET Ubuntu 10.04 Hosts the GET Framework and RES
tool
Table 6.8: Testbed virtual machines and their specifications
VM1 hosts the Syslog generator tool that replays logs generated by the MESI infrastructure.
The logs contain evidence of brute force attacks and the GPS locations of users. VM3 hosts
the GET framework configured with a proper parser for Windows Server events processed by
the Tivoli Security Operation Manager (TSOM). The GET communicates with the OSSIM
Server through a REB node. VM2 hosts a second REB node that collects the events sent by
the GET and passes them to the OSSIM Server. Once alerts are triggered, the events are
stored on the RES, which is installed on the VM3. Finally, the RES visualization interface is
installed on the VM1 machine. Figure 6.2 demonstrates the experimental setup for scenario
provider validation with MASSIF.
6.5.3 Execution Process
1. The Syslog client tool replays raw events, as shown in Figure 6.3, using the Syslog tool of
the GET. The event sets contains patterns of a brute-force attack targeting a Windows
Server machine in the environment.
2. Figure 6.4 demonstrates initiation of the REB server for event transfer to OSSIM. The
GET, seen in Figure 6.5, is used to collect, parse and translate these events into the
OSSIM Normalized format. Figure 6.6 demonstrates the replay of event logs using
rsyslog to be fed into the GET tool. The cycle of events from GET to OSSIM with the
REB tool is shown in Figure 6.7.
3. The GET encrypts each original log generated by the monitored infrastructure and
converts it into the OSSIM Normalized event, the formatted logs have an anonymised
version of the fields required for correlation on the OSSIM server. As seen in Figure 6.8,
the REB then transfers these encrypted events in OSSIM format to the OSSIM server.
4. OSSIM receives these events through the REB and applies the correlation directive. The
alarms triggered from the directive are stored both on the OSSIM alarm database and
on the RES. The RES contains the alarms and the triggering events with the encrypted
payload. These alarms stored on the RES, seen in Figure 6.9, can be decrypted only by
authorized parties(password-based encryption).
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Figure 6.2: Experimental setup with MASSIF and Alienvault
Figure 6.3: Original raw event data showing accurate geolocation
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Figure 6.4: Starting the REB server, ready to channel parsed events from the GET to OSSIM
Figure 6.5: Starting the GET tool
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Figure 6.6: Event replay of these raw logs to be sent to the GET
Figure 6.7: OSSIM, REB and GET
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Figure 6.8: REB sending encrypted events in OSSIM format from GET to OSSIM server
Figure 6.9: OSSIM generated alarms (left) and log events triggering the alarm (right) stored in RES
and can be retrieved by plugin id(top)
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6.6 Summary
With the Managed Enterprise simulation we aimed to determine novel security methods for
SIEMs like anonymisation and whether these can be integrated in commercial SIEMs. The
commercial SIEM considered in this demonstration was OSSIM by AlienVault.
The demonstration showed capabilities provided through the MASSIF GET tool to preserve
privacy and confidentiality. Sensitive information was anonymised and the original events
were encrypted at the edge of the SIEM by the GET. Data fields considered as ‘private or
potentially sensitive were specified to be geographic data, other data fields provided in the
logs where encrypted as not to be utilised within the SIEM.
In particular, the need was identified to ensure privacy of users in this managed environment
where services are outsourced and data handling is managed in areas of different jurisdictions.
Also, the demonstration used the operations of the RES system. The RES guarantees un-
forgeability of security events and implements the least persistence principle, i.e. just relevant
security events are stored and maintained for forensic purposes. Moreover, data on the RES
is demonstrated to be visible only to authorized parties.
The demonstration carried dissemination of events through the REB, which establishes a re-
liable communication between the GET component and the OSSIM Server.
Finally, the demonstration shows the OSSIM SIEM product seamlessly integrated with the
MASSIF components mentioned above. The objectives of the demonstration that were
achieved can be summarized as follows:
• Show confidentiality preservation capabilities:
At the edge, encryption of the event payload is performed. At the core, security alarms
are stored and restricted access is guaranteed.
• Show novel privacy implementation abilities:
Event field anonymisation is applied to location data to ensure the privacy of users
while still enabling the data to be used for security analysis purposes.
• Use of resilient mechanisms in the data layer of MASSIF:
Communications between the edge and core sides relies on the Resilient Event Bus. The
Alarm storage is based on Resilient Event Storage facilities(provided by CINI).
• Show ease of integrative abilities with an existing SIEM
• Integration between MASSIF data layer components and the OSSIM SIEM.
Chapter 7
Testing
The implementation discussed in the previous chapter considered a brute-force attack from
a windows server, in a standard managed enterprise environment monitored by a SIEM. OS-
SIM is used to emulate a typical live SIEM environment and is enhanced with anonymisation
capabilities and the accomodation to read geographical location data. The objectives of the
demonstration centrally focused on the validation of the hypothesis supporting the purpose
of this study. Security detection within the correlation engine - at the data and information
layer, encompassed the application of geographical data in an attack detection strategy. Novel
privacy implementation abilities were incorporated in the earlier stages of processing - at the
information gathering and normalisation level, for this geographical data.
This chapter proceeds to assess the data sets used in the experimental simulation(section 7.1),
the performance of the integration of various tools needed for the experiment, particularly
the GET tool (section 7.2), the anonymisation technique implemented for the location data
(section 7.3), and finally the application of geolocation in the the correlation phase of the
SIEM(section 7.4).
7.1 Event Preparation
The data used in the experimental run were collected from two data sources in particular,
Windows Log Parser and Windows Event Log. The collection amounted to 8,612,030 and
8,133,396 respectively. This totals the event sets retrieved for testing to 16,745,426 from
Windows Servers, collected by 47 sensors.
The data was analysed in two main considerations, the misuse case brute-force attack and
credible geographical content.
7.1.1 Misuse Case Data
The graph in Figure 7.1 shows the events statistics for a sample data set modelled to emu-
late the brute-force attack from a windows infiltration attempt. The data set is transported
through the client-server protocol Syslog to the GET, which acts as the collector, peforms
processing of events and sends it through to OSSIM, the acting SIEM for result and detection
evaluation.
The number of events identified by OSSIM when received by the GET totalled 98%, OSSIM
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did not recognise 2% of the received events. The loss was identified in events with uniden-
tifiable event type IDs, that were not present in the the previously loaded event rules (see
Table 6.3, section 6.4) in the event parsing phase of implementation into the OSSIM database.
Figure 7.1: MC-5.5.1 Event Frequency Distribution
The foreign/nonsensical IDs ascertain the default behaviour when an unknown Windows
log/ID is encountered by the SIEM. As observed through the test runs, the event is not
matched to a default ID or included at all in the SIEM correlation rather, discarded, and
can only be found through a manual analysis of the raw event logs. This is useful for noise
reduction and clarity but is an important consideration for high volume data, ensuring all
relevant event IDs for the specified data source are accounted for, particularly when changes
or additions are made of the source format. As an example, the Specified user account has
expired identifier for Windows servers is either 532 or 4625, both valid IDs for the rule.
The events colored in red indicate IDs in the login failure categories (539, 534, 533, 529),
16% of the data set indicated malfeasance or suspicious activity, this was the data needed
for the identification of a brute force according to the definitions specified in the OSSIM
correlation directive. The basic condition for the trigger required 15 consecutive login failures
from the same IP address within a limited time frame. 62% of the data (680, 538, 673, 540)
contained typical login data, authorised logins, logouts and authentication requests. The
events indicated in green (540) identified successful authentications, and finally the suspicious
events(540) such as requesting login through an expired account indicated in yellow.
7.1.2 Geographic Data
Geographic location data is comprised of a pair of co-ordinates. In the case of the event
sets used, the data is retrieved in geographic lattitude and longitude format. The number
of lattitude degrees changes in the direction of north-south and the longitude degrees in an
east-west direction. The degrees of lattitude and longitude are the units for determining an
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exact location on earth, and carries two attributes of consideration, precision and accuracy.
The precision of the degree does not verify the accuracy of the location, and vice versa.
Both need to be evaluated and considered seperately in their sufficiency for the purposes of
experimentation.
Locational Precision
First, the level of precision necessary for geographic location data is discussed. In an effort to
determine this, the physical distance between a ‘degree’ of longitude/ lattitude needs to be
calculated. Consider the equator, the center of the two North and South poles, it is divided
into 360 degrees of longitude. To ascertain the estimate metre per degree, the circumference
of the equator must be divided by the 360 degrees. Therefore, where dm is estimate metres







The radius of the semi-major axis of the Earth at the equator is recorded at 6,378,137.0
metres[5]. Therefore, the calculated equatorial circumference is 40,091 146.8 metres, dividing
by 360 gives the estimate metres for a degree of longitude, approximately 111.36km.
This calculation carries a certain margin of error, because the earth is not uniform and its
attributes constant as the assumption this calculation makes. Considering the earth as a
spherical shape, moving from the equator towards a pole a degree of longitude is multiplied
by the cosine of the latitude decreasing the distance to approach zero at the pole. A degree of
lattitude is therefore, either less or the same distance. When reaching the poles, the lattitudes
shrink towards the poles decreasing the distance measure of a degree, but this is only signifi-
cant over 80 degrees lattitude. Another factor is that the earth is in fact not purely spherical
and is rather defined as an an oblate speheroid, this gives a discrepancy at an estimate error
of 0.3%[58]. If one considers the margin of error in the context of determining the precision
level of location, the offset can be ignored with the current estimation sufficient for judging
the weight of geographic degree in physical distance.
Table 7.1 shows[63] the physical relation to the number of decimal places required for a
particular precision.
In conclusion, the level of precision at four decimal places can be seen as a sufficient threshold
requirement for determining a user location, with the precision working in a range of around
11 metres. For the purposes of this study data this is the maximum level considered in the
experimental scenario. The geographic location of users with a precision of this level is enough
indication for user identification should that be necessary in a jurisdication that explicitly
permits the use of geolocation data for authentication procedures under user consent.




Units 111 km Determines roughly the large state or country the point is in.
First Decimal
(0.0)
11.1km Can distinguish between cities.
Second Decimal
(0.00)
1.1km Narrows down to differentiation between villages.
Third Decimal
(0.000)
110m Can identify large facilties, such as a university campus or institution.
Fourth Decimal 11m Identify a patch of land, the level of granularity is typical to GPS unit accuracy.
Fifth 1.1m Can distinguish between trees, commercial GPS units can achieve this only
with differential correction[63].
Sixth 0.11m Can track the smallest details, especially in slow-travelling objects such as
glaciers.
Seventh 11mm Good for surveying needs, reaches the limit for a GPS-based instrument.
Eighth 1.1mm Very sensitive data measurements, tectonic plate movement for example
Ninth 110microns Level of microscopy, when determining a physical location, this is pointless
precision.
Table 7.1: Reference table of degree precision to distance
Locational Accuracy
The managed enterprise data sets from the windows servers containing geographic co-ordinates
fields, were obtained from sources typically connected to high-level accuracy sources, such as
GPS and mobile devices or WiFi router data. The level of precision from these devices ranged
between 0.4 to 0.6 decimal degrees.
However, some geographic data fields were not complete, in cases where some data sources did
not publish the information. To handle this, events from the data sets that revealed empty
location fields due to a missing sensor contribution or location source feed were populated
with information from the online MaxMind database, using the conversion of IP address to
geographical location. The accuracy of the data from this database varies depending on the
country.
Table 7.2 shows the percentages of data accuracy, retrieved from the developers of Maxmind
concerning the geo-database GeoCity used for the experimental evaluation.
If one compares the figures given for each country, the lowest accuracy is at 49% in Finland
and the highest 98% for Singpapore.
Examining the data accuracy levels in Figure 7.2, the average accuracy is seen dependant
stringently on the specific area of the globe the data comes from. Only one country is under
the 50% accuracy threshold with 19 over 60% accurate. The level of incorrectly resolved
information has a maximum of 34% with the average under 20%.
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Country Correctly Resolved Incorrectly Resolved Unresolved
Australia 66% 28% 6%
Austria 70% 15% 15%
Belgium 74% 4% 21%
Brazil 73% 19% 8%
Canada 84% 14% 3%
Denmark 83% 7% 10%
Finland 49% 14% 37%
France 63% 29% 8%
Germany 74% 19% 7%
India 50% 34% 16%
Italy 60% 27% 12%
Malaysia 71% 21% 7%
Netherlands 74% 6% 20%
New Zealand 66% 25% 9%
Norway 79% 10% 11%
Poland 56% 33% 11%
Singapore 98% 0% 2%
South Africa 71% 21% 7%
Spain 76% 15% 9%
Sweden 64% 14% 23%
Switzerland 59% 10% 32%
Turkey 77% 16% 8%
United Kingdom 71% 19% 10%
United States 81% 15% 4%
Table 7.2: Percentage data accuracy by Country, sourced from MaxMind
To summarise, the percentage level of accuracy estimated for IP address to geographic location
is above 60 for 83% of the countries listed.
Considering all freely available IP-to-GeoLocation services, Maxmind has positive results
considered sufficient for the purposes of this demonstration in the cases where geographic
data must be estimated with just an IP address available.
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Figure 7.2: Geolocation data accuracy trend for selected countries
7.2 SIEM Performance in a Managed Enterprise
The experimental simulation was performed on a Windows i7 dual core, Intel HP laptop, with
8GB ram capacity, 500GB storage space. The tools of MASSIF and the OSSIM solutions
were installed in Virtual Machines, running Ubuntu and Debian respectively, using VMWare
virtual box software. The measured rates should be considered with these capacities to
properly evaluate the performance of the tools and their integration.
7.2.1 Global Event Collection Rate
The first test concerned the rate of event collection, we assessed the number of events collected
per time unit(for all collectors and log sources). This is to ensure the events replayed through
the tools used (the GET tool), meets the performance requirement of a managed enterprise
environment. The rate of collecting must meet the needs of a managed enterprise expectation
to affirm the case of running this in a live environment. If bottlenecks, or event loss, occurs
then this will be a negative factor while the ability to handle all submitted events will be a
positive evaluation.
The results for the varied rate of submission are shown in Table 7.3. The prepared data sets
were replayed to the GET at different submission rates to assess the collection ability of the
tool and its effect in acting as the first point of entry and data collector for the SIEM.
In a typical managed enterprise environment, large reference clients are seen in the range of
10 000 - 20 000 EPS (events per second), or higher if network traffic is also included.
An estimate given by the source providers of the test data used in this study state around
30 000 EPS is seen sufficient to handle around 11 500 Desktops, 300 Servers and an estimate
total of 225 network devices. A large industry reference SOC In the USA has reported peak
processing in the order of 70 000 EPS. Commercial SIEM appliances typically handle 30 000
EPS before an additional appliance needs to be introduced.















100 Delay-0 18:28:34 18:28:35 100
506 Delay-0 23:48:52 23:48:53 506
1026 Delay-0 13:54:55 13:54:56 1026
1026 Delay-2 14:10:23 14:10:26 342
30000 Delay-0 13:33:28 13:34:01 909
30000 Delay-2 14:23:22 14:24:51 337
70954 Delay-0 14:17:33 14:18:28 1290
Table 7.3: Global Event Collection Rate Statistics
The observed contribution volumes in large enterprise environments are:
• 5 EPS multiplied by the number of servers in use with peak reaching 20 EPS at high
volumes.
• 150 EPS multiplied by the number of Authorisation Service Control (ASC) Centers with
peak of 1000 EPS at high loads.
Figure 7.3: Global event collecting input rate
Figure 7.3 compares the rate at which data is sent into the system and the rate at which all
events are collected in the system. It can be seen from the graph, the highest rate of events
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coming into the collector is around 1000 EPS, the maximum rate at which the system can be
seen to handle input rates.
Regarding the global event collecting input rate seen, for the current scenario the events are
stored in batch format, the processing time in a batch was evaluated and seen to be sufficient
for this rates of event delivery in the actual environment.
We observed a rate of around 1000 EPS per GET instance which satisfies the performance
requirement of this scenario with further observing that multiple instances of the GET can
be installed on the same machine. Thus the with two instances of the GET, and can further
increase its scale to accommodate copious event rates through this use of multiple GET
instances.
7.2.2 Output Rate for Output Processing
In the replay of sample log files we need to determine whether the tools used can process
events at the offered submission rates. If bottlenecks occur, or processors exhaust memory,
processing power before median loads are reached then this would indicate that the collec-
tor(in this simulation it is the GET) does not have the processing capacity to handle event
submission for a managed enterprise service environment. Scalability techniques should be












0 14:43:10 14:43:30 0.20
50 15:46:37 15:46:57 0.20
500 15:54:32 15:55:21 0.49
1000 16:16:13 16:17:36 0.83
Table 7.4: Output Rate for output processing statistics
A summary of results with test data sets for the MESI brute-force misuse case is shown in
Table 7.4. Delays have been tested from the minimum (ideally 0, around 0.1ms) delay possi-
ble on a real machine to a maximum range which includes the possibility of slow attacks in
addition to fast brute attack attempts.
Figure 7.4 compares the rate at which data is sent into the system and the resulting time
taken for all events to be correlated once in the system. It can be seen from the graph the
processing time is not dependant on delivery times for incident detection, the lowest EPS rate
from 0.20 to 0.83 for the largest delay time.
Confirmation of the processing ability of the GET at varied rates can be deduced from these
results based on the data set collected for the Managed Enterprise Service scenario.
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Figure 7.4: Output rate of processing comparison rates
7.2.3 Processing Time
The third performance test carried out was to measure the ability of the system to process
input data and to provide meaningful results in real-time.
The duration of processing time is evaluated between the timestamp of delivery and detection
in the event pattern sequence. This time represents the processing time of the GET tool to
analyse and OSSIM to detect the event set anomalies.
Regarding the simulation, the time taken for test input data to be processed by the GET was
recorded at an average of 20 seconds for the Brute-force misuse case. This statistic includes
the identification of brute force patterns from correlation procedures by OSSIM.
7.3 Geolocation Anonymisation
The method of geolocation anonymisation implemented in this study, adopts a method of gen-
eralisation. Where k is the precision value and k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, defining the decimal degree
of precision for a geographic co-ordinate. Therefore, an anonymisation level of 2, reduces the
precision to a 0.2 figure. To determine the cloaking effect achieved for a user in the different
level of granularities, the distance covering a range of precision needs to be calculated. The
co-ordinate range for a location (x, y) where x is lattitude, y is longitude and gen(p, k) =
value of p at precision k, can be defined as;
(gen(x, k), (gen(x, 0) + (1− gen(1, k))), gen(y, k)− (gen(y, 0), (1− gen(y, k))))
For example, if k is 2 and (x, y) is (45.2314 , 87.3333), the range is determined from the
above as (45.23, 45.99) , (87.33,87.99). The longest distance possible between any two
points in this area would be the diagonal line calculated of the rectangular area covered,
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this can be computed by finding the distance from the maximum bounds (gen(x, 0) + (1 −
gen(1, k)), (gen(y, 0) + (1 − gen(1, k)) to the minumum bounds gen(x, k), gen(y, k) of the
co-ordinate range.
The area of cloaking for each level of precision (referred to as anonymisation level) can be
evaluated using the distance in metres of this diagonal as a comparative measure. Assuming
the basis of a spherical earth, the physical distance covered by th diagonal can be calculated
through one or more applicable formulas discussed below.
7.3.1 Applicable Formulae
To determine the distance between two points on earth, depending on accuracy and complexity
the following methods can be used:
• Equirectangular approximation
• Spherical Law of Cosines
• Haversine
The basic formula approach is the Equirectangular approximation, this uses pythagoras the-
orem on a geographic projection. This is most applicable for very small distances with more
weight given to performance over accuracy. The accuracy is sufficient along the meridian but
varies on other positions on the globe depending on bearing ,distance and lattitude[58].
x =M λ · cosϕ (7.2)
y =M ϕ
d = R ·
√
x2 + y2
Where ϕ is latitude, λ is longitude, and R is the earths radius.
The spherical law of cosines can calculate an estimated precision to a few metres on the
earth[58], with more focus on calculation accuracy. The formula is simply;
d = acos(sinϕ1sinϕ2 + cosϕ1 · cosϕ2 · cos M λ) ·R (7.3)
Where ϕ is latitude, λ is longitude, and R is the earths radius.
Both formulae discussed are a better preference over the Haversine which is far more complex
numerical computation. The formula calculates the great-circle distance, ‘as the crow flies’,
between two points[58].
However, the Haversine is the best option for accuracy even at small distances unlike the
spherical law of cosines. As accuracy is a higher concern over performance in this case, to cal-
culate the diagonal distance the Haversine formula is adopted to obtain accurate comparisons.
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7.3.2 Haversine
The formula for calculating the great-circle distance is as follows:






d = ρ · c (7.6)
Where ϕ is latitude, λ is longitude, and ρ is the earths radius.
Assuming the radius of the earth is 6,378,137 metres, ρ = 6,378,137 m. The first step requires
conversion of the lattitude and longitude to spherical co-ordinates. ϕ and λ can be converted
to radians by multiplying by 2π/360◦, c would be the angular distance in radians.
Given two points in spherical coordinates (ρ, λ1, ψ1) and (ρ, λ2, ψ2), the arc made from con-
necting the points[12] is:
c = arccos(sinϕ1sin2cos(λ1− λ2) + cosϕ1cosϕ2). (7.7)
The great circle distance between the two locations is ρ · c.
Figure 7.5: Distance between upper, lower bounds of cloaking range at Level 1
A visualisation of the a geographic data point present in the test data for Denver city in
the United States of the great-circle diagonal is shown in Figure 7.5. The distance shown is
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calculated using the Haversine formula to be 14 026.48m.
One can compare the calculated diagonal at each anonymisation level to ascertain the scope of
spatial cloaking by the generalising anonymisation approach. In addition to this, the consider-
ation of the actual position of the geographic data point weighs into the distance calculations.
As discussed earlier in section 7.1, the distance between lattitude changes when reaching to-
wards either poles as the lines shrink towards zero. A degree of lattitude is therefore not a
consistent measurement when converted to metres.
To ensure the comparative assumptions made from our data sets are not subjective to these
changes rather than the levels of precision, we need to consider the global effect in geographic
terms of distance calculations. Therefore, in order to take all affecting factors into considera-
tion, randomly selected data samples covering all known countries of the world is incorporated
into the test range. The great-circle distance is then calculated at all levels of anonymisation
for each of these locations covering the globe.
In the following tables we show the results found through the use of the Haversine formula to
calculate the great-circle distance. The test geographic data points covered every populated
country. The list of valid populated countries from which testing is necessary was obtained
from the Google Maps API library, a source open to the public.
Country Code Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
Afghanistan AF 144942.7628 14463.3020 1446.3041 144.4971 14.3196
Albania AL 145622.7637 14572.4153 1457.3453 145.6010 14.4289
Algeria DZ 148196.0794 14847.0180 1484.6590 148.3331 14.6997
American Samoa AS 154941.2127 15499.1515 1549.9263 154.8526 15.3458
Andorra AD 138301.6409 13826.3875 1382.8651 138.1609 13.6916
Angola AO 134340.0711 13430.1471 1343.1748 134.1954 13.2987
Anguilla AI 153414.2997 15351.9631 1535.1629 153.3800 15.1998
Antarctica AQ 138301.6409 13857.5032 1385.8199 138.4569 13.7209
Antigua and Barbuda AG 134340.0711 13446.1826 1344.2170 134.2987 13.3089
Argentina AR 143543.1308 14372.1595 1437.4058 143.6137 14.2320
Armenia AM 157281.6147 15728.5360 1572.7409 157.1324 15.5717
Aruba AW 155573.5623 15555.8585 1555.5196 155.4130 15.4013
Australia AU 149955.9872 15009.5763 1500.6837 149.9336 14.8583
Austria AT 134340.0711 13430.1471 1343.1748 134.1954 13.2987
Azerbaijan AZ 144249.3331 14456.3680 1445.5416 144.4216 14.3120
Bahamas BS 135938.0671 13582.0089 1358.0391 135.6781 13.4456
Bahrain BH 152979.6997 15277.7416 1527.7502 152.6377 15.1263
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Country Code Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
Bangladesh BD 151040.4352 15096.1818 1509.2981 150.7942 14.9435
Barbados BB 130321.0619 13060.3542 1306.0385 130.4891 12.9314
Belarus BY 133537.1065 13333.7686 1332.8953 133.1732 13.19735
Belgium BE 131927.9674 13188.9420 1319.1378 131.7963 13.0609
Belize BZ 135140.6998 13494.2264 1349.4214 134.8211 13.3607
Benin BJ 156352.4911 15638.56761 1563.8156 156.2403 15.4833
Bermuda BM 145622.7637 14572.4153 1457.4123 145.6084 14.4296
Bhutan BT 148799.8178 14877.0360 1487.7784 148.6442 14.7305
Bolivia BO 136731.2669 13685.1135 1368.2699 136.7003 13.5469
Burundi BI 157281.6147 15729.3500 1572.7734 157.1359 15.5720
Bonaire BQ 155573.5623 15567.4736 1556.5358 155.5125 15.4112
Bosnia and Herzegovina BA 137519.4134 13716.6706 1371.8196 137.0581 13.5823
Botswana BW 133537.1065 13341.8087 1333.9405 133.2768 13.2076
BouvetIsland BV 135938.0671 13574.0470 1357.0837 135.5834 13.4362
Brazil BR 154941.2127 15502.4910 1550.1596 154.8763 15.3481
British Indian Ocean Territory IO 156756.3532 15678.2504 1567.7103 156.6300 15.5219
Brunei Darussalam BN 134340.0711 13454.1966 1345.3389 134.4100 13.3199
Bulgaria BG 135938.0671 13566.0812 1356.4465 135.5206 13.4299
BurkinaFaso BF 155573.5623 15564.6037 1556.3636 155.4953 15.4094
Cambodia KH 155573.5623 15555.8585 1555.4017 155.4000 15.3400
Cameroon CM 140604.4612 14079.3918 1407.6245 140.6324 13.9365
Canada CA 142824.8336 14264.4291 1426.1330 142.4824 14.1199
Cape Verde CV 135938.0671 13558.1115 1355.7292 135.4529 13.4232
Cayman Islands KY 142095.1397 14183.8093 1418.3643 141.7054 14.0429
Central African Republic CF 156923.1620 15689.9262 1568.9069 156.7500 15.5338
Chad TD 154591.8383 15460.9652 1545.9395 154.4550 15.3067
Chile CL 143543.1301 14343.6915 1434.0617 143.2768 14.1986
China CN 136731.2669 13669.3035 1366.4516 136.5202 13.5291
Christmas Island CX 156115.7489 15612.7823 1561.1502 155.9739 15.4569
Cocos(Keeling) Islands CC 149386.6241 14935.7975 1493.2428 149.1896 14.7845
Colombia CO 140604.4612 14056.7707 1405.5130 140.4282 13.9163
Comoros KM 155856.0386 15581.4831 1558.0219 155.6618 15.4259
Congo CG 157425.3797 15742.7200 1574.1318 157.2715 15.5855
The Democratic Republic Of The Congo CD 157185.8933 15723.1507 1572.1882 157.0770 15.5662
Cook Islands CK 152049.4647 15217.0158 1521.6368 152.0260 15.0656
Costa Rica CR 156352.4911 15629.5144 1562.8224 156.1408 15.4734
Croatia HR 135938.0671 13621.7559 1362.4104 136.1220 13.4896
Cuba CU 152049.4652 15202.5238 1520.2371 151.8886 15.0520
Curaçao CW 142824.8336 14307.8375 1430.3311 142.9018 14.1615
Cyprus CY 143543.1308 14379.2459 1437.9723 143.6667 14.2372
Czech Republic CZ 132732.7508 13245.2718 1324.6899 132.3477 13.1155
CôteD’Ivoire CI 156756.3533 15674.7030 1567.3563 156.5937 15.5183
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Country Code Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
Denmark DK 127146.4387 12734.4411 1273.2122 127.2078 12.6061
Djibouti DJ 136731.2669 13700.9028 1369.8489 136.8636 13.5631
Dominica DM 154591.8383 15460.9651 1546.0831 154.4693 15.3078
Dominican Republic DO 153414.2997 15330.7528 1533.0018 153.1620 15.1782
Ecuador EC 145622.763 14579.1172 1457.4793 145.6157 14.4307
Egypt EG 149386.6246 14918.3497 1491.8469 149.0530 14.7710
El Salvador SV 135140.6998 13486.2261 1348.7815 134.7540 13.3540
Equatorial Guinea GQ 157401.4037 15739.5315 1573.8096 157.2395 15.5823
Eritrea ER 145622.7630 14558.9690 1456.0018 145.4674 14.4157
Estonia EE 129520.9548 12964.2623 1296.4297 129.5299 12.8363
Ethiopia ET 156352.4911 15642.9552 1564.1657 156.2757 15.4868
Falkland Islands(Malvinas) FK 131123.7373 13092.4642 1308.7675 130.7577 12.9580
Faroe Islands FO 149955.9872 15004.0080 1500.0148 149.8667 14.8517
Fiji FJ 153828.0754 15372.6505 1537.2697 153.5892 15.2206
Finland FI 137519.4134 13732.4164 1373.0003 137.1745 13.5938
France FR 135140.6998 13534.1803 1353.4960 135.2258 13.4007
French Guiana GF 157281.6148 15724.1079 1572.2835 157.0870 15.5672
French Polynesia PF 153828.0754 15376.7249 1537.4326 153.6030 15.2219
French Southern Territories TF 128724.4477 12884.5569 1288.6978 128.7510 12.7591
Gabon GA 145622.7637 14585.8049 1458.3492 145.7033 14.4391
Gambia GM 155268.5405 15528.4088 1552.7170 155.1324 15.3735
Georgia GE 130321.0619 13068.3786 1306.7607 130.5580 12.9382
Germany DE 141354.7687 14101.9287 1410.3285 140.9093 13.9640
Ghana GH 156756.3533 15667.3267 1566.6012 156.5188 15.5109
Gibraltar GI 142824.8336 14307.8375 1430.6912 142.9436 14.1656
Greece GR 140604.4612 14094.4259 1409.1283 140.7864 13.9518
Greenland GL 130321.0619 13068.3787 1306.7607 130.5580 12.9382
Grenada GD 155573.5623 15567.4736 1556.7073 155.5301 15.4129
Guadeloupe GP 149386.6241 14953.0887 1495.0310 149.3711 14.8025
Guam GU 155268.5405 15528.4089 1552.7170 155.1321 15.3735
Guatemala GT 149386.6241 14953.0887 1495.0310 149.3711 14.8025
Guernsey GG 132732.7508 13277.4605 1327.5061 132.6307 13.1436
Guinea GN 156352.4911 15624.8490 1562.3562 156.0949 15.4689
Guinea-Bissau GW 155856.0389 15575.9473 1557.5800 155.6182 15.4216
Guyana GY 157185.8934 15714.6363 1571.3049 156.9896 15.5575
Haiti HT 153414.2997 15322.1234 1531.9661 153.0602 15.1681
Heard Island and McDonald Islands HM 129520.9540 12988.2457 1298.4280 129.7287 12.8560
Holy See(VaticanCityState) VA 142095.1397 14213.2766 1421.3101 142.0056 14.0726
Honduras HN 154591.8383 15471.6426 1546.8662 154.5458 15.3153
HongKong HK 151554.5959 15163.0153 1515.9393 151.4567 15.0092
Hungary HU 134340.0711 13462.2081 1345.9798 134.4788 13.3267
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Country Code Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
Iceland IS 134340.0711 13454.1966 1345.1787 134.3948 13.3184
India IN 139844.9788 14003.6718 1400.1271 139.8848 13.8625
Indonesia ID 136731.2669 13708.7894 1370.6376 136.9376 13.5704
Iran IR 145622.7637 14565.6993 1456.6070 145.5279 14.4217
Iraq IQ 144942.7628 14511.4685 1451.1872 144.9891 14.3683
Ireland IE 129520.9548 12956.2745 1295.7907 129.4644 12.8298
Isleof Man IM 128724.4485 12892.5091 1289.2545 128.8082 12.7648
Israel IL 139844.9788 13973.1388 1397.3031 139.6057 13.8348
Italy IT 139077.1042 13880.7662 1387.7583 138.6536 13.7404
Jamaica JM 153414.2997 15356.1425 1535.6636 153.4263 15.2044
Japan JP 142824.8336 14300.6315 1430.2590 142.8975 14.1610
Jersey JE 132732.7508 13293.5524 1329.5174 132.8325 13.1636
Jordan JO 146939.9575 14690.8241 1468.7246 146.7400 14.5418
Kazakhstan KZ 133537.1065 13390.0201 1339.1628 133.7921 13.2587
Kenya KE 157425.3797 15742.7919 1574.1378 157.2721 15.5855
Kiribati KI 157401.4037 15738.6927 1573.7166 157.2302 15.5814
Korea KP 144249.3331 14393.3818 1439.1736 143.7896 14.2494
Korea KR 143543.1308 14322.2146 1432.4156 143.1108 14.1821
Kuwait KW 147575.9417 14767.0411 1476.7903 147.5483 14.6219
Kyrgyzstan KG 139077.1042 13927.0928 1392.9305 139.16806 13.7914
Lao People’s Democratic Republic LA 146939.9575 14664.9257 1466.1330 146.4817 14.5162
Latvia LV 127146.4387 12687.4896 1268.4400 126.7263 12.5585
Lebanon LB 131123.7381 13116.5662 1311.5790 131.0419 12.9861
Lesotho LS 147575.9410 14748.1980 1474.9708 147.3615 14.6034
Liberia LR 156923.1620 15693.0501 1569.2023 156.7784 15.5366
Libya LY 149386.6246 14947.3425 1494.6862 149.3338 14.7989
Liechtenstein LI 131123.7381 13116.5662 1311.5790 131.0419 12.9861
Lithuania LT 139077.1042 13911.6809 1391.3901 139.0111 13.7759
Luxembourg LU 144249.3331 14456.3680 1445.4722 144.4188 14.3118
Macao MO 142095.1397 14176.4162 1417.4033 141.6131 14.0338
Macedonia MK 139077.1042 13896.2385 1389.8467 138.8569 13.7606
Madagascar MG 153414.2993 15339.2993 1533.9407 153.2571 15.1877
Malawi MW 155268.5402 15534.6656 1553.3113 155.1915 15.3793
Malaysia MY 157185.8934 15721.1649 1572.0105 157.0600 15.5645
Maldives MV 129520.9548 12940.3098 1294.1941 129.3049 12.8140
Mali ML 153828.0758 15380.7783 1537.8384 153.6472 15.2263
Malta MT 135140.6998 13486.2261 1348.3015 134.7052 13.3492
Marshall Islands MH 136731.2669 13669.3035 1366.7680 136.5565 13.5326
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Country Code Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
Martinique MQ 154941.2130 15489.0006 1548.7779 154.7396 15.3346
Mauritania MR 152049.4652 15226.5783 1522.7350 152.1353 15.0764
Mauritius MU 152524.6304 15259.4184 1525.8277 152.4438 15.1070
Mayotte YT 121193.4873 12136.98091 1213.345277 121.2271 12.0135
Mexico MX 151040.4352 15096.1818 1509.5614 150.8205 14.9462
Micronesia FM 149955.9872 15004.0080 1500.0148 149.8667 14.8517
Moldova MD 140604.4612 14094.4260 1409.3535 140.8081 13.9539
Monaco MC 137519.4134 13732.4164 1373.2363 137.1973 13.5961
Mongolia MN 135140.6998 13494.2264 1349.5014 134.8251 13.3610
Montenegro ME 135938.0671 13613.8151 1361.2195 136.0006 13.4775
Montserrat MS 145622.7637 14572.4153 1457.0770 145.57689 14.4265
Morocco MA 138301.6409 13834.1767 1383.6437 138.2379 13.6993
Mozambique MZ 153414.2993 15335.0365 1533.3016 153.1919 15.1812
Myanmar MM 152049.4652 15182.9257 1518.3288 151.6970 15.0330
Namibia NA 139844.9788 13950.1519 1395.2351 139.4006 13.8144
Nauru NR 157425.3797 15742.4323 1574.1049 157.2688 15.5852
Nepal NP 148196.0794 14828.8071 1482.4730 148.1142 14.6780
Netherlands NL 130321.0619 13060.3542 1306.0385 130.4883 12.9313
New Caledonia NC 143543.1308 14336.5445 1433.4899 143.2167 14.1926
New Zealand NZ 139844.978 13950.1519 1395.2351 139.4014 13.8145
Nicaragua NI 155573.5623 15546.9106 1554.5060 155.3105 15.3911
Niger NE 139077.1042 13911.6809 1390.6960 138.9463 13.7695
Nigeria NG 156352.4911 15645.1142 1564.2954 156.2895 15.4881
Niue NU 152979.6997 15317.7776 1531.6182 153.0242 15.1646
Norfolk Island NF 147575.941 14785.7406 1478.4722 147.7169 14.6386
Northern Mariana Islands MP 149955.9872 14992.8174 1499.0628 149.7711 14.8422
Norway NO 124080.5404 12412.0176 1240.9035 123.9805 12.2864
Oman OM 152049.4652 15202.5238 1520.2857 151.8929 15.0525
Pakistan PK 146939.9575 14703.6821 1470.0757 146.8749 14.5552
Palau PW 156756.3533 15674.7030 1567.3921 156.5982 15.5187
Palestine PS 146288.7002 14599.1374 1459.7493 145.8452 14.4532
Panama PA 139077.1042 13927.0928 1392.9305 139.1688 13.7915
Papua New Guinea PG 138301.6409 13795.1642 1379.5098 137.8241 13.6583
Paraguay PY 151040.4347 15106.6729 1510.5576 150.9211 14.9561
Peru PE 135140.6998 13510.2177 1351.1801 135.0000 13.3786
Philippines PH 155573.5623 15546.9106 1554.4758 155.3063 15.3907
Pitcairn PN 135140.6998 13550.1381 1355.0117 135.3772 13.4157
Poland PL 131123.7381 13076.4053 1307.8041 130.6591 12.9482
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Country Code Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
Portugal PT 140604.4612 14071.8607 1406.7205 140.5420 13.9276
Puerto Rico PR 153414.2997 15351.9631 1535.1629 153.3800 15.1998
Qatar QA 149955.9877 15004.0080 1500.2380 149.8890 14.8539
Romania RO 135938.0671 13558.1115 1355.7292 135.4521 13.4232
Russian Federation RU 123339.2316 12330.4807 1233.1211 123.2015 12.2092
Rwanda RW 157401.4036 15738.2373 1573.6845 157.2270 15.5811
Reunion Island RE 136731.2669 13669.3035 1366.5307 136.5297 13.5300
Saint Barthelemy BL 134340.0711 13438.1660 1343.7360 134.2555 13.3046
Saint Helena SH 128724.4485 12892.5091 1289.4136 128.8217 12.7661
Saint Kitts And Nevis KN 153828.0758 15388.8214 1538.7238 153.7329 15.2348
Saint Lucia LC 135938.0671 13558.1115 1355.8090 135.4561 13.4236
Saint Martin(FrenchPart) MF 153414.2997 15360.3010 1535.7467 153.4375 15.2055
Saint Pierre And Miquelon PM 135140.6998 13486.2261 1348.2214 134.7004 13.3487
Saint Vincent And The Grenadines VC 144942.7628 14511.4685 1451.2556 144.9925 14.3686
Samoa WS 155268.5402 15518.8563 1551.7300 155.0319 15.3635
San Marino SM 134340.0711 13414.1026 1341.1694 133.9950 13.2788
Sao Tome and Principe ST 157425.3797 15742.7680 1574.1338 157.2717 15.5855
Saudi Arabia SA 146939.9568 14722.8536 1472.4394 147.1143 14.5789
Senegal SN 131123.7381 13140.6816 1314.3120 131.3133 13.0130
Serbia RS 146939.9568 14722.8536 1472.2485 147.0927 14.5767
Seychelles SC 144942.7628 14470.2229 1446.9959 144.5683 14.3266
Sierra Leone SL 132732.7508 13285.5067 1328.0693 132.6862 13.1491
Singapore SG 157401.4037 15740.6102 1573.9178 157.2502 15.5834
Sint Maarten(Dutchpart) SX 153414.2997 15360.3010 1535.9956 153.4603 15.2078
Slovakia SK 133537.1065 13341.8087 1333.9405 133.2707 13.2070
Slovenia SI 135140.6998 13542.1610 1354.0546 135.2864 13.4068
Solomon Islands SB 135938.0671 13558.1115 1355.8887 135.4656 13.4245
Somalia SO 134340.0711 13446.1826 1344.6177 134.3427 13.3133
SouthAfrica ZA 146939.9568 14690.8240 1468.9181 146.7567 14.5435
South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands GS 128724.4477 12876.6093 1287.7440 128.6549 12.7496
South Sudan SS 156756.3533 15667.3267 1566.5634 156.5156 15.5106
Spain ES 139844.9788 13988.4222 1398.6021 139.7355 13.8476
SriLanka LK 156756.3533 15669.2059 1566.7329 156.5326 15.5122
Sudan SD 137519.4134 13716.6706 1371.4257 137.01559 13.5781
Suriname SR 157281.6148 15724.1079 1572.3023 157.0883 15.5673
Svalbard And Jan Mayen SJ 146939.9568 14671.4229 1466.8482 146.5544 14.5234
Swaziland SZ 134340.0711 13470.2169 1346.7005 134.5508 13.3339
Sweden SE 124080.5404 12434.4945 1243.5256 124.2380 12.3119
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Country Code Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
Switzerland CH 137519.4126 13740.2806 1373.6295 137.2397 13.6003
Syrian Arab Republic SY 144249.3331 14400.4310 1440.2305 143.8952 14.2599
Taiwan TW 151040.4352 15096.1818 1509.2454 150.7874 14.9429
Tajikistan TJ 141354.7687 14109.4219 1410.7031 140.9460 13.9677
Tanzania TZ 156923.1618 15694.5767 1569.2938 156.7874 15.5375
Thailand TH 131123.7381 13148.7226 1315.0356 131.3888 13.0205
Timor-Leste TL 135938.0671 13629.6922 1362.8865 136.1656 13.4939
Togo TG 134340.0711 13422.1259 1342.4530 134.1257 13.2917
Tokelau TK 156352.4908 15640.7730 1564.0351 156.2637 15.4856
Tonga TO 135938.0671 13629.6922 1362.7278 136.1513 13.4925
Trinidad and Tobago TT 156115.7492 15607.7946 1560.5256 155.9130 15.4508
Tunisia TN 143543.1308 14350.8267 1435.2031 143.3894 14.2098
Turkey TR 141354.7687 14101.9287 1409.9537 140.8696 13.9600
Turkmenistan TM 135938.0671 13566.0812 1356.7651 135.5556 13.4334
Turks and Caicos Islands TC 152049.4652 15197.6537 1519.4090 151.8044 15.0437
Tuvalu TV 156756.3532 15676.4884 1567.4634 156.6046 15.5194
Uganda UG 157401.4037 15740.6102 1573.9113 157.2495 15.5833
Ukraine UA 133537.1065 13365.9213 1336.2712 133.5032 13.2301
United Arab Emirates AE 151040.4352 15106.6730 1510.6621 150.9305 14.9571
United Kingdom GB 127932.5896 12805.3006 1280.2177 127.9038 12.6752
United States US 142095.1397 14242.5725 1423.8006 142.2552 14.0974
United States Minor Outlying Islands UM 152979.7001 15309.0242 1530.6108 152.9244 15.1547
Uruguay UY 145622.7630 14558.9690 1455.9344 145.4641 14.4153
Uzbekistan UZ 139077.1042 13919.3907 1391.6214 139.0350 13.7782
Vanuatu VU 154591.8380 15464.5461 1546.2262 154.4829 15.3091
Venezuela VE 135938.0671 13597.9204 1359.3121 135.8101 13.4587
VietNam VN 154941.2130 15509.1037 1550.7545 154.9347 15.3539
Virgin Islands VG 153414.2997 15343.5415 1534.3219 153.2960 15.1915
Virgin Islands VI 135938.0671 13582.0089 1357.7207 135.6471 13.4425
Wallis and Futuna WF 154941.2127 15502.4910 1549.9597 154.8570 15.3462
Western Sahara EH 150507.4152 15064.2585 1506.4785 150.5120 14.9156
Yemen YE 154591.8383 15457.3624 1545.5792 154.4197 15.3028
Zambia ZM 155268.5402 15537.7604 1553.6825 155.2289 15.3830
Zimbabwe ZW 152979.6997 15317.7776 1531.7923 153.0411 15.1662
Åland Islands AX 124080.5404 12434.4945 1243.1502 124.2005 12.3082
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The tests show Mayotte Island with the smallest haversine distance in all levels of anonymi-
sation, and Kenya with the longest haversine distance in all levels of anonymisation. A
comparison of all levels for each country shows an approximate variance between levels by a
multiplication factor of 10. This supports the initial calculation approximation in Table 7.1
for decimal degree precision area.
We assess the distance calculation difference in countries per level to ascertain the relevance
of the effect on the tabulated comparison estimations. An abritrary point from each country
was used to evaluate the pattern and effect of the physical distance between lattitudes on
every inhabited place in the world. By doing this, it can be confirmed what distance can be
cloaked at minimum and maximum at each anonymisation level.
Figure 7.6: Global Geographic data, Anonymisation Level: 0
The dataset shown in Figure 7.6 recorded the distance ranges from the highest at 157425
metres to a lowest of the 121193 metres. The largest great path distance recorded to be
157425.3797 metres was located in Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, Nauru and Kenya. The
average distance under the anonymisation cloak at level 0 for all countries was calculated
at 144397.2822 metres. The place with the smallest distance margin of 121193.4873 metres
was located at the French island Mayotte just off the coast of South-East Africa, between
north-western Madagascar and north-eastern Mozambique.
The dataset shown in Figure 7.7 recorded the distance ranges from the highest at around
15743 metres to a lowest of around 12137 metres. The largest great path distance recorded to
be 15742.7919 metres was located towards east africa in Kenya. The average distance under
the anonymisation cloak at level 1 for all countries was calculated at 14441.3983 metres. The
place with the smallest distance margin of 12136.9809 metres was located at the French island
Mayotte.
The dataset shown in Figure 7.8 recorded the distance ranges from the highest at 1574.1378
metres to a lowest of the 1213.3453 metres. The largest great path distance recorded to be
1574.1378 metres was located towards Kenya. The average distance under the anonymisation
cloak at level 2 for all countries was calculated at 1444.0303 metres. The country with the
smallest distance margin of 1213.3453 metres was located at the French island Mayotte.
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Figure 7.7: Global Geographic data, Anonymisation Level: 1
Figure 7.8: Global Geographic data, Anonymisation Level: 2
The dataset shown in Figure 7.9 recorded the distance ranges from the highest at 157.2721
metres to a lowest of the 121.2271 metres. The largest great path distance recorded to be
157.2721 metres was located once again, in Kenya. The average distance under the anonymi-
sation cloak at level 3 for all countries was calculated at 144.2730 metres. The country with
the smallest distance margin of 121.2271 metres was located at the French island Mayotte.
The dataset shown in Figure 7.10 recorded the distance ranges from the highest at 15.5855
metres to a lowest of the 12.0135 metres. The largest great path distance recorded to be
15.5855 metres was located in Kenya. The average distance under the anonymisation cloak
at level 4 for all countries was calculated at 14.2973 metres. The country with the smallest
distance margin of 14.2973 metres was located at the French island Mayotte.
At every level of anonymisation, the highest, average and lowest distances calculated matched
the same country statistics. Kenya, identified as the highest distance in all levels, lies on the
equator where the lattitude degree would be expected to be its maxmimum in metre distance.
The relative variance in the distances depending on the country maintained a consistent pat-
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tern at every level. This indicates the position on the globe does not interfere with the
distance difference in the levels of precision of that geographic location. Figure 7.11 shows
the relation between the anonymisation levels affected by geographic position when scaled in
1/(10k) where k is the anonymisation level. The y-axis indicates the distance measured in
metres, of the haversine diagonal distance for each location. The conclusions of the anonymi-
sation effect on the geographic data is summarised in Table 7.5.
Figure 7.9: Global Geographic data, Anonymisation Level: 3
Figure 7.10: Global Geographic data, Anonymisation Level: 4
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Figure 7.11: Haversine Distance Trend across countries for levels 0-4 of anonymisation
Level Great-Circle Distance (Haversine)
0 The geographic location can be estimated within an area at a maximum distance of
121194m - 157425m from the actual location.
1 The geographic location can be estimated within an area at a maximum distance of 12137m
- 15743m from the actual location.
2 The geographic location can be estimated within an area at a maximum distance of 1213m
- 1574m from the actual location.
3 The geographic location can be estimated within an area at a maximum distance of 121m
- 157m from the actual location.
4 The geographic location can be estimated within an area at a maximum distance of 12m
- 16m from the actual location.
Table 7.5: Haversine effect on anonymisation depending on geographic location
7.4 Geolocation-based Security
The SIEM utilises various methods for detecting anomalies from log data. The method used
in the implementation is the instruction of a correlation directive. The directive is essentially
a collection of rules and conditions, if a rule is met it becomes the premise for one or more
rules or invokes an alarm. The requirements set by the rule definitions aid security adminis-
trators in mining odd behaviour in a specific time-frame sequence of a user.
In the case of the brute-force attack implemented in this study, a consecutive number of login
attempts within a very small time window indicates suspicious script attack behaviour.
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Geographic location can be incorporated into a correlation rule definition as part of the con-
dition for a trigger. The value of this inclusion can be specified in two areas. Alarms can be
filtered through geographic context, promoting situational awareness and aiding prediction
patterns using location as the basis of monitoring. Suspicious user location behaviour can
indicate unauthorised access. An example rule definition would be, if user X logs out from
location Z and logs in from location C within a time gap of half an hour where the physical
possibility of this occurring is impossible (e.g Zimbabwe to Russia).
In order to verify the application of geolocation as a correlation rule, the additional condition
for the brute-force attack added the requirement ‘from a certain geographic location’. The
location-based brute-force detection was written, using Denver, USA as the test location. The
directive successfully triggered under the applied conditions, these confirmed results applied
for all levels of anonymisation which was a fundamental concern of the test. The results of a
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Table 7.6: Details of triggered alarm - misuse case Brute Force Geolocation
The successful application of geolocation data in anonymised format for security rule detection
indicates the feasibility of the anonymisation method, and validates the process of including
location-based security procedures to capitilise on location for identification.
7.5 Summary
This chapter evaluated the outcomes of the implemented simulation, in terms of data accuracy
and performance. The events sets were examined including geographic accuracy and precision
of the location fields. The hypothesis of this study ascertains the effect of geographic data
inclusion for SIEMs in a managed enterprise environmment. The performance focused on
affirming the conditions and expectation of a running SIEM in such an environment. Finally,
tests are carried out to evaluate the anonymisation effect on the geographic data, and the
application of location-based security analyis.
Chapter 8
Analysis of Results
The previous chapter assessed the implementation approach supporting the utilisation of ge-
olocation in security and privacy. We proceeded to validate the use of location in advancing
an existing open source SIEM with the support of an EU initiated SIEM research framework
which provided the necessary augmentation tools. The misuse case addressed in the test
simulation was a location-based brute force attack in a managed enterprise environment. In
addition to augmenting the SIEM security techniques with locational data, privacy proce-
dures were incorporated for this data when used with the SIEM solution.
To state it briefly, the following solutions were proposed in this study towards advancing
SIEMS in security and privacy with locations:
• A proposal for security augmentation with geolocation data, which is demonstrated
with;
Location-based incident detection in a managed enterprise environment.
• A SIEM privacy guideline which is demonstrated with;
Location anonymisation within SIEM applications after normalisation.
The simulation was carried out incorporating these validation requirements as a proof-of-
concept platform.
This chapter focuses on analysis of the conclusive results obtained from these research efforts
towards supporting the aims of this study. The results achieved and the implications of these
outcomes to the propositions made of applying geolocation data for security analysis with
enforced privacy measures are discussed and evaluated.
8.1 Interpretation of Findings
The experimental setup was executed using the collected data sets from the Managed enter-
prise. The implementation proved successful and demonstrated feasibility in tool adaptation,
modification, and integration of both OSSIM and the selected MASSIF tools with geoloca-
tion data. The results in terms of detection and experiment achievements are reported in this
section.
118
CHAPTER 8. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 119
8.1.1 SIEM Response
The OSSIM solution provides a web-based visualisation interface for viewing the events from
various sensors, statistics generation, and most importantly incident detection and response
through alarm generation. The test case(MC-5.5.1) executed a brute-force attack attempt,
prompting the correlation directive stored on the OSSIM server. The additional condition of
the directive was to examine the source location and raise the trigger only if it located to be
from Denver city, USA.
The geographic-based filtering applied here functioned as a test of the SIEM solution ability
to incorporate location in the correlation engine detection phases. Test data matching the
required conditions triggered the following alarms seen in the OSSIM interface:
Figure 8.1: Alarms raised from brute force from set location
The default asset value applied in the duration of this execution was 2, the highest priority
activated by the misuse data set was a level 4. Table 8.1 shows the resulting risk for the
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Calculated Risk
Correlation Rule Asset Value Reliability Priority/Threat Resulting Risk
Level 1 2 2 4 0
Level 2 2 4 4 1
Level 3 2 7 4 2
Table 8.1: Calculated Risk by OSSIM for MC-5.5.1 Brute-Force
For every alarm generated on the OSSIM server when a security rule is triggered, the trig-
gering events for the alarm can be examined, as shown in Figure 8.2, along with the level
of correlation it satisified to aid identification of which rule within the relevant directive was
satisfied by the event.
Figure 8.2: Triggering events for MC-5.5.1 from Denver, USA
The correlation rules specified for the brute-force attack has a collection of rules that need to
be satisfied to trigger the alarm. The correlation level in the results indicated all rules were
satisified within the directive, these are:
Initiation: 1 x Authentication failure of user from location (x, y) where x ∈ {39.9000...39.8999}
and y ∈ {−105, 1000...− 105.1999}
Level 1: WHILE T <T 1 IF 10 x Authentication failure of user [Reliability:2]
Level 2: WHILE T <T 2 IF Level 1 AND 5 x Authentication failure of user [Reliability:4]
Level 3: WHILE T <T 3 IF Level 2 AND 1 x Authentication failure of user [Reliability:7]
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T 1, T 2 and T 3 refer to the time frame within the event must be received in before rule expiry,
in this case these were set as 40, 400, 4000 seconds respectively. The actual events matching
all rules discussed above are reported in Table 8.2, for the windows server test data with the
correspondings level of correlation triggered and risk relation. The recorded detection time
of the attack from the time the first event of the data set was received by OSSIM to the time
of the alarm creation was recorded at 37 seconds.
The results are indicative of the success of applying location-based rules within a SIEM en-
vironment in processes surrounding user authentication. The application of location-based
examinations for situational awareness and suspicious incident detection provide significant
aid for security monitoring of global networks. In section 3.3 a matrix of geolocation based
security rules was introduced and discussed towards improving security in the areas of cloud,
mobility, advanced threats and regulatory compliance. Applying these rules in incident detec-
tion correlation procedures, as demonstrated in this study elevates the level of exploitation of
existing data present in logs sent to the SIEM. Environments such as that of a managed en-
terprise where copious amounts of security data are received every day globally, are scenarios
well applied for situational awareness and geographic compliance concerns.
Event Type and Details Risk Correlation Level
Logon Failure: Unknown username or bad password 0 4
ALARM: OSSIM generated Level 3 2 4
Logon Failure: User not allowed to log on at this computer 0 3
Logon Failure: The user has not been granted the requested login 0 3
Logon Failure: Account currently disabled 0 3
Logon Failure: Account locked out 0 3
Logon Failure: User not allowed to log on at this computer 0 3
ALARM: OSSIM generated Level 2 1 3
Logon Failure: User not allowed to log on at this computer 0 2
Logon Failure: Account currently disabled 0 2
Logon Failure: Unknown username or bad password 0 2
Logon Failure: The expected user account has expired 0 2
Logon Failure: Unknown username or bad password 0 2
Logon Failure: Unknown username or bad password 0 2
Logon Failure: Unknown username or bad password 0 2
Logon Failure: Unknown username or bad password 0 2
Logon Failure: Unknown username or bad password 0 2
Logon Failure: Unknown username or bad password 0 2
ALARM: OSSIM generated Level 1 0 2
Logon Failure: Unknown username or bad password 0 1
Table 8.2: Triggering event data for correlation level from the test MC-5.5.1
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Field Field name Comment
TSOM Specific
18 <SourceIPGeoCC> Two letter country code of <SourceIP>or string ”1918” if it is a private IP address
19 <SourceIPGeoASN> ASN of <SourceIP>or empty string if it is a private IP address.
20 <SourceIPGeoLat> Latitude of <SourceIP>or empty string if it is a private IP address
21 <SourceIPGeoLong> Longitude of <SourceIP>or empty string if it is a private IP address
25 <DestinationIPGeoCC> Two letter country code of <DestinationIP>or string ”1918” if it is a private IP address
26 <DestinationIPGeoASN> ASN of <DestinationIP>or empty string if it is a private IP address
27 <DestinationIPGeoLat> Latitude of <DestinationIP>or empty string if it is a private IP address
28 <DestinationIPGeoLong> Longitude of <DestinationIP>or empty string if it is a private IP address
Event Specific
40 <SourceIPGeoCC2> Two letter country code of <SourceIP2>or string ”1918” if it is a private IP address.
41 <SourceIPGeoASN2> ASN of<SourceIP2>or empty string if it is a private IP address.
42 <SourceIPGeoLat2> Latitude of<SourceIP2>or empty string if it is a private IP address.
43 <SourceIPGeoLong2> Longitude of<SourceIP2>or empty string if it is a private IP address.
Table 8.3: Event fields from sensor containing geographic information
8.1.2 Geographic Processing
The source data used in the test simulation considered event data from windows server
2003/2008 sources from a managed enterprise environment. The collected events retrieved
through SNMP underwent a normalisation procedure mapping event attributes to an input
vector. The input vector consists of two parts, TSOM-specific and Windows-specific. These
relate to different sources containing geographic information for source/destination events.
Field Validation
The TSOM-specific attributes were pulled from Tivoli’s central management system, contain-
ing information captured by the event aggregation module. The Windows-specific attributes
are obtained from the raw windows event through the $EVENT.INFO token. Both sources
capture geographic field data concerning the event, and at the very least, an flag indication
if it is a private IP address. An extract of the fields containing location information in both
sources is shown in Table 8.3. The fields highlighted in the table are the values extracted by
the GET for anonymisation procedures from the event logs. The preferred source of geoloca-
tion was the data pulled from the TSOM rather than the raw events, on the basis of higher
accountability of the TSOM sensors in providing valid information.
Process Validation
To examine the processing of these fields, consider the events from the test data with a ge-
ographic data point ρ from a location in Denver city, United States - the area chosen as the
primal area of investigation for an analysis test case. The relevant fields were <SourceIPGeo-
Lat>and <SourceIPGeoLong>. In the raw log, the fields were recorded as 39.91470000000001
and -105.0809, respectively.
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Before any correlation process held in the SIEM solution, all events went through three
transformation processes in the GET tool;
1. Encryption. The log was duplicated, encrypted using a password-based encryption
algorithm.
2. Anonymisation. The highlighted fields in Table 8.3 were anonymised at a level k —
where k could be any number from 0 to 4
3. OSSIM Schema mapping. The transformation vector for windows server events was
applied, mapping selected fields into OSSIM event fields. In the case of the geographic
data fields, they were placed in OSSIM USERDATA fields and the encrypted copy of
the log in the OSSIM LOG field. The resulting event line sent to OSSIM is shown in
Figure 8.3.
Figure 8.3: Format of test event sent to OSSIM
Depending on the level of anonymisation applied the geographic data fields received in OSSIM
varied, Figure 8.4 shows the values for a Level 1 test run.
The rules applied from the correlation require the geographic range of lattitude of 39.9 and
longitude of -105.1, this matches the range from the generalisation method applied by the
GET in the case of level 1, which converts 39.91470000000001 ->39.9 and -105.0809 ->-105.1.
However, the requirement for this process is to match the rule if the location is in Denver,
regardless of the level of anonymisation applied. Therefore, the detection must work with
all values within range bounds of anonymisation herefore for lattitude (39.9000, 39.9999...),
longitude (-105.0000, -105.9999...) all values in this range will satisfy the trigger rule (note:
decimal degrees past 0.9 can be considered pointless precision figures).
The successful triggering of the directive demonstrated at all levels in test runs validates
the anonymisation implementation on the geolocation data. This satisfies the requirement of
anonymisation of geolocation in the correlation process and its utilisation in the process of
incident detection from a certain location.
Finally, Table 8.4 shows the point range provided through the anonymisation obfuscation
method that can be obtained at each level. The maximum distance possible between two
points provisioned by the cloaking area is an estimate 14 000 metres at Level 1 to just 14
metres at Level 4. The preferred range can be applied depending on regulatory compliance
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Figure 8.4: Geographic field data values received in OSSIM
rules applying to the source country.
A map visualisation of the ranges for ρ was implemented using Google Maps JS API v3 to
evaluate the context of physical range covered by the cloaking area, shown in Figure 8.5.
The maxmimum obfuscation generalises to city level while the minimum is a granular level
of couple of metres. This allows for flexibility in geolocation based security application, if the
method is a geo-authentication procedure for a mobile user, the suitable level would be 4.
If it is geographic load-balancing in the cloud, jurisdiction enforcement and/or a compliance
procedure then a level 0 or 1 is sufficient.
Co-ordinates Anonymisation Level Maximum Distance(m)
39.xxxx -105.xxxx 0 140 604.50
39.9xxx -105.0xxx 1 14 026.48
39.91xx -105.08xx 2 1 401.99
39.914x -105.080x 3 140.15
39.9147 -105.0809 4 13.89
Table 8.4: Haversine distances for test Denver city data point
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Figure 8.5.a: Red: Level 1, v 14 000m Figure 8.5.b: Green: Level 2, v 1 400m
Figure 8.5.c: Blue: Level 3, v 140m Figure 8.5.d: Dark Blue: Level 4, v 14m
Figure 8.5: Spatial cloaking area for anonymisation of geolocation
8.2 Evaluation of Results
In the following section the effect of the integration of geolocation data into SIEM collection
and analysis is evaluated loosely based on the Common Criteria 1 standard as the strategy of
assessment. This criteria is a series of standards adapted to the evaluation of the security of
information technology software and devices. It is applied in this context to evaluate a SIEM
framework that applies geolocation security and privacy measures as a ‘next-generation’ SIEM
solution.
For this evaluation, MASSIF as a framework and OSSIM as a solution are the two SIEMs
assessed in their current abilities towards a ‘next-generation’ SIEM solution. The three cate-
gories of the evaluation criteria applying to this study are :
• Security
• Efficiency
1The Common Criteria(known as Common Criteria or CC) for Information Technology Security Evaluation
is an international standard (ISO/IEC 15408) for computer security certification.
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• Adaptability
These three areas are evaluated in the influence of geolocation on their quality of delivery as
a SIEM. For each criterion C within these areas, there are two considerations; the support
of the SIEMs of the criteria C and the effect of geolocation to criteria C. The assessment is
carried out on the SIEM(s) that were applied for that criteria in the experiment implemen-
tation of this research.
A primary concern of the overall outcome of this proposed research is that the basis of the
expectations of such integration do not compromise the existing SIEMs within these evalua-
tory facets, and that it encourages advanced functionality of the SIEMs.
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A description of the criterion template used and its various applicable fields is given below:
ID: e.g
M.F.1.1.1
Name: Name of the Cri-
terion
Category: e.g Security
Description: Description of this criterion
Rationale: Brief description explaining the importance of this criterion in our evaluation.
Metrics: The metrics used to evaluate the product, this dependant on the defined cri-
terion. The role of this metric is to aid the developer to define the score value.
For example, to evaluate the processing rate the metrics can represent the
number of processed events.
Evaluator: D Rank D Score 100%
Evaluation
assessment:




How the criterion is affected by the inclusion of geographic data in SIEM
security techniques and/or it’s privacy measures, and vice versa.
Table 8.5: Evaluation Criteria Template
Additional details of some fields for the evaluation criteria can be listed as the following:
1. : ID: A unique identifier of that criterion.
2. Rank: Importance of the criteria: this field is used to specify the importance or ranking
of each criterion. Each criterion may be assigned a rank of:
• M: for Mandatory,
• D: for Desirable, or
• O: for Optional.
3. Score: Record the score assigned to the criterion after evaluation. For example, a
scale value as 10/10 for fully satisfied, 5/10 for substantially satisfied, 1/10 for partially
satisfied or 0 for not satisfied.
4. Evaluator: the person who will evaluate the product/results using this criterion and set
up the score value. In this case, we are the evaluators (D), the partners of MASSIF
confirmed the outcomes in any instance where the MASSIF tool(s) applied.
The remainder of this section henceforth, uses this template to describe and evaluate the
SIEMs in security, efficiency and adaptability. The SIEMs, OSSIM and MASSIF framework
are only evaluated in the criterion functionality in which they were applied in the test simu-
lation.
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8.2.1 Security
The following tables address criteria that concern the SIEM provision in the area of security.
This functionality is referred to in terms of validity, protection and verification of data from
damage or tampering. This encompasses the concerns of users with regards to data privacy
rights and usage terms.
ID: M.F.1.1.0 Name: Data
Authenticity
Category: Security
Description: System capability to provide unforgeability, non-repudiation and fault toler-
ance of stored data.
Rationale: This criterion aims at evaluating the robustness of the SIEM to guarantee
authenticity, unforgeability and non-repudiation of stored data, when either
faults or intrusions are affecting the system.
The criterion provides a number representing the percentage of acceptable
data loss as a consequence of stored data corruption. This percentage is the
amount of lost data that can be recovered.
Metrics: Percentage
Evaluator: D Rank D Score 100%
Evaluation
assessment:
This can be assessed in the methods of data recovery put in place in the SIEM
system. The Resilient Event Storage of MASSIF does not permit events to be
edited that are in storage, to ensure data integrity and authenticity. Addition-
ally, measures of encryption can be taken by the GET for every original event
which can be stored as a copy along with the event sent for any processing
after collection. Since the SIEM is implemented with an enterprise storage
management solution beneath it, a virtualised replica of the store can be cre-
ated (mirrored) on an ongoing basis. Given the integrity checks of MASSIF
storage (from a security perspective) and underlying integrity of the Enterprise
storage (from a resilience perspective) it is considered that no data corruption




The data recovery methods applied are of direct relevance to geographic loca-
tion data stored in the event logs, particularly if this geographic data is used
to structure visualisation interfaces within the SIEM to enhance situational
awareness and for the enforcement of regulatory compliance through location
filters or rules. The test simulation applied encryption to the entire event
containing the location information. In addition to this, the utilisation of the
Resilient Event Storage to store the data and alarms in the simulation affirmed
the authenticity of the geographic data. This was facilitated through MASSIF
tools and satisfies the data authenticity requirement.
Table 8.6: M.F.1.1.0 - Data Authenticity
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Description: System reliability in guaranteeing privacy of forensic records
Rationale: This criterion aims at evaluating the reliability of the SIEM in providing
forensic records only to authorized parties. Specifically, the criterion eval-
uates whether the SIEM allows the unauthorized parties to access the forensic
records or not.
Metrics: Boolean Value: YES/NO
Evaluator: D Rank M Score TRUE
Evaluation
assessment:
Access control external to a SIEM will prevent unauthorised parties from
access and SIEM technologies such as those created in MASSIF can ensure
privacy through encryption and anonymisation methods. Any data sent used
for processing or security analysis is either encrypted or anonymised. Its only
present in its original form upon entry through collectors such the GET tool
of MASSIF. During any processing privacy of data is ensured and can cater




With regards to experimental simulation, the location fields were regarded as
private information, the GET tool ensured the data reliability and privacy
which can be used for forensic analysis, by encrypting the original field, and
anonymising the content to be processed further. The issue of ensuring privacy
of forensic records was supported by the geolocation implementation, as it in-
cluded the condition of geo-anonymisation. If this information was exploited
in the security analytic procedures without this consideration, the SIEM would
be violating its advocation of privacy, considering the sensitive nature of ge-
olocation data as explained in chapter 4. The simulation used anonymisation,
data encryption and resilient storage on the geolocation information brought
in, regardless of whether the data was to be used in security analysis or not.
This is an important observation, bringing into cogitation that geolocation
data most often present in logs from device networks, were not taken into
consideration for privacy such as within the OSSIM solution.
The experiment demonstrated privacy-enforcing procedures using the GET
to enhance OSSIM in this regard. The techniques applied from the point of
entry to it’s storage and finally, deletion. This satisfies the SIEMs ability in
privacy for it’s forensic records, in particular geolocation, which was explicitly
demonstrated and tested.
Table 8.7: M.F.2.1.0 - Privacy of forensic records
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Description: Sensitive corporate data within events needs to be anonymised.
Rationale: Anonymisation of event data is required, and a mapping from actual to
anonymised (coded) data will be conducted before providing data sets. Suit-
able audit trails and evidence leading towards inferences will be required to
ensure a legal basis for security findings from SIEM components.
Metrics: The event anonymization tool accepts CSV file input. Rows required to be
anonymized must be identified.
Evaluator: D Rank M Score TRUE
Evaluation as-
sessment:
Data with specification of which fields required anonymisation were given to
the MASSIF collector. The result logs produced were compared against the
output file results in terms of anonymisation and data integrity preservation of
fields meant to be unaffected. The method of anonymisation used was custom




The advanced anonymisation shown with MASSIF is the customisable
anonymisation ability of various fields whilst still enabling the data to be used
for security analysis detection, thus ensuring privacy has not been breached
while in use. This was applied to the geolocation information, with the cus-
tomisation applying to data in the format of decimal degrees of a lattitude
and longitude. The anonymisation applies to all geolocation source events.
The level of anonymisation can be adjusted depending on the requirement from
regulatory or user right specifications. The method applies a generalisation
technique, decreasing the precision of a geographic data point. The generali-
sation can cloak with an offset of an estimate 11 metres up to an area covering
a city. This specific SIEM requirement greatly satisfies the use of geolocation
in SIEM through the advanced anonymisation provision demonstrated with
the GET tool.
Table 8.8: E.F.3.1.0 - Data Anonymisation
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8.2.2 Efficiency
The following tables address the flexibility of the SIEM in aspects of data handling for the
wide and growing range of network domains and sources. It also addresses the functionality
of the SIEM with monitoring and defence mechanisms towards ‘identified’ adversaries.




Description: Number of security event formats supported by SIEM
Rationale: The aim of this criterion is to evaluate the capability of a SIEM to cope with
a large number of highly heterogeneous data sources originating from different
operational domains
Metrics: Number of supported event formats
Evaluator: D,U Rank M Score 2(out of 2)%
Evaluation
assessment:
SIEMs such as MASSIF and OSSIM cater for this through the use of parsers,
whilst OSSIM applies the parsing through the instruction of regular expres-
sion mapping, the GET tool creates a parser per event format and instructs




With regards to geolocation, two event formats were tested with using the
GET MASSIF tool, both containing geolocation information, and proved to
efficiently support them.
OSSIM also demonstrated, in the case of geolocation, the ability to read and
handle this information. The data was also applied in the correlation engine
showing support from information gathering to the data-to-information layers
(see Figure 2.1).
The ability to handle different data sources supports the ability to accomodate
sources of geolocation from sensors and other devices the are more equipped
in it’s provision. Therefore, SIEMs demonstrate strong capability to support
geolocation inclusion, with complete support given for all scenarios and their
unique data sources.
Table 8.9: M.E.17.1.0 - Heterogeneous data source support
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ID: E.E.23.1.0 Name: Track Logins Category: Efficiency
Description: Track failed and successful logins.
Rationale: Login attempts which fail more than 3 times may be an attempt at a brute
force attack. The source of the attempts must be recorded as well as the
targeted user
Metrics: Login events must be identified as well as whether they are successful or not.
Multiple failed attempts in rapid succession must be recorded. Users which
thereafter succeed to login must be flagged.
Evaluator: D Rank M Score Possible
Evaluation
assessment:
OSSIM provides visualisation, alarm generation and incident storage which
facilitate all tracking of events. The correlation directive component of OSSIM
can be applied to match attack patterns, a triggered directive initiates the
creation of an incident event that is stored in the OSSIM database and an




Geolocation factors can be applied using this functionality as seamlessly as it
is applied for default patterns of known attacks like the brute force. Login
attempts from an incorrect location for example, can flag a brute force at the
beginning of the attack after three base failed attempts. The tracking of logins
is particularly useful if the geographic data that comes with it is considered in
security analytics. Particularly for detecting unauthorised access and physical
areas of bad ip-reputation that can be blocked as pre-emptive measures. The
applied SIEM greatly satisfies this requirement and is strongly supported by
the use of geolocation for tracking suspicious behaviours.
Table 8.10: E.E.23.1.0 - Track logins
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8.2.3 Adaptability
The following table addresses the considerations of a SIEM with regards ease of adaptation
and compatibility for various platforms. The scope available for adjustment is a critical
component in assessing the feasibility of such a solution.





Description: The capability of the SIEM to adapt to any new event format by creating a
fully functional event parser.
Rationale: In order to improve the capabilities of the next generation SIEM, there needs
to be the ability to seamlessly integrate any type of security tools/probes
Metrics: Capability of integrating any new type of data feeds
Evaluator: D,U Rank M Score 2(out of 2)%
Evaluation
assessment:
MASSIF is able to integrate any type of security event feeds with the under-
standing that the creator has a sound level of the associated grammar knowl-
edge and of the environment. The integrative ability is facilitated through the
GET, that works with the parsers.
OSSIM is able to integrate any event format through plugins, provided the
user/creator has a sound understanding of regular expressions and also, the




With regards to the test experiment, two fully functional event parsers were
created and could be adapted to changes regarding the log information. This
applies to geolocation due to the fact the adaptation ability is the critical
requirement of the inclusive action of geolocation sources.
The SIEMs satisfy this requirement and in doing so, support geolocation for
exploitation possibilities.
Table 8.11: M.P.2.1.0 - Parsing expressiveness and adaptibility
8.3 Summary
This chapter discussed the resulting outcomes from the simulation applied and the conclusions
that can be drawn from the results. After the discussion of results, evaluation is carried out.
The evaluation concerned the advancement of SIEM with geolocation security and privacy
measures. Through the assessment of the SIEM provisions in the affecting criteria, the use of
geolocation is evaluated and considered in its support and feasibility of application to future
SIEM versions, towards a ‘next-generation’ SIEM. The effectiveness of the results of this
study are therefore evaluated in the context of the applied SIEMs.
Chapter 9
Conclusion
This chapter provides a summary of the research findings and practically applied evaluations
of geographic data in a SIEM context. The research highlights the need for expanding a
SIEM security infrastructures intelligence through the exploitation of existing data, and has a
strong focus on encompassing much-needed privacy compliance. The feasibility of geographic
location is discussed and evaluated in these areas, its application within the framework, and
the resulting outcomes. Finally, the results are weighed with the hypothesis put forth in this
research; concluding the research achievements and providing recommended future work.
9.1 Research Summary
Security information and event management technology refers to tools and processes for the
centralised real-time collection, integration, and analysis of log events occurring in a dis-
tributed system. The considerable advantage of centralised SIEM tools is the provision of
unified interfaces to a variety of disparate data, while also allowing real-time correlation of the
different events occurring in the collected parts, to effectively detect threats to the system[6].
This research involved an investigative study into the augmentation of SIEM technologies
within an enterprise environment. A managed enterprise environment has many issues re-
garding managed security operating with clients of typically large enterprise level. An existing
managed enterprise was considered as the source of identification of current security challenges
still faced by these environments. The most common security issues discovered were presented
as misuse cases;
• brute-force password attacks (MC-5.5.1),
• attempted unauthorised logins (MC-5.5.2),
• malicious SQL injection (MC-5.5.3),
• session hijacking through XSS (MC-5.5.4) and lastly,
• worm propogation (MC-5.5.5).
To determine the possibilities of advancing SIEM frameworks, by addressing these challenges
and the main concerns affectings security; the research proposed the use of geographic data as
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exploited in geographic information systems, to increase certainty of authenticity of certain
individuals.
To evaluate this feasibility, an insight into SIEM architecture was required. SIEMs can be
defined as holistic approaches to security analysis and detection. The framework centralises
and performs mining procedures on the collected data to produce insights into the conditions
of all devices and systems being monitored. The methods applied for security data manage-
ment and exploitation for analytics are a primary area of consideration for geographic data
exploitation. Such methods include the techniques of normalisation and pattern correlation
detections. Attacks can be profiled and analysed using these correlative abilities to detect pat-
terns of suspicious behaviour on the network. The method of correlation monitors incoming
data provided in logs defining certain aspects of an activity, for example a login process would
follow an authentication procedures. Deviations from the normal pattern of such a process
raises flags for the attention of security administrators in discovering potential attacks from
the mass of real-time collecting of data.
For inclusion within existing techniques such as correlation, geographic co-ordinate data and
its application in various security-enforcing systems through GIS are investigated. The ad-
vantages of geolocation data identified from existing systems with applied geographic data
can determine the augmentation potential of security within a SIEM.
To state it briefly the geolocation application investigated in the areas of security and analytics
filtering, provided the following advantages;
• Enhanced visualisation[33], geographic perspective aided the creation of contextual
viewing for administrators.
• Aiding user preparedness and rapid response, the use of a geographic context enabled a
user to quickly identify an area of concern and seperate it from the unconcerning data.
• Selective display[33], isolating errors or situations through filters based on geographic
location. This assisted in better analysis through isolation of specific areas for evalua-
tion.
• Predictive modelling, data such as geographic location has an element of identification
as a characteristic in certain situations. The behaviour of a target in terms of location
with relation to time realises movement patterns, which can be used to create predictions
for future events.
• Better network analysis and simulation, provided through the context of situational
awareness provided through mapping from geolocation.
• Improved decision making, this is aided through the increased ability to evaluate a
situation and a context, have a bird’s eye view.
• Facilitating dynamic visual intrusion detection[13], a network system state visualised
through physical locations, helps link a physical infiltration to the virtual context, al-
lowing the security to be considered in context at all layers.
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• Risk assessment of assets[47], locational context can provide the means to prevent tran-
gression of failures and prioritising certain assets depending on their physical implica-
tions if compromised. For example, a dam is a high priority critical infrastructure, if
an attacker infiltrated the automated control unit the repurcussions are extensive. The
use of geolocation to collate the asset value to potential hazard is instrumental value.
The advantages of geolocation data identified were then discussed in the context of SIEM
advancement in the two areas - security and privacy. The correct application of geolocation
to augment existing security techniques present in SIEM tools with applied privacy consid-
erations leads to the satisfaction of the hypothesis stated in this thesis. The hypothesis was
stated as the following;
Location-based information enhances SIEM capability to perform advanced security detection.
Privacy-enforcing procedures on geolocation in SIEMs and meta-systems alike are necessary
and enforceable.
Towards SIEM security, a matrix of geolocation based security procedures was introduced
that mapped their contributive abilities in the driving areas of security of today. The driving
areas are mobility, the cloud, advanced persistent threats and regulatory compliance. User
authentication through ‘contextual’ analytics such as location-based authentication has been
predicted to rise in enterprises by more the 30% by 2016[2].
The introduced procedures can be applied within SIEM security through the integration of
geolocation in correlation and analytic procedures. The effective results from application of
these techniques are dependant on the accuracy of the user geographic data, in which case
a set of geolocation accuracy techniques were evaluated. Wang’s street-level client indepen-
dant IP geolocation was resolved as the best solution, requiring only the IP address of the
concerned user for a street-level estimation of users whereabouts. The method uses a combi-
nation of pinging and landmark range search using surrounding routers.
Towards SIEM privacy, a guideline based on the EU Data Protection Directive[15] was intro-
duced. This considered the privacy implications from the Directive to a SIEM. SIEMs can
be seen as meta-systems containing information of other systems, thus an extremely sensitive
commodity of system or network. The enforceable requirements for SIEMs to adhere to in
order to increase protection of user data rights and privacy are made explicit in this guideline.
Regarding geolocation and privacy, techniques of anonymisation such as the use of general-
isation approaches are discussed. The application of this technique to support the efforts
towards enforcement of privacy is shown feasible for geolocation data.
Therefore, the inclusion of geolocation for security procedures through privacy-enforcing pro-
cedures supports both areas of argument presented in this research.
Once determined as a suitable solution, further study was carried out to explore the integra-
tion of geolocation into an existing SIEM. The implementation consisted the utilisation of
an existing open-source SIEM, OSSIM, and selected tools of the MASSIF SIEM framework.
Using a feasible integration, an integrated prototype was created and tested.
OSSIM was used to demonstrate the integration of geolocation in an existing SIEM for se-
curity analysis. The MASSIF tools were used to develop the privacy-enforcing technique
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on geolocation information entering this SIEM. The MASSIF tools also ensured the forensic
credibility of the data through protected storage. The privacy implications were addressed of
geolocation data through complete application in the prototype experiment.
The results of applying geolocation in an incident detection procedure addressing the brute-
force misuse case(MC-5.5.1) was fully accomplished. The data used in this test was anonymised
by the MASSIF GET tool prior to it’s exploitation within the SIEM. The anonymisation
ranges were tested at various levels and evaluated in their feasibility.
The implementation was assessed in the context of the relevant SIEM solution and framework,
how they augment functionalities of these SIEMs and to determine if the application is fully
supported and does not mitigate SIEM standard of delivery.
In conclusion, both the security application of geolocation-based detection and the anonymisa-
tion procedures undergone on the geolocation data proved feasible and successful for addition
within a SIEM.
9.2 Discussion
In the preliminary investigative stages of research, a collection of questions were raised, to-
wards satsifying the aims of this research. These questions are reviewed here, to determine if
they are satisfied supporting the achievement of the research hypothesis.
9.2.1 What can geolocation data provide for SIEMs? Is it significant?
As the accuracy and availability of geolocation data has increased, it’s application can be
seen in many avenues of security. The use of geolocation performs a provision of contextual
analytics, a stringent need in large and distributed environments for better awareness within
analysis of copious levels of security information.
Using geolocation as a second-level authentication or progressive authentication promotes
stronger security for mobile users, using the mobility as the method of contextual identifica-
tion. Process monitoring techniques can apply location in the authentication cycle, to support
the user authentication with their location as part of their logon identity. This significantly
curbs the possibilites of an unnauthorised user login. A compromised login is the gateway for
larger security crimes such as advanced persistent threats. By addressing the first phase of
attack through illegal user login the larger threats, harder to trace can be mitigated.
Another application within SIEMs is the use of location-based blocking, the unified approach
of SIEMs enables analysts to identify the patterns in terms of bad reputation sources. Apply-
ing this through the concept of bad geo-reputation, analysts can identify physical locations
on the globe which can be blocked for access based on users that repeatedly utilise suspicious
proxies or malicious behaviour.
In terms of regulatory compliance by SIEMs, geolocation can successfully enforce access re-
strictions. Therefore, geographic restrictions with data movement by data managers, support-
ing compliance is a salient contributive factor. The creation of security policies to consider
geolocations when handling data within security frameworks such as SIEMs supports the
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compliance for the entire organisational system, enforcing it in a collateral effect of organisa-
tion protection.
The use of geographic data for contextualisation for better decision making within SIEMs
is an important utility for security analysts. The provision of situational awareness plays a
significant role in detection of suspicious user activity.
Finally, rule detection based on geolocation can provide insight into anomalous behaviour
through the monitoring of geographic footprints.
9.2.2 How does geolocation data fare with privacy concerns?
Geolocation data is considered as personally identifiable information. It has been proven[14]
that a user can be identified simply through an analysis of their geographic patterns. There-
fore, this data needs to be ensured with privacy-enforcing techniques wherever the data is
held or used.
Various cloaking techniques were discussed that can be applied to geolocation data in ef-
forts to mainitaining privacy. The method of generalisation was the chosen anonymisation
approach demonstrated in this research.
9.2.3 Can geolocation data augment SIEM event analysis tools that already
exist?
The geolocation security techniques identified earlier, can be applied in the data-to-information
layer of SIEMs. Correlation within the SIEM provides a base for creating rules such as those
encompassing geolocation. The inclusion of the geolocation within these analyis engines was
demonstrated to be possible. Additionally, it was demonstrated using the MASSIF SIEM
tool, the GET, the performs normalisation and translation, was able to perform anonymisa-
tion procedures on the geolocation before entry into the centralised SIEM center.
9.3 Results Achieved
Returning to the hypothesis stated for this study; collated with the research efforts made in
investigations and proof implementation, the achievements are reviewed;
• Location-based information enhances SIEM capability to perform advanced security de-
tection.
Location-based security techniques were brought forward from research investigations
into existing applications of such methods in industry. The techniques were applied
to current SIEM challenges towards solving them. A misuse case within an enterprise
was successfully evaluated through the use of geolocation analysis filtering. The result
highlighted the solution of increasing priority levels to events from high risk countries
for faster response and remediation to alarms with low false negative probabilities.
• Privacy-enforcing procedures on geolocation in SIEMs and meta-systems alike are nec-
essary and enforceable.
The process of anonymisation was performed on geolocation data before sending the
events to the OSSIM SIEM solution. The anonymisation allowed the geolocation data
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to be used for security evaluation procedures while ensuring user privacy is not com-
promised simply for expediency.
In considerations where organisations inform users of geolocation tracking and retrieve their
consent for use, multiple geolocation security enhancement methods have been discussed in
the context of the four main driving areas of security. Augmentation of security in these areas
using geographic data highlight significant security detection abilities in the case of unautho-
rised users and the provision of situational awareness to security management frameworks.
The enforcement of privacy-preserving approaches in SIEMs where users have concerns on
personal geolocation privacy enforcement (for example on servers outside certain jurisdic-
tions), is facilitated through the provision of anonymisation levels, while ensuring it can still
be applied in security analytics even at the strictest level(Level 0) of anonymisation.
The study supports both dimensions of the research hypothesis through background investi-
gations and fully integrated implementation analysed in the context of an existing SIEM, and
in light of this is considered to be confirmed.
9.4 Future Work: Directions of the SIEM
Compliance requirements and growing concerns over more targeted and sophisticated attacks
have boosted interest in security information and event management systems. Companies
need to have greater ability to monitor their systems and generate compliance reports to
meet regulatory requirements. SIEM systems are a good solution for this, but are typically
expensive to deploy as well as complex to operate and manage[32].
However, organisations are looking to SIEMs in the cloud as a method of overcoming these
challenges of cost and complexity.
Turning security and information management into a security cloud service will enable smaller
companies lacking the high technical skills required to deploy a SIEM internally to reap these
benefits. Its typical for a company to move from manual to management and finally to SIEM.
There are many applications of SIEMs to cloud technology, such as running SIEMS on clouds,
SIEMs as cloud monitors for operators and users, cloud security services and cyber-physical
systems. There are alot of advantages that come from this, if we look at SIEM as a managed
security service in the cloud - it gains the additional cloud advantages of transportation cost
cuts, unlimited storage and high computational resources. SIEM as a cloud management
infrastructure component can provide analysis and reporting on services. And finally, SIEMs
can be used as the core of a trust-enabler for cloud computing services.
For future work, it is suggested to use geolocation in aiding the transition of SIEM technology
as a cloud-based service to harness the advantages of the cloud technology. There are many
areas of concern with regards to cloud technology in terms of trust, data rights and usage.
Cloud providers have to do more to assuage the security concerns of potential customers,
turning over internal security data to a cloud provider requires trust, and nearly half of all
users of cloud services desire more clarity on providers security precautions, according to
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Gartner[32]. The major roadblock to full adoption of cloud computing has been this concern
regarding the security and privacy of information.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) collaborated with representative
from RSA and Intel Corporation to develop a method for trusted geolocation for cloud work-
loads. The proposition utilises the physical hardware as the root of trust that is monitored
to ensure workloads are not placed in prohibited places, such as those falling out of a certain
jursidiction. The solution takes a three-stage approach summarised below[54]:
• Stage 0: Trustworthy Platform Attestation. This prerequisite stage is making sure
the platform a workload is placed on is trustworthy. By securing the cloud server and
continous security configuration verification of the cloud server’s BIOS and hypervisor
while it’s runnning.
• Stage 1: Secure Migration. After stage 0, the permission of workload migrations between
homogeneous trusted servers – trusted servers in the same cloud with the same hardware
and virtualization architectures.
• Stage 2: Geolocation-Based Secure Migration. This stage brings in the consideration of
geolocation to Stage 1 and 0. Geolocation needs to be confirmed before placing a work-
load onto a server and continually throughout the run of the workload. This is done to
ensure workloads are placed on servers with right jursidictions and should a geolocation
policy change it can adjusted and triggered immediately from the geolocation checks on
the running workloads. If a conflict arises, it can be reported immediately and owners
of the workload can either cease the running of the workload or transfer it to another
server.
The implementation of this proposition in the context of a cloud-based SIEM environment
can be seen as the suggested future work, having incorporated geographic data within SIEMs
and implemented the use with applied anonymisation techniques. The NIST technique can
augment the SIEM security-as-a-service approach towards safer cloud security foundations.
Ensuring trustworthiness of platforms and restricting workloads within geographic constraints
to observe regulatory compliance is a salient consideration of future security.
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Event Rules script for OSSIM, so that it can recognise log events through event IDs and
prioritise accordingly.
1 −− Herah Test TSOM logs
2 −− Plugin id: 9010
3
4 DELETE FROM plugin WHERE id = ”9010”;
5 DELETE FROM plugin sid where plugin id = ”9010”;
6
7 INSERT INTO plugin (id, type, name, description) VALUES (9010, 1, ’herah−tsom’, ’Herahs TSOM log
testing’);
8 INSERT INTO plugin sid (plugin id, si
9 d, category id, class id, name, priority, reliability) VALUES (9010, 528, NULL, NULL, ’Successful logon’, 1,
3);
10 INSERT INTO plugin sid (plugin id, sid, category id, class id, name, priority, reliability) VALUES (9010,
4624, NULL, NULL, ’Successful logon’, 1, 3);
11 INSERT INTO plugin sid (plugin id, sid, category id, class id, name, priority, reliability) VALUES (9010,
540, NULL, NULL, ’Successful Network logon’, 1, 3);
12 INSERT INTO plugin sid (plugin id, sid, category id, class id, name, priority, reliability) VALUES (9010,
529, NULL, NULL, ’Logon Failure: Unknown username or bad password’, 1, 3);
13 INSERT INTO plugin sid (plugin id, sid, category id, class id, name, priority, reliability) VALUES (9010,
4625, NULL, NULL, ’Logon Failure’, 1, 3);
14 INSERT INTO plugin sid (plugin id, sid, category id, class id, name, priority, reliability) VALUES (9010,
4672, NULL, NULL, ’Special Privileges assigned to new logon’, 1, 3);
15 INSERT INTO plugin sid (plugin id, sid, category id, class id, name, priority, reliability) VALUES (9010,
4634, NULL, NULL, ’User logoff’, 1, 3);
16 INSERT INTO plugin sid (plugin id, sid, category id, class id, name, priority, reliability) VALUES (9010,
530, NULL, NULL, ’Logon Failure: Account logon time restriction violation’, 1, 3);
17 INSERT INTO plugin sid (plugin id, sid, category id, class id, name, priority, reliability) VALUES (9010,
531, NULL, NULL, ’Logon Failure: Account currently disabled’, 1, 3);
18 INSERT INTO plugin sid (plugin id, sid, category id, class id, name, priority, reliability) VALUES (9010,
532, NULL, NULL, ’Logon Failure: The specified user account has expired’, 1, 3);
19 INSERT INTO plugin sid (plugin id, sid, category id, class id, name, priority, reliability) VALUES (9010,
533, NULL, NULL, ’Logon Failure: User not allowd to logon at this computer’, 1, 3);
20 INSERT INTO plugin sid (plugin id, sid, category id, class id, name, priority, reliability) VALUES (9010,
534, NULL, NULL, ’Logon Failure: The user has not been granted the requested logon’, 1, 3);
21 INSERT INTO plugin sid (plugin id, sid, category id, class id, name, priority, reliability) VALUES (9010,
537, NULL, NULL, ’Logon Failure: An unexpected error occurred during logon’, 1, 3);
22 INSERT INTO plugin sid (plugin id, sid, category id, class id, name, priority, reliability) VALUES (9010,
539, NULL, NULL, ’Logon Failure: Account locked out’, 1, 3);
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23 INSERT INTO plugin sid (plugin id, sid, category id, class id, name, priority, reliability) VALUES (9010,
576, NULL, NULL, ’Special privileges assigned to new logon’, 1, 3);
24 INSERT INTO plugin sid (plugin id, sid, category id, class id, name, priority, reliability) VALUES (9010,
538, NULL, NULL, ’User logoff’, 1, 3);
25 INSERT INTO plugin sid (plugin id, sid, category id, class id, name, priority, reliability) VALUES (9010,
551, NULL, NULL, ’User initiated logoff’, 1, 3);
A.1
Custom OSSIM Plugin defined to read in events in this case, the plugin was created to test
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A.2
Script for timedate adjustment for log data to simulate real-time, enabling detection in OS-
SIM based on the three day limitation.
1 #!/usr/bin/env python















17 #pattern = ’<<([ˆ>]∗)>>’
18 pattern = dict(tsom=’ˆTBS;[ˆ;]∗;[ˆ;]∗;([0−9]+);∗$’,mcafee=’(herah)’,apache=’will be some regular
expression’)
19 mcaffee pattern = ’’
20 win tsom pattern = ’’
21 uct apache pattern = ’’
22 datematchto = ’nodate’
23 datachangeto = ’nodate’
24 old date = ’’
25 timestamp = False
26 geo line = ””
27
28 def user replace(match):
29 print(’in the replace function’)
30 if (isinstance(match, str)):
31 matchfrom = match
32 else:








41 if(matchfrom != datematchto):
42 datematchto = matchfrom
43
44 if(timestamp == True):
45 datechangeto = input(’Change the current field from %s to? ’ % time.strftime(’%Y−%m−%d %H:%M
:%S’, time.localtime(int(matchfrom))))
46 return datetime.datetime.strptime(datechangeto, ’%Y−%m−%d %H:%M:%S’).strftime(’%s’)
47 else:
48 datechangeto = input(’Change the current field from %s to?’ % matchfrom)
49 return datechangeto
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50 else:
51 if(timestamp == True):








60 print(’Event Generator for events from the following sources − CSV−ed McAffee, CSV−ed TSOM
Windows and Apache Logs:’)
61 print(’ The following arguments are required − <inputfile> <outputfile> <log source (mcaffee/tsom/
apache)>’)
62 parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=”∗∗∗∗∗ \n \
63 This script regenerates the events as if they were real time so they can work with Alienvaults real time
analysis”,
64 epilog=”Many thanks, \n created by Herah A Khan. ∗∗∗∗∗”)
65 parser.add argument(’infile’, type=argparse.FileType(’r’))
66 parser.add argument(’outfile’, type=argparse.FileType(’w’))
67 parser.add argument(’logsource’ , type=str)
68 args = parser.parse args()
69 print(’Working through ’ + args.logsource + ’ logs...’)
70 gi = pygeoip.GeoIP(’c:/Users/Herah/Documents/Mine/GeoIP/GeoLiteCity.dat’)
71
72
73 matcher = re.compile(pattern[args.logsource])
74
75 count = 0;
76 for line in args.infile:
77 if (args.logsource == ’tsom’):
78 timestamp = True
79 old date array = re.split(’;’, line)
80 arraylen = len(old date array)
81 if(arraylen > 3):
82 print(old date array)
83 if (len(old date array[15]) > 1) :
84 geosrcinfo = gi.record by addr(old date array[15])
85 print(geosrcinfo[’latitude’])
86 old date array[19] = str(geosrcinfo[’latitude’])
87 old date array[20] = str(geosrcinfo[’longitude’])
88
89 if (len(old date array[22]) > 1):
90 geodstinfo = gi.record by addr(old date array[22])
91 print(geodstinfo[’latitude’])
92 old date array[26] = str(geodstinfo[’latitude’])
93 old date array[27] = str(geodstinfo[’longitude’])
94 print(old date array[3])
95 old date array[arraylen −1] = ”;\n”
96 geoline = ””
97 geoline = ”;”.join(old date array)
98 #new line = re.sub( old date array[3], user replace(old date array[3]), geoline)
99 #print(’The new tsom line is’ + new line)
100 args.outfile.write(geoline)
101 if (args.logsource == ’apache’):
102 new line = matcher.sub(user replace, line)
103 print(’The new line is’ + new line)
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104 args.outfile.write(new line)
105 if (args.logsource == ’mcafee’):
106 old date array = re.split(’;’, line)
107 if(len(old date array) > 5):
108 print(old date array)
109 print(old date array[4])
110 print(old date array[27])
111 response = urllib.request.urlopen(’http://api.hostip.info/get html.php?ip=’ + old date array[27]
+ ’&position=true’).read()
112 data = str(response.decode(’utf−8’))
113 print(data)
114 m = re.match(’ˆ.∗Latitude:(.∗)Longitude:(.∗)\nIP.∗$’, data)
115 print(m)
116 old date array[32] = lon + ’,’ + lat
117 geoline = ””
118 geoline = ”;”.join(old date array)
119 new line = re.sub( old date array[4], user replace(old date array[4]), geoline)









129 if name == ’ main ’:
130 main()
A.3
Script to calculate the Haversine distance for data points retrieved from all countries. Calcu-
lations for each data point are collected and stored in a CSV file for download.
1 geocoder = new google.maps.Geocoder();
2
3 function measure(lat1, lon1, lat2, lon2){ // generally used geo measurement function
4 var R = 6378.137; // Radius of earth in KM
5 var dLat = (lat2 − lat1) ∗ Math.PI / 180;
6 var dLon = (lon2 − lon1) ∗ Math.PI / 180;
7 var a = Math.sin(dLat/2) ∗ Math.sin(dLat/2) +
8 Math.cos(lat1 ∗ Math.PI / 180) ∗ Math.cos(lat2 ∗ Math.PI / 180) ∗
9 Math.sin(dLon/2) ∗ Math.sin(dLon/2);
10 var c = 2 ∗ Math.atan2(Math.sqrt(a), Math.sqrt(1−a));
11 var d = R ∗ c;




16 //download results in CSV format file for parsing and graphing
17 function getCSV(distarray)
18 {
19 var csvRows = [];
20
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25 var csvString = csvRows.join(”%0A”);
26 var a = document.createElement(’a’);
27 a.href = ’data:attachment/csv,’ + csvString;
28 a.target = ’ blank’;






35 //accuracy for a location in each country
36 function getCountry(country, map, distarray) {
37 geocoder.geocode( { ’address’: country }, function(results, status) {
38 if (status == google.maps.GeocoderStatus.OK) {
39 var ln;
40 var lt;
41 var ltg = results[0].geometry.location.lat();
42 var lng = results[0].geometry.location.lng();
43 // map.setCenter(results[0].geometry.location);




48 // alert(”Geocode was successful for the following reason: ” + results[0].geometry.location.lat() );
49 //accuracy of 1
50 ln = Math.floor(lng);
51 lt = Math.floor(ltg);
52 var lnb = ln + 0.999999;
53 var ltb = lt + 0.999999;
54 var accuracy = measure(lt,ln,ltb,lnb);
55 // alert(’Accuracy of ... ’ + accuracy + ’check:’ + lnb);
56 //accuracy to .1
57 ln = Math.floor(10 ∗ lng) / 10;
58 lt = Math.floor(10 ∗ ltg) / 10;
59 var lnb = ln + 0.099999;
60 var ltb = lt + 0.099999;
61 var accuracy1 = measure(lt,ln,ltb,lnb);
62 //accuracy to .2
63 ln = Math.floor(100 ∗ lng) / 100;
64 lt = Math.floor(100 ∗ ltg) / 100;
65 var lnb = ln + 0.009999;
66 var ltb = lt + 0.009999;
67 var accuracy2 = measure(lt,ln,ltb,lnb);
68 //accuracy to .3
69 ln = Math.floor(1000 ∗ lng) / 1000;
70 lt = Math.floor(1000 ∗ ltg) / 1000;
71 var lnb = ln + 0.000999;
72 var ltb = lt + 0.000999;
73 var accuracy3 = measure(lt,ln,ltb,lnb);
74 //accuracy to .4
75 ln = Math.floor(10000 ∗ lng) / 10000;
76 lt = Math.floor(10000 ∗ ltg) / 10000;
77 var lnb = ln + 0.000099;
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78 var ltb = lt + 0.000099;
79 var accuracy4 = measure(lt,ln,ltb,lnb);
80 distarray.push([country, accuracy, accuracy1, accuracy2, accuracy3, accuracy4]);
81 //wait = true;
82 // setTimeout(’wait=true’,2000);
83 // alert(country + ’ acc: ’ + accuracy +’ acc1: ’ + accuracy1+ ’acc2: ’ + accuracy2+ ’ acc3: ’ +
accuracy3 + ’acc4: ’ + accuracy4);
84 } else {
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Installing GET consists in extracting all the files inside the archive to a directory. The
Sender Agent module needs to be flagged to use the REB with the appropriate flags. The
GET does not require any further configuration besides the storage of the parser JAR files,
Macafee v1.jar and Winser v1.jar to be used by its GAP module, in the relevant folder of the
GET placed in the relevant virtual machine.
B.0.2 REB Component
1. Since REB runs over UDP/IP, it is necessary to allow UDP traffic between the hosts
where the GET and CEP are running.
2. In order to allow Java applications (GET) to use the REB, it is necessary to include the
directory where the REB.jar file is located in the environment variable CLASSPATH.
3. Finally, it is required to establish the following kernel parameters:
1 − Sets the maximum socket receive buffer size
2 net.core.rmem\ max=2904000
3 − Sets the maximum socket send buffer size
4 net.core.wmem\ max=2904000
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Since certain operating systems impose a small limit on the maximum socket read/write buffer
sizes, REB might not be able to set the ideal buffer size for the local UDP sockets during
initialisation. As of the latest version, REB uses an ideal socket buffer size of 29,040,00 bytes
(2.9 MB). Failure to set the buffer size to this value may result in increased packet dropping
at receiver nodes. It is thus necessary to configure the maximum limit imposed by the local
OS to a value of at least the ideal size[22].
Installing REB consists in extracting all the files inside the archive to a directory. The files
include: a Jar file REB.jar which contains the REB API classes necessary for interaction with
other Java programs (such as GET); a default configuration file nodes.cfg to be completed
with information about the REB nodes; script files for generating shared cryptographic keys
(genkeys) and validating the configuration (checkreb). The script files should be given per-
mission to execute[22]. Optionally, the environment variable REB HOME may be set to the
directory containing the Jar file.
In order to verify the REB installation, the script checkreb can be used with each of the REB
node ids using the command at terminal ’./checkreb x’ where x is the node id[22].
In the simulation, the REB is used for transmitting events through a resilient channel. It does
not modify the events or contribute further information for this scenario but rather facilitates
the reliability and integrity of events as it is necessary especially in situations of high load
data. The REB is installed and resides in the same machine as the GET, the massif-get
machine. It is used in conjunction with the Sender Agent component of the GET as it is part
of the transmission phase of events. The Sender Agent module needs to be flagged to use the
REB with the appropriate flags, as show in the GET section of the MESI scenario.
B.0.3 RES Component
Installing the RES consists in extracting all the files inside the archive to a directory and does
not require any further configurations besides running the jar through script specifying the
relevant port and address.
